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THESIS ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Dieudonne Mayi for the Master of Arts in Political Science 
presented January 30, 1995. 
Title: Sustainable Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Strategies for Self-help in Food 
Production, Case Study of Kenya 
This thesis analyses the food crisis in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s and 1990s, 
identifies roots of the problem, and proposes strategies of sustainable development based 
on self-sufficiency in food production for domestic needs. The main goal of this research 
has been to devise development strategies centered on development of the food production 
sector. The thesis strongly suggests that countries of the region should consider 
developing the food production sector to experience any meaningful development, and to 
escape a dark future of food shortages and food dependency on developed economies. 
Investigation into Development Economics, Dependency, Underdevelopment, and 
Modernization theories has provided a basis to justify that improvement of the food 
production sector is an urgent necessity for sub-Saharan African countries. 
The thesis uses a comparative analytical methodology based on a historical study of 
Kenya from the colonial period to the 1990s. The food crisis is identified as a common 
problem for many countries in sub-Saharan Africa and its general causes are investigated: 
( 1) low output productivity of traditional methods and technology, (2) harsh ecological 
environment with frequent droughts and soil erosion, (3) neglect of food production in the 
policies and priorities of governments, ( 4) poor marketing and distribution of foodstuffs, 
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(5) fast population growth. Kenya is then used as a model to confirm the hypothesis that 
roots of the crisis are strongly linked to the colonial setting of these economies as cash crop 
and raw material producers. Also, neglect of the food production sector in government 
policy is matched in the Kenyan case. 
Kenya's food crisis can be explained by two sets of factors. On the input side of the 
food production sector, reasons found were ( 1) government emphasis on cash crops to the 
neglect of food production, and (2) underdeveloped technology and agricultural methods 
used in food production. On the output side, food shortages are due to ( 1) an inefficient 
marketing and distribution system, (2) inefficient pricing policies, and (3) fast population 
growth. 
A model of five solutions is presented which puts emphasis, on the input side, on (1) a 
shift of policies from cash crop production to accommodate food crop production as a 
viable economic development policy, (2) curbing food imports, and (3) boosting domestic 
food production by empowering women, attracting men to the food production activity, 
reorganizing production, and improving agricultural technology and methods. On the 
output side the solutions call for ( 4) reorganizing and improving the distribution, and 
marketing, and pricing of foodstuffs, and (5) developing rural economies around the food 
production sector and the agribusiness industry. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis focuses on food production as a development strategy that should be 
emphasized by governments in sub-Saharan Africa to provide populations with self-help 
for their food needs. The major recommendation I am making is to shift emphasis from 
sole cash crop production to boost domestic food production. 
In the 1980s and 1990s the food crisis in Africa is exacerbating. Its manifestations are 
( 1) Africa's severe nutritional problems compared to other regions of the world (Berg and 
Whitaker 1986; Hanley 1992B; World Resources 90-91), (2) wide hunger belt and 
growing malnutrition in Africa (FAQ Sept. 1992; World Resources 1990-91; Hanley 
1992A; Hanley 1992B; Rotberg 1983; Christensen et al. 1981; UN Statistical Yearbook 
1988), and (3) increased food imports by many countries to cover the food gap (UN 
Statistical Yearbook 1985/1986; Shapouri et al. 1986; Raikes 1991; World Resources 
1990-91 ). Considering the growing magnitude of the food crisis and its expansion to the 
whole region of sub-Saharan Africa, it seems urgent that policymakers in those countries 
re-orient development policy to incorporate food production as a priority in the 1990s. If 
such effort is not done, there is a great risk of severe food shortages and food dependency 
in the region for the 1990s. The economic decline in the region doesn't seem to indicate 
that the economies will be able to afford even the cheap foodstuffs from Most Developed 
Countries (MDCs). 
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IMPORTANCE OF FOOD PRODUCTION IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Food production has been advocated by many scholars of Development Economics and 
Dependency School as an important and critical step in economic development of a country. 
Ros tow' s ( 1990) linear stage theory of economic development suggests development of the 
food production sector as a prerequisite for industrial take-off. The agriculture sector must 
be sufficiently developed to provide support for the growing industrial sector. Particularly, 
the price of food must be made cheap to support industrial workers. In addition, with the 
development of the food production sector and its mechanization, surplus labour from 
agriculture sector will flow in the manufacturing sector. 
In a comparative study of agriculture of many developing countries since 1935, Colin 
Clark (Rostow 1990) attacks the wide view in MDCs that agriculture is no longer a key 
priority in economic development because of its small share of GDP and work force. As 
Ros tow, he supports that improvements in agriculture productivity are necessary conditions 
for industrial development. 
Another pioneer of Development Economics theory, Arthur Lewis (Ros tow 1990), 
known for his two major concepts in economic development (the "anatomy of growth with 
unlimited supply of labor," and "the fundamental role of increased agricultural productivity 
in the process of industrialization") recognizes the critical position of agriculture in the 
process of industrialization. 
Carl Eicher and Lawrence Witt (1964) have recognized an important role for 
development of the food production base in economic development. They recognize that 
successive steps of the Rostow model are no longer rigidly applicable to economic 
development. That is, economic development need not be launched by either agriculture or 
industrial sector alone. Rather, each economy contains both components. However, they 
suggest a wide agreement by many economic historians that no country in experience has 
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fully developed without a rise in agriculture productivity preceding or accompanying 
industrial development. 
As Carl Eicher and Lawrence Witt, W. H. Nicholls (Eicher and Witt 1964) has 
recognized the dominant place of agriculture in the economic development of developing 
countries. He has suggested that development requires the migration of vast number of 
people from the rural agricultural sector to manufacturing and service sectors in the cities. 
In the investigation of the relationship between agriculture development and industrial 
development, Nicholls found that agriculture progress is fundamentally a prerequisite for 
industrial development as is the case in a closed economy. He agrees with the linear 
models that the prerequisite of industrial development is the achievement of the rate of 
increase in agricultural productivity that exceeds the concurrent rate in the rate of demand 
for food. Therefore, the rising agricultural productivity supports and sustains industrial 
development in two important ways. First, labour force is released from agriculture to 
industry while meeting the food needs. Second, as a rise in agriculture productivity raises 
agricultural incomes, it increases the rural purchasing power needed to purchase industrial 
goods and rural savings that may then be mobilized to finance industrial development. 
Therefore, it enables agriculture to produce foods at prices that are profitable for industry 
workers to buy and save to buy industrial products. 
Johnston O'Brien (Gladwin 1991) finds that higher food production is critical to 
achieving structural transformation of the economy from agriculture to manufacturing. 
The neo-Marxists and Dependency School theorists such as Samir Amin (1976; 1990) 
suggested that development must satisfy the basic needs of the people. Amin particularly 
advocates an inward-oriented development that satisfies the needs of the people in African 
countries. Going against linear stage models, he considers development as a circular 
process centered on basic needs. Therefore, it can start and expand from any basic need to 
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reach the other sectors. Food production falls in this category as a basic needs policy that 
must be given priority for inward-oriented development. 
FOOD PRODUCTION AND THE REALM OF POLffiCS 
The issue of food production can be linked to the politics of a country in different ways: 
world political economy, national economic development (historical and current policies), 
welfare policies, allocation policies, governance and political institutions that provide a 
framework for these policies. Each of these aspects is considered in this thesis. 
First, the world political economy provides a framework on which political and 
economic forces affect food production in sub-Saharan African countries. Here, a 
Dependency approach (Amin 1973; Davidson 1989) explains that the structural setting of 
sub-Saharan economies as cash crop producers (outward-oriented) does not favor food 
production to benefit local needs. 
The Core as dominant force in the world political economy, the North seriously 
influences economies politics in the South (Frank 1979; Amin 1985). For example, 
Gladwin ( 1991) accuses Structural Adjustment Programs of forcing governments to 
withdraw subsidies to rural farmers, particularly women. Also, the agricultural trade 
policies of the EEC (Common Agriculture Policy -- CAP, and Lome Convention 
agreements) and the USA flood Third World markets with foodstuffs which affect the way 
policy makers in those countries look at the need for domestic self-sufficiency in food 
(Raikes 1991). Farmers of the North are satisfied while those of the South and self-
sufficiency are sacrificed. 
The combination of external interests (MNCs) and those of the local bourgeoisie (elite) 
often determines the tone of government economic policy (W ambalaba 1985) in African 
countries. External economic forces have often combined with internal bourgeoisie (Ake 
5 
1978) to thwart politics and economic policy to outward needs rather than those basic needs 
of people inside countries (Amin 1985). Therefore, aid and development assistance have 
failed to emphasize food production enhancement in those countries. Rather they have 
emphasized cash crop production to serve the consumers of the North. 
Political forces in the North have often influenced governments of the South (in need to 
support unpopular regimes) to divert large sums of money to buy weapons, which ends 
supporting the weapon industries and workers of the North. Also national revenues and 
loan money have been often misused in building palaces and garnishing foreign bank 
accounts of government leaders, rather than investing in food production as a basic needs. 
Food production enters in the realm of economic development which itself is linked to 
political economy and area of comparative politics. In the domestic political economy, the 
middle class in the cities force governments to provide cheap foods and imported tastes. 
Therefore, food imports are and easy solution for political elites to avert middle class revolt 
in the cities. Furthermore, the centralized nature of many economies in sub-Saharan Africa 
make them very vulnerable to negative influences of politics. 
Second, colonization set up a serious precedent in the economic development of many 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The colonial agricultural system of most sub-Saharan 
African countries, such as Nigeria, Kenya, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Kenya concentrated on 
producing cash crops for the consumption of metropolises (Amin 1973; Berman 1990; 
Davidson 1989). The case of Kenya reveals that food production was consistently 
neglected by government policy during the colonial period in the favor of cash crop 
production for exports. Many governments after independence inherited this structural 
setting and have not succeed in making a structural transformation of the economies 
(Raikes 1991; Shapouri et al. 1981; Maletnlema 1991 ). 
Third, welfare policies of the government come to play to determine what are the most 
important needs of populations. In a parochial system with less developed participatory 
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institutions, elite policy often fails to determine what needs are vital to the populations. For 
example, in Kenya, welfare policies have often focused on providing infrastructure for 
education and health and have neglected the domestic food production base or left it to 
subsistence production. 
Fourth, allocation policies place the government as a regulator of economic activity. In 
the case of food production and agriculture in general, examples of the USA and EEC 
suggest that the government provides loans, grants, and subsidies to food farmers to 
protect the food production sector. One would have expected similar allocation of 
resources to rural food farmers in sub-Saharan countries. However, the case of Kenya 
suggests that the government allocates these resources almost exclusively to cash crop 
farmers and men particularly. Small scale food crop farmers and the majority women are 
denied these resources (Gladwin 1991). Another flaw in allocation is the waste of capital 
resources often invested in capital intensive projects, infrastructure, beautiful palaces, 
private pockets of leaders, and military expenditures. 1 These scarce resources could be 
better allocated to boost private food production. 
Finally, governance and political institutions are another area of politics that retards 
economic development in the Third World (Rostow 1990) and the food production sector 
in sub-Saharan Africa in particular. 2 With an undemocratic style of governance in the 
hands of the elite and the absence of political institutions to aggregate the needs and 
volitions of food farmers, there is no institutional framework for the latter to express their 
1 See TABLE XXX in APPENDIX A; Kenya, Military Expenses as a Percentage of GNP, This table 
shows that military spending took an average 9.1 percent of total government expenditures. 
2aunner Myrdal (Rostow 1990) accused the lack of mature political institutions and the overwhelming 
government control of economic activity of retarding economic development in Third World countries of 
Africa. Latin America and Asia. Particularly the parochial, undemocratic, and less developed political 
institutions did not allow full participation, expression, and aggregation of the interests of the citizens. 
Mature political institutions and institutions of governance are crucial to open opportunities not only 
for participation, but also for access to economic resources. In many African countries, political elites have 
often dominated every aspect of the national agenda and have hindered political participation and access to 
economic resources. 
7 
needs for support in the food production sector. For example, Women have almost no 
voice to claim credits, ownership of the land, and other resources that they need for food 
production. 
With more participatory institutions that allow people to express their needs, there is 
good chance that food production farmers would express a need for government policy 
allocation of resources to this sector. Conversely, most policy decisions are done at the 
discretion of elites including the allocation of development resources, casting out farmer 
from the process (Raikes 1991; Amara and Founou-Tchuigoua 1990). The reasons 
discussed above will be used in CHAPTER II and CHAPTER III to explain how politics 
have limited the allocation of resources to food production at scale in Kenya, and have 
hindered consideration of this sector in comprehensive development policies of the country. 
FOOD PRODUCTION AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS 
The issue of food production can be placed in the realm of Comparative Politics as a 
discipline under the Basic Needs Approach (BNA) to development which emerged in the 
mid-1970s (Lisk, 1985). 3 Food production should be sustained in quantity and quality 
produced so that food availability and quality are met as primary needs to sustain human 
life. 
Comparative Politics as suggested by R.A. Chilcote (1990) deals with comparative 
investigation of all governmental and non-governmental forms of political activity. 
Immediately after W.W.II the attention of theorists of Comparative Politics was turned on 
issues of economic and political development of former European colonies in Latin 
America, Africa and Asia (So 1990). 
3 Franklyn Lisk suggests that planning for basic needs requires popular participation in the decision 
making process, both politically and economically. The basic needs approach (BNA) to development 
emerged in the mid- l 970s. It places popular participation as an important prerequisite to attain sustained 
economic growth and social progress. As such it should be placed as a development goal . 
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Modernization theory emerged in the late 1950s and early 1960s as the predominant 
view for development predicated by developed nations to the emerging nations. 
Modernization is a multidisciplinary approach to examine Thir_d World development based 
on Western models. 4 This School of thought encourages Third World nations to follow 
the example of Western nations in their political and economic development. That is, to 
adopt pluralistic and democratic political institutions as well as institutions of governance, 
to engage in free market economy, and to follow the linear stage models of economic 
development. The most known models are the European evolutionary model, Rostow's 
phased economic modernization process, and democratization through liberal pluralism. 
Other schools of thought to approach development in the Third World emerged starting 
from the early 1960s: the Dependency School in the 1960s as a critique of both the 
modernization model for LDCs and Orthodox Marxism in Latin America 5, the 
underdevelopment theory, and the concept of neo-colonialism. 
4 (So 1990). Modernization theory encompasses political, economic, and socio-cultural aspects. 
Therefore, it draws from many disciplines including economics, political theory, sociology, psychology and 
others. 
5The Dependency School was also a critique of the orthodox Marxism in Latin America. Marxist 
influence reached Latin America only tardily and remotely in the 1870s, introduced with a stream of 
European immigrant refugees from the French Commune, the Italian Risorginento, and the republican 
struggles in Spain (Aguilar 1978). They brought new social consciousness not only with an impetus 
towards rebellion and self-organization, but also a strong tendency towards anarchism as a doctrine. 
Orthodox Marxism was characterized by ( 1) anarchism by rebellion that did not provide any economic 
independence nor development, (2) justification of struggle on Cold War lines rather than on class struggle 
as classical Marxism supports, (3) tendency towards an anarchical peasant-proletariat government without 
any leadership. Orthodox Marxism was widespread between 1928 and 1935. It was accompanied by 
increased revolutionary radicalism of Communist parties against capitalism and Trotkyst Socialism 
throughout Latin America (Cuba, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico). 
Orthodox :rv1arxism was criticized in the 1960s for its lack of productivity and ineffectiveness to achieve 
a socialist revolution. Carlos Salazar Montejo (Aguilar 1978) critiques Orthodox Marxism for drifting 
away from organized struggle of the proletariat against the exploitative bourgeoisie (classical Marxism) to 
focus solely on Cold War motives under control of the Soviet Union. Revolutionary anarchism in Latin 
America, for example in Cuba with the Castro regime, has claimed to fight US imperialism. Yet it has 
fallen under Soviet imperialism and increased rebellion in the cities with no prospect of any successful 
socialist revolution. The Cuban economy has not improved, but declined dramatically instead. Therefore, 
Orthodox Marxism has placed Latin American countries on servitude under Stalinism and created dependency 
on the Soviet Union rather that independence that it intended to obtain. Montejo also accused the 
Communist parties in Latin America for having inherited corrupt hierarchies from Stalinist Moscow and 
have established a reputation for servility, impudence, and political irresponsibility. 
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The Dependency School (ECLA in the early 1960s; Bodenheimer in 1970; Dos Santos 
1973, Cardoso and Faletto 1965 (1971)) came to existence as a sharp critique of the 
modernization model after the failure of Western models to solve growing problems in 
many LDCs of Latin America and Africa: unemployment, inflation, currency devaluation, 
declining terms of trade and other economic problems. 
The Dependency School states that capitalism keeps the Third World in a structural 
dependency situation on the Core composed of industrialized countries (Cardoso and 
Faletto 1971). Therefore, the only way out is through autonomous peripheral capitalism 
with centralized state control and the acquisition of industrialization (ECLA, Raul Prebish 
in (Rostow 1990)). To go further, eliminate the disparity of incomes in the periphery 
caused by industrialization. Cardoso and Faletto propose implement of socialism is the 
best way to achieve these objectives. Thus the Dependency School calls for development 
based on industrialization with Import Substitution Industries (ISi) and the "delinking" 
from Western world as advocated by Prebish moreover reformulated by Samir Amin (Amin 
1985). 
Amin recognizes the expansion of world capitalism. However, he acknowledges that 
the world capitalist system based on liberal utopia has failed to produce growth and benefits 
for all. Rather it has favored the accumulation of wealth and power in the North and 
caused progressive marginalization of the South, particularly Africa. Amin suggests that 
the only way for Third World countries to escape the structural constraints imposed on 
them by the world capitalist economic system is to "delink" if they ever hope to raise living 
standards of their populations. He does not call, however, for complete self-sufficiency or 
economic autarky as the ECLA has supported. Rather he suggests that each country submit 
its external economic relations to domestic development priorities, i.e., to limit the effects 
of external economic forces on internal choices. He contends the basing of development 
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only on competitiveness as suggested by the liberal doctrine. Rather it implies a sustained 
and constant improvement of productivity in all possible fields from a given starting point 
and action to ensure the participation of all and the equal distribution of the returns. Amin 
calls for "reciprocal adjustment" rather than unilateral adjustment of the weak to the strong, 
also rejection of bourgeois subordination that reproduces intolerable economic situation for 
the South. He concluded that achievement of such an aim requires broad popular coalition 
to control the state and protect it from external forces and their allied internal forces. 
In the late 1960s another concept, 'underdevelopment' was introduced by Gundar 
Frank ( 1967; 1969; 1979). This school of thought develops the idea of metropolis-satellite 
exploitation. On the world capitalist system, Frank suggests that modernization favors 
development of the metropolis and under-develops the satellites. The metropolis 
continually exploits the resources of the satellites in a way that destroys traditional customs, 
skills, trading systems, and communities. A consequence is a dependency of periphery 
countries on international market mechanisms in which they are not players. Samir Amin 
( 1976) developed the concept of underdevelopment further to apply it to the dualistic 
economies in LDCs: a developed economy at the urban centers that underdevelops and 
exploits the mral areas. He called this relationship "internal colonialism." Amin has 
particularly applied this concept to former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Amin continued his work to criticize outward-oriented development policies as a 
continuation of neocolonialism (Amin 1973) and as a dependency trap that thwarts any 
possibility of real development in those countries that meet the basic needs of the people. 
In Maldevelopment (Amin 1990) Amin criticizes the failure of development in the Third 
World. particularly Africa. He suggests that the major reason has been an outward-
development trend that does not target the needs of domestic economies. As in Delinking 
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(Amin 1985) he suggests breaking the dependency bond by embracing inward-oriented 
development strategies sustained by popular political movements to catalyze national efforts 
and to provide a better resistance to external bourgeois forces. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, however, continuing catastrophic decline of economies in the 
Third World (Africa particularly), growth of abject poverty, communal violence, the denial 
of basic needs to more than 20% of the world's population living in those areas (Korten 
1990; Cheru 1989), and the failure of development in the Third World (Amin 1990), seem 
to question the validity and applicability of Wes tern prescriptions particularly the Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAP) imposed by the IMF. These trends seem to call for a re-
orientation of these programs (Berg and Whitaker 1986). Therefore, new approaches by 
scholars in the Third World come about to emphasize sustainable and inward-looking 
development strategies for LDCs (Korten 1990; Chem 1989; Amin 1985). Sustainable 
development strategies are those which emphasize on satisfying the basic human needs of 
food, health. and education. This approach to development draws from the Basic Needs 
Approach (BNA). In other words this trend calls for economic development strategies that 
are people-oriented in a way that is sustainable to their cultural and physical environment. 
Food production falls in this category as a major basic need to prioritize. 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN CRISIS 
Sub-Saharan Africa, one notable example where development solutions seem not to 
hold, is plagued in the 1980s and 1990s with many difficult problems to solve (Chem 
1989: African Recovery 1992, vol. 6): growing debt burden and rampant poverty of the 
masses 6, denial of human rights (Ntanda 1993), communal violence 7, high population 
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growth (see Figure 6) s, growing hunger (see Figure 3) and malnutrition (see Figure 5) in 
the 1980s (Shapouri et al., 1986) with a prospect of severe food shortages in the 1990s 
(FAO Sept. 1992; World Resources 1990-91; Hanley 1992A; Hanley 1992B). 9 
Addressing the issue of debt, many impoverished sub-Saharan African countries are locked 
in the debt cycle. Although the debt is smaller compared to Latin America ($182.284 
billion versus $225.962 billion for South America in 1987) 10 at issue is that these 
countries do not have means to pay back the debt. This locks them into negative transfers 
and debt crisis (Berg and Whitaker 1986). Unemployment adds to the debt burden and 
6 SRI CIS 1991, R 8750-5, 1991 World Population Projections to 2025 by region and country. This 
report shows a GNP per capita in Africa of $610/year against $2,380 for Asia as a whole, and $1,980 for 
Latin America. 
World Debt Tables. the World Bank 1989-90 shows the sub-Saharan Africa region with an outstanding 
debt of$ 140 billion for total EDT and $40 billion from private sources in 1989. The report reveals a 
principal debt service of $8 billion/year on average with interests of $4 billion/year in average, and debt 
service ratio (INT/XGS)of 25% in average per year between 1979 and 1989. The EDT/GNP ratio of almost 
120 in 1989. 
7 For example, recent civil wars in Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, Mozambique, Angola, Burundi, and 
Rwanda. 
8 See U.S DCESA. (1991). This report shows an annual average population growth rate of 3.0 % in 
Africa compared to 2.1 in Latin America and 2.0 in Asia (excluding China). 
See also (Hanley 1992A). The population of sub-Sahara Africa is estimated at 495 million in 1990 
and to be 668 million by year 2000 and 1.2 billion by year 2025, which is a growth rate of about 3.4% per 
year. 
9 FAO (FAO Sept. 1992, 9) indicated a total of 9,795 thousand tons of cereal import requirement, 
4,962 anticipated commercial cereal imports, 4,833 total food aid requirements with 2,470 out of 
emergency. All these imports are needed to offset the deficit with the only 21,825 thousand tons produced 
domestically. 
The United Nations Statistical Index 1981 (World Summary) shows that Africa lags behind Latin 
America and Asia in total per capita food production since 1970s. Also the per capita food production of 
Africa has severely declined (101 in 1970 to 89 in 1980) as opposed to Latin America and Asia whose 
indexes have increased or remained constant. 
See also (World Resources 1990-91, 87). Table 6.2 shows that Africa had the highest share of 
malnourished population in the world from 1969 to 1985 (32% of population in 1969-70 and 32% in 1983-
85.) 
FAO predicts a 200-million tons food gap in sub-Sahara Africa by year 2020 (Hanley 1992A). 
World Bank report {Hanley l 992Bl on nutrition shows that Africa lags behind in the daily calorie 
supply per person in 1989: 2,122 for Africa versus 2,617 for East Asia/Pacific, 3,433 for Europe, and 
3,671 for the United States. 
10 See World Resources 90-91 SRI R9455. p.248 
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flawed economic policies to cause alarming poverty for the common human in the region. 
With the growing economic desperation of thousands, the crisis of governance in many 
countries, communal violence and denial of human rights are visible almost everywhere 
(Zaire, Chad, Cameroon, Liqeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Mozambique, 
Burundi, Rwanda, etc.) Total anarchy has arisen in some cases causing the death of 
thousands and displacement of millions in cases such as Somalia in 1993 and Rwanda in 
1994. The main aspect of interest in this research investigation is that food shortages and 
malnutrition are on the rise. Fred Sai (Berg and Whitaker 1986, p. 140) suggests that 
"sub-Saharan Africa is the only region in the Third World that suffered the most of 
nutritional problems and severe food shortages on a large scale in the 1980s." 
Furthermore, Hanley's (l 992A; 1992B) articles on hunger in Somalia and Ethiopia reveal 
a hunger belt covering most of sub-Saharan Africa. The same articles show that Africa is 
the continent with the highest rate of population growth, and the highest hunger and 
malnutrition population in 1993. Facing all these crises, attention comes to search for 
strategies to secure at least the vital basic needs to the populations of sub-Saharan Africa. 
A SURVEY OF THE KENYAN SITU A TI ON 
Kenya is a country in East Africa. The East Africa Region since the British colonial era 
is politically defined as a set of three countries: Tanzania the largest, Kenya the second 
largest. and Uganda the smallest (see Figure 1.b and Figure 2 in APPENDIX B). This 
region was colonized by Great Britain just before the turn of the 19th century (Duignan and 
Jackson 1986; Ochieng 1990; Berman 1990). Kenya covers a total area of 582,644 Km2, 
and had a population of 25.2 million in 1991. With an average annual growth rate of 3.2% 
in the early 1990s (one of the highest in the world), the actual population of the country is 
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expected to double by the year 2010 and its annual growth will reach 4%. 11 Population 
growth in Kenya has been always a problem for land shortage and food supply since the 
colonial era in Kenya. 
Kenya is a middle income country to African standards with an annual GDP at current 
market prices of US $8596 million and a GNP per capita of US $380.00 in 1988. 12 In 
1987 the total external debt of Kenya was $5.95 billion with a debt/export ratio of 342.0. 
Nonetheless its delicate ecological setting (with only 9% of the total land suitable for good 
agricultural land), Kenya is an agricultural country. Its economy relies heavily on cash 
crop agriculture as the single major contributor of GDP ( 40% in 1956-63, and roughly 30 
% from 1964 on.) The major export cash crops, ranked in the order of importance, are 
coffee, tea, pyrethrum, and others (sisal, horticultural products). Its main staple food for 
domestic consumption is maize, beef and dairy products. 
Kenya became independent from Great Britain on December 12, 1963 after almost three 
quarters of a century of British colonial rule starting from 1895. Jomo Kenyatta, national 
leader of KANU (Kenya African National Union) and long time nationalist leader, became 
the first president and built a semi-democratic one-party state. One may suggest that 
Kenyatta's rule embodied characteristics of authoritarian paternalism, increased state 
intervention in the economy and Kenyatta's personal rule. At Kenyatta's death in 1978, 
Daniel Arap Moi at the time Vice President and member of KANU took over. Moi started 
on a promising tone following closely on policy lines drawn by late Kenyatta. However, 
11 U.S DCESA. (1991). World Population Profile: 1991. U.S. Department of Commerce Economics 
and Statistics Administration BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. 
The US Statistical Research Institute (SRI, CIS R 8750-5: 1991 World Population projections to 2025 
by region and country, 1991 annual data sheet.) indicates that in mid-1971 Kenya's population was 
estimated at 25.2 million, with an annual natural increase of 3.8%, a "Doubling Time" of 18 years as 
opposed to 90 years average in the developed countries, and a projected population of 63.2 million in year 
2025. 
12 See African Socio-Economic Indicators 1988- United Nations-ECOSOC. 
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with more state control of power and an attempted coup in 1982, Moi's regime became 
increasingly corrupt and repressive. 
The choice of Kenya as a case study has been guided by its complex and unique 
colonial experience in black Africa (Qchieng 1990), its particular ecological situation and 
great reliance on commodity export crop agriculture since the colonial era (Berman 1990), 
its agrarian crisis starting from the 1980s (Shapouri et al. 1986; FAQ 1986-87) and 
worsening in the 1990s (FAQ Sept. 1992; Raikes 1991). Many elements distinguish 
Kenya's colonial experience from that of Tanzania, Uganda and any other former European 
colony in black Africa (Berman 1990). First is Kenya's strategic position as the Center of 
the British East African Protectorate from 1895, and therefore, center of the vital railway 
road to link the center of the region to the coastal ports. Also because of its unequaled 
temperate climate in the region and its fertile highlands around Mount Kenya, Kenya 
offered favorable conditions for settlers' goals for an agriculture-based independent country 
such as present day Zimbabwe in Southern Africa. Second, differently from other former 
British possessions, Kenya was ruled directly. A sizable colony of European settlers 
established themselves in the country. Third, on economic aspect Kenya has experienced a 
high degree of capitalist penetration in social relations of production not only in settler 
agriculture, but also in metropolitan/international industrial investment, peasant commodity 
production, the spread of commodity production, and finally the process of class 
formation within the indigenous populations. As a result Kenya's economic development 
by the time of the independence was far ahead that of Tanzania, Uganda and many other 
countries in black Africa. 
This study focuses on the experience of Kenya since the early times of British 
penetration in the 19th century. However, intention is not to make an economic analysis of 
the country. Rather, a discussion is conducted on major political and economic 
characteristics of colonial Kenya as well as major developments in the political economy 
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and their implications. Of primary interest for the thesis is food production and supply for 
domestic needs, and government policies regarding food production. The scope of 
investigation covers two periods: the colonial period extending from 1895 (beginning of 
effective British control over Kenya as a Protectorate) to 1963 (date of Kenya's 
independence from Great Britain), and the post-colonial period extending from 1963 to the 
1990s. The post-colonial period is investigated in two sub-periods corresponding to the 
two presidential regimes of the country since independence: Joma Kenyatta (the immediate 
post-independence period, 1963-1978) and Daniel Arap Mai (the period extending from 
1979 to the early 1990s). For each period, issues relating to the political economy of the 
country are investigated and an attempt made to link the current politico-economic 
characteristics with the colonial experience of the country. Of particular interest is the 
agrarian crisis of the 1980s and the 1990s in Kenya. An attempt is made ( 1) to link the 
roots of the crisis to colonial policies that emphasized expanded commodity production 
agriculture at the expense of food crop production for domestic markets, and (2) current 
government policies. 
GOALS OF THE THESIS 
This thesis analyses the food crisis in Kenya as a case study in sub-Saharan Africa in 
the 1980s and 1990s, identifies roots of the problem, and proposes strategies of sustainable 
development based on self-help in food production for domestic markets and needs. This 
recommendation calls for a shift of emphasis from cash crop production to accommodate 
food crop production in economic development policies and practices. The main goal is to 
devise development strategies centered on developing the agricultural sector to secure 
17 
enough food production and supply 13 for domestic consumption. This view supports that 
Kenya, and in extension other sub-Saharan African countries should rely heavily on 
developing the agricultural sector for food production to experience any meaningful 
development at all, and to escape a dark future of food shortages. Facing the severe food 
shortage in the region, a very affordable solution seems for these countries to boost the 
internal basis of food production for local needs in the short term. It should not be 
understood that economic development of the region should be focused only on the food 
production aspect. Although it is a triviality that food is not the only aspect of life, it is, 
nonetheless trivial that lack of adequate food is a threat to productivity and animal life as a 
whole. Therefore, securing self-sufficiency in food should be made a priority for sub-
Saharan African countries in the 1990s. 
HYPOTHESES 
Many theories in Development Economics 14 recognize that development of the food 
production sector of agriculture is a prerequisite for any sound economic development, 
particularly development of a sustained industrial sector. Based on this premise, my 
ambitious conclusions on the African food crisis stem from the following reasons: 
( 1) The economic problems and food shortage in sub-Saharan Africa are 
13 The reader should be aware of the distinction made between food production, food supply and food 
availability. Food production is used throughout the thesis to indicate the quantity of foodstuffs that are 
harvested or produced domestically. Food supply indicates the quantities of food available in the market as a 
whole including the food produced domestically and the food imported through aid or loans. Food 
availability is used to indicate the food that is really available to the consumer in relation with his/her 
buying power moreover in relation to the capacity of the market and distribution systems to make the food 
available to the consumer. 
14 See Rostow and Colin Clark (Rostow 1990), Carl Eicher, Lawrence Witt, and W.H. Nicholls 
(Eicher and Witt 1964). Even some scholars of the Neo-Dependency School such as Samir Amin (Amin 
1990) call for a sustainable development based on inward-looking strategies that secure the basic needs of 
the populations. Since food is placed first in the list of primary basic needs, it can be understood that 
inward-looking development strategies should stress development of the food production sector. 
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similar from one country to another, which this research to hypothesize 
that the origin of the problem is rooted in the colonial legacy that these 
countries inherited, especially considered that they are still dependent 
economies, 
(2) Colonial and post-colonial agriculture has encouraged production and 
export of foodstuffs and cash crops at the expense of sustainable food 
production for local needs, 
(3) As a consequence there is a lack of adequate food supply for the fast 
growing population--and hunger is a crisis in the region. Therefore, there 
can be no significant development when the people are not adequately fed, 
(4) Western policy advisers have tried to solve the problem of bad 
economies but have concentrated mostly on growth with the GNP/capita 
indicator and on commodity production to pay the debt; hence they have 
paid little or no attention to the food production sector, 
(5) Some projects proposed by governments and supported by Western 
donors such as capital extensive agricultural projects (large scale 
irrigation, for example), drain financial resources and exacerbate the debt, 
( 6) The modem agricultural techniques are not sustainable because pesticides 
and chemical products destroy the useful land through, 
(7) The overemphasis on the development of the cash crop and industrial 
sector has caused a big income differential that adds to government neglect 
and some ill-thought donor policies to give fewer incentives for food 
production. Therefore, the price of food is high compared to the average 
income per capita from cash crop production for exports and the industrial 
sector, 
(8) Boosting food production for domestic consumption is a sure way to set a 
basis for small scale industrialization to support food production. 
!viETHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis is a comparative analytical model . First, the food 
crisis is identified as a common problem for many countries in sub-Saharan Africa and its 
general causes are investigated. Second, Kenya is used as a model to confirm the 
hypothesis that roots of the crisis are strongly linked to colonial setting of these economies 
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as cash crop and raw material producers. Also, government policy neglect of the food 
production sector is matched in the Kenya case. 
An in-depth review of (1) Kenya's colonial political economy from 1895 to 1963, (2) 
the current economic situation, and (3) food production, supply and distribution, is 
conducted. The causes of Kenya's food problem are identified and analyzed by trying to 
find a link between current economic characteristics of the country (including the food 
production sector) and those of the colonial period. This way of proceeding has been 
inspired by the fact that Kenya and many other economies of sub-Saharan Africa have 
remained agricultural and resource producers as they were during the colonial period. 
Many of these economies emphasize cash crop production for exports as the main source of 
national revenues (Davidson 1989; Amin 1973). 
Kenya was chosen because of its ranking by FAQ among the countries with 
prospective food shortages in the 1990s (see Figure 3). A second reason for the choice of 
Kenya is its 'rich' colonial experience with Great Britain, its dependence on commodity 
cash crop exports, and its economic and hunger crisis starting from the 1980s (Shapouri et 
al. 1986) and worsening in the 1990s (FAQ Sept. 1992). Other criteria include the fact that 
Kenya has one of the fastest growing populations in the world (3% to 4% since the 1950s). 
Furthermore, Kenya heavily relies on its agriculture for exports and food supply on an 
unfavorable ecological setting that provides only 9% good agricultural land out of the total 
land area. 
Strategies proposed for a development centered on food production in the short term are 
applied to Kenya. An evaluation of the strategies proposed is conducted considering their 
capability to overcome existing domestic (flawed government policies, debt, poverty, level 
of development, ecological setting, etc.) and international barriers (exploitation, imbalance 
of terms of trade, capitalist imperialism, etc.) The strategies are designed to be as broad as 
possible to answer food problems common to the sub-Saharan region as a whole. 
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The thesis is divided into six chapters. CHAPTER II is an investigation of colonial 
Kenya from the beginning of British penetration in 1887 to independence in 1963. The 
political economy is analyzed and government policies are examined with special attention 
on the emerging permanent characteristics of the political economy and the food production 
sector. In this chapter an attempt is made to find hints of food problems stemming from 
government policies during this period. The impact of politics on food production in 
Kenya during this period is discussed. 
CHAPTER III is a study of post-independence Kenya from 1963 to present. The 
major aspects of investigation are government policies and food production situation. An 
attempt is made to find colonial characteristics in the modern political economy of the 
country. The discussion tries to demonstrate that the food crisis in the 1990s is not only 
due to a very high population growth rate as contended in general by Western economic 
analysts, but most of all is grounded in the government policies that neglect food 
production. This argument is supported by the fact that Kenya has turned from self-
sufficiency in food production before and at the onset of the colonial period and in the 
1960s to a net importer of food in the 1980s and 1990s. This characteristic, it is 
demonstrated has originated from the setting of colonial agriculture whose development 
policies completely neglected African agriculture. Even after liberalization in the 1950s 
with the Swynnerton Plan (Berman 1990; Heyer et al. 1976; Shiroya 1968; Duignan and 
Jackson 1986) government policies stressed the growing of cash crops for exports at the 
neglect of food production for local needs. Therefore, it comes to mind as a better strategy 
to attack the problem at the root rather than focusing on current adverse conditions of the 
world market alone. 
Al though neocolonialism still affects former colonies of Africa (economic dependency, 
exploitation of natural resources, political influence in domestic and international affairs), it 
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is not correct, however, to blame the colonial experience alone on the current situation 
some thirty years after independence. It is important to recognize that many dependent 
economies of sub-Saharan Africa including Kenya have failed to restructure their 
economies by removing the colonial characteristics. Therefore, the impact of local politics 
on food production is assessed and discussed at the end of the chapter. 
CHAPTER IV starts on an assessment of sub-Saharan Africa's food crisis from the 
1970s to the 1990s. Roots of the problem are investigated which may link the crisis to 
colonial setup of the economies of the region. The chapter continues with an investigation 
of solutions that have been proposed to address the food crisis in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
chapter finds reasons that support development of food production sector based on 
Development Economics theories and the experience of agriculture-rich Western countries. 
A case for policies encouraging food production is made at the conclusion of the chapter. 
CHAPTER V presents conceptual solutions aimed at increasing food production in sub-
Saharan Africa. Specific problems such as the reorganization of production, distribution 
and marketing of foodstuffs, decentralization with development of rural economies around 
food production and agribusiness industry, the reorganization of rural communities around 
food production business are targeted. The first three issues (production level, 
distribution, and marketing of foodstuffs) were found responsible for the inefficiency of 
the Kenya's food production sector to meet the demands of its growing population. These 
problems were also found common to other African countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Cameroon as an example (Boyer and Davis 1990). Therefore, the thesis builds from the 
case of Kenya primarily (and Cameroon to some extent) to conceptualize solutions to 
develop the food production sector in countries of the region. The chapter concludes with 
an assessment of unanswered questions for the proposed strategies to find a fertile ground 
in a prospective implementation by policy makers. 
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The last chapter opens new horizons for the strategies, namely ( 1) the long term 
correction of the food gap and possible increase in domestic savings, (2) regional economic 
integration with trade of foodstuffs within sub-Saharan Africa, and (3) the creation of small 
scale entrepreneurship industry in the agribusiness sector that will be domestic-owned, to 
satisfy the needs of the growing food production sector of the economies. 
CHAPTER II 
COLONIAL KENYA (1895 - 1963): POLITICAL ECONOMY 
FOOD PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY 
INTRODUCTION 
From the time the structures of the colonial administration and its economic foundations 
were established in the first decade of the 20th century, the political economy of Kenya 
inherited four major characteristics (Berman 1990). The first was a dialectic of the colonial 
state itself caught in the process of reconciling conflicting interests and at the same time 
maintaining its autonomy. On one hand the state had to legitimize and protect settler 
production by control and exploi_tation of African labour. On the other side its efforts were 
to maintain autonomy as a neutral arbiter between settler and African interests. However, 
the state acted in the interests of the settlers although it claimed to act in the best interests of 
African as its paternalistic ideology presumed. As a consequence Africans distrusted the 
colonial administration and their struggle intensified against the settlers who had 
confiscated their land. 
The second characteristic was the high level of state control and intervention in the 
economy. The various studies covered in this research indicate that state policies intended 
to keep the agriculture-based economy afloat by providing settler production with coerced 
or cheap African labour to achieve surplus (1920's). 1 The state sometimes encouraged 
l Basil Davidson ( 1989) suggests three ways in which the few Europeans in the colonial state 
controlled the many Africans: (1) physical coercion by military force that wasted many lives and faced 
increased resistance of the colonized, (2) high taxation that forced Africans to labour for settlers and the 
colonial government to pay taxes, and (3) the forced labour policies whether from coercion or taxation 
24 
controlled peasant production to back up the declining settler production during times of 
economic downturn such as the Great Depression. The third characteristic was the nature 
of colonial Kenya's economy as a cash crop production enclave for exports to England. 
The fourth characteristic rel~tes to government reforms of 1954. Since the Swynnerton 
Plan, government policies encouraged a significant level of foreign investment in Kenya's 
industrial sector by multinational corporations. This policy was continued by the post-
independence governments of Kenya and explains the high level state control and 
intervention in the economy of the country. 
All these characteristics went hand in hand with the contradictions of Kenya's political 
economy. First, the authoritarian attitude of the state towards Africans contradicted its 
paternalistic ideology to act in their best interest. Second, the struggle over land 
confiscation from Africans by the settlers and the scarcity of arable land in the African 
reserve areas intensified. Third, a class split emerged among Africans in the rural areas: an 
African petty bourgeoisie of wealthy peasants and a class of landless peasants. These 
contradictions intensified nationalist and political organization of Africans that culminated in 
the Mau Mau uprising of 1952. For the most, policies of the colonial state before 1952 
dispossessed or exploited Africans to the benefit of the settlers. These policies changed 
after the Mau Mau insurrection in an attempt of the colonial state to keep a European-
dominated state by co-opting Africans into a multiracial society. At the exception of the 
paternalistic policies of the Provincial Administration, 2 policies of the colonial state almost 
uniquely emphasized cash crop production. 3 
removed a great number of village men from rural areas and largely disturbed the stability and peace in rural 
areas. 
2 These policies encouraged food production for self-sufficiency of the household in African reserves 
only to 3.void the breakdown of African societies. 
3 See also Basil Davidson (1989). 
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Food production by indigenous Africans was sufficient during this period of Kenyan 
history and was carried with traditional methods of household production, mainly in rural 
areas (Ochieng 1990; Duignan and Jackson 1986). However, the policies of the state and 
the nature of the economy that put too much emphasis on cash crop production for exports 
progressively eroded Kenya's self-sufficiency in food production (Duignan and Jackson 
1986; Berman 1990; Davidson 1989). The problem worsened exponentially with the 
country's high population growth as will be analyzed for the post-colonial period. 
Major developments in Kenya's political economy serve as a guide to the discussion of 
the country's colonial period. The first period is the beginning of Kenya as a colony 
(1895-1914) and the underlying fundamental characteristics of the political economy of the 
country. The second development took place during the 1920s and 1930s as a response of 
the colonial government to international economic depressions. The policies of the state 
tended to maintain the economy afloat and settler domination of production. 
The period after the war ( 1945-1952) was characterized by a surge and intensification 
of African nationalist movements in Kenya as well_ as a decline of settler production and 
influence in the colonial state. African nationalist movements started to expand statewide at 
the example of the transformation of KAU (Kenya African Union) into KANU (Kenya 
African Nationalist Union) in 1944. Also, a growing class struggle originating from class 
struggle among Africans and the issue of land confiscation triggered the Mau Mau rebellion 
in 1952 and the subsequent state of emergency in the colony. The third development came 
after 1952 with government reforms initiated under pressures by Eliud Mathu 4 and the 
subsequent reforms of the 1954 Swynnerton Plan (Berman 1990; Duignan and Jackson 
1986) of land reform and cash crop liberalization for Africans. These reforms increased the 
size and gap between the class of wealthy African peasants and the landless peasants. 
4 Eliud :tvfathu was the first elected African to the Legislative Council in 1944 (Myrick 1975). 
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Also, the improvement in labour wages and work conditions in the cities following the 
Report of the Carpenter Commission on African Wages, accelerated with new influx· of 
foreign investment increased. The size of the urban proletariat increased and this gave an 
opportunity to new petty trad~rs and businessmen among Africans. This period witnessed 
an expansion of nationalist movements and the increase of African representation in the 
central political organs of the colonial state such as the Legislative Council and lower state 
bureaucracy. 
The imprisonment of political leaders after the Mau Mau rebellion in 1952 (including 
Jomo Kenyatta) caused increased tensions and nationalist pressures. These pressures 
defeated the efforts of colonial officials and settlers to transform Kenya into a multiracial 
state dominated by Europeans. The power of the colonial state and the settlers dwindled as 
the African elite and wealthy class directly dealt with metropolitan capital and officials. The 
decline of the British position as a world economic and military power after W. W .II, and 
the involvement in the Suez Canal crisis of 1956 made it difficult for Great Britain to 
maintain colonial rule in many colonies in Africa (Berman 1990). Also after W.W.II, 
United States policy encouraged freedom fight of the colonized people against colonization 
around the world. Particularly the United States pushed the United Nations to force 
colonial powers to grant independence to their colonies and trustee territories (Davidson 
1989). Therefore, beginning of 1959, British metropolitan authorities entered a process of 
progressive road toward the independence of Kenya. 
THE BEGINNING OF KENYA AS A COLONY: THE MOTNES 
As Ochieng's study suggests, Kenya has the most complex colonial history among all 
British colonies in Black Africa. Its colonial experience is diverse. Early trade contacts 
(ivory, rhinoceros horns, and tortoise shells) started with the Roman Empire through the 
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intermediary of Arabs. Portuguese penetration by the 16th century began with control of 
trade in the whole Indian Ocean, and their conquest of coastal towns including Sofala, 
Kilwa, Mombassa, Zanzibar and Pemba in the early 1500s. After two centuries of ravages 
of the slave trade carried by. the Portuguese, the Omani Arabs colonized the region and 
continued the slave trade as well. Finally, British colonization started with early 
commercial interests in 1887 that opened the door for colonial rule. British colonial rule 
lasted until Kenya's independence in 1963. 
A better understanding of the political economy of colonial Kenya requires a grasp of 
the motives of British penetration in the country, and the foundations of British colonial 
rule in the country before W.W.I. These aspects provide a ground for understanding key 
characteristics of the colonial state and its policies in Kenya as well as the characteristics of 
the Kenyan economy starting from this period. 
P.O. Ndege (Ochieng 1990) and Berman's study both traced the beginning of Kenya as 
a colony before W.W.I. The earliest commercial interests of Britain in Kenya started in 
1887, represented by William Mackinnon, a businessman who forme~ the East African 
Association to trade with the Kenyan mainland that was at the time ruled by the Sultan of 
Zanzibar. In 1888, the caravans of the British East Africa Company (IBEAC) penetrated 
from the coast with primary interests in the commerce of ivory. However, IBEAC became 
bankrupt and could no longer represent the British imperialistic interests in the area as a 
private company. Of particular importance was (1) the desire of British officials to 
maintain British influence around East Africa to compete with other colonial powers (the 
Germans and Italians), and (2) the construction of a vital railroad to link the coast to the 
interior for exports. Therefore, in 1895 the British Government established control over 
Kenya as a Protectorate. Because of its strategic position to the coast, its temperate climate 
and rich land around the Rift Valley, the colony suited for European settlement, agriculture 
and ranching. Kenya became the Center of the British East African Protectorate in 1895 
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with its capital Nairobi as the center of the railroad. Until 1900, the Kenyan Protectorate 
remained under the British consul-general who resided in Zanzibar. Then there was the 
establishment of a Protectorate Commissioner stationed in Nairobi. 
The role of the colonial state was to exercise control over the colony to supervise 
production of agricultural commodities (coffee, tea, wattle, wheat, pyrethrum and maize) 
for export to Great Britain. The necessary precondition for the establishment of any forms 
of production and self-sufficiency of the colonial state required stable and effective control 
over African populations. Therefore, the British (settlers particularly) used military force to 
subdue the Maasai,5 Kikuyu and the Luo. However, maintenance of order through 
military power was costly for the new colonial state. Therefore, the strategy of the colonial 
state was to replace military power by civilian power, i.e., to obtain the consent of 
Africans. They used uniformed police, hut taxes, and a system of passes for Africans. 
Collaborators were rewarded with medical advantages and limited education while the 
recalcitrant were expropriated. The colonial officials used the African chiefs and the 
_ headsmen to secure the collaboration of their tribesmen. 
By 1902, the Protectorate's first Commissioner Sir Charles Eliot started a program that 
encouraged more European settlers in the colony. The policy was to create an agriculture-
based economy dominated by settlers to finance the construction of the rail way and to be 
the base for commodity exports to England. In 1905, vast lands in the Maasai, Kikuyu and 
Luo areas in the Rift Valley were confiscated and given to the settlers to constitute the 
"White Highlands" rich in fertile soil, moderate climate and grazing land. A regulation was 
subsequently passed to forbid the transfer of "White Highlands" to ownership by Africans. 
51n the 19th Century, the Maasai had dominated the area. At the beginning of the 20th Century, their 
domination was being replaced by that of the Kikuyu and the Luo. 
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The settler economy benefited of the surplus that coerced African labour offered and 
financing of infrastructure from taxes 6 imposed on Africans. Settler agriculture surplus 
depended solely on the provision of African forced labour because of lack of machinery 
and improved agricultural e.xpertise. Therefore, British settlers pressured the state to 
provide free labour for their farms. The colonial state responded by using African chiefs as 
collaborators to provide unpaid labour from their tribesmen. In the first decade of the 20th 
century, the agriculture-based economy of colonial Kenya was flourishing from settler 
surplus. By 1913, the economy was agricultural commodity export and dominated by 
settler production, a characteristic that will be maintained until the early 1940s. 
In the second decade of the 20th century, the political economy of colonial Kenya was 
laid down: an authoritarian and coercive state apparatus, and a cash crop economy 
dominated by the settlers while the Indians traded imported commodities in the rural areas. 
The state apparatus was a prefectural system with a Central Administration represented by a 
Secretariat and a Legislative Council in Nairobi, and Provincial Administration composed 
of field administrators (Provincial and District Commissioners) in the rural districts with 
their networks of collaborators (African chiefs and headsmen). Three main characteristics 
of the political economy of the colonial state began to emerge in Kenya. First, the struggle 
over land confiscation from Africans and their resentment against colonial authority 
increased because of the unfair methods of the colonial state: forced labour, taxes and 
coercion. Second, the commodity export agriculture was dominated by settlers as owners 
of estate and farms while the Indians were petty traders in the rural areas. Africans were 
denied access to economic production. Third, the colonial state found itself in a delicate 
contradictory situation. At one level the legitimating of surplus accumulation by the settlers 
required the control of the African peasant production. At the second level the colonial state 
6Between year 1904 and 1905, Africans paid 29% of the hut tax revenues and by 1910 they paid up to 
40% of total state revenues in taxes and import duties. The state used hut tax revenues to finance building 
roads and other infrastructures. 
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was caught in a dilemma to maintain a neutral position between the expropriated Africans 
and the influential settlers. The state found itself mostly favoring settlers at the expense of 
African interests. 
As Berman suggests, five contradictions characterized the colonial state in Kenya 
before W. W .I: (I) the dialectic ties of the colonial state to settlers and the Africans as local 
classes of producers with clashing interests often dominated by settler influence over the 
government, (2) the internal contradictions of the political economy, notably the conflict 
between the Central Administration and the Provincial Administration created a dual 
administration system, (3) the colonial state acted on behalf of settler interests although it 
claimed neutrality and commitment to protect African interests, ( 4) the growth of 
segregationist ideas to limit contacts between African and settler areas, and (5) the 
expansion and scope of state intervention in the political economy of the colony. As a 
result of these contradictions the colonial state's control shaped the process of class 
formation in the colony. Also, the state apparatus increased before W.W.I. The structure 
of the colonial st_ate did not significantly change after the war. However, the size of its 
apparatus and its policies changed with economic depression and the rise of African 
political consciousness in the 1920s. 
THE COLONIAL STATE: POLICIES, CONFLICTS AND CONTRADICTIONS 
The colonial state had a major policy of protecting the cash crop economy dominated by 
the settlers. The revenues from exports helped the state to make construction projects such 
as the railway and other infrastructures such as roads, hospitals, and schools. The state 
used control. coercion and paternalism over the Africans to the benefit of settler interests. 
Investigation of different colonial periods suggests that the policies of the colonial state and 
the size of its apparatus of control changed to respond to the fluctuations of the world 
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economy, in an effort to protect settler production. Conflicts, crises, and contradictions 
within the colonial state itself (see TABLE I and TABLE II), particularly the increased 
political awareness of the Africans, followed which definitely eroded the legitimacy of the 
colonial state and caused it& end. Five periods can help to analyze the policies of the 
colonial state and their consequences: before 1920, the 1920s, the 1930s and the Great 
Depression, the 1940s, and the 1950s after the insurrection. In each period, the policy of 
the state is investigated. Conflicts and their consequences are assessed. 
Before 1920. At the on-setting of the colony and its settlements, British settlers used brutal 
force to subdue African tribes, confiscate their land, and coerce them to labour. In 1914 
increased settler brutality on Africans by settlers nearly caused a collapse of the colonial 
state. The state's reaction to this threat was a policy that took control over recruitment of 
labour supply for settler estate production. Through the Provincial Administration, the 
state applied direct coercion to provide African laborers. The labour force came from ( 1) 
the Western Highlands (Nandi, Gishu, Uasin, Trans Nzonia), (2) zone of Ravine, Nakuru, 
Navaisha and Laikipia in the Rift Valley, and (3) Nairobi, Kiambu, Machakos, Kitui, Voi, 
Mombassa and the coast, and the eastern highlands of Kiambu and Nyeri Kikuyuland. , 
Therefore, coercion was institutionalized by the state police to help the setters at the 
expense of African interests. 
The colonial state faced resistance because the Africans not only felt betrayed by the 
colonial state, but they were also unwilling to stay on the job. In response, the state 
instituted a policy of squatting in 1918 through the Residence Native Labourers as means 
of control. 7 A contradiction arose from this arrangement because squatting became a threat 
to settler production in the local commodities and some cash crop export commodities such 
as maize. Between year 1919 and 1922 the state applied direct coercion more than 
7 Squatters worked for the settlers in exchange of renting a piece of land for their own cultivation. 
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squatting to provide African labour to the settlers. Another major policy of control was the 
institution of a heavy taxation on the Africans with the hut tax that brought more than 50% 
of state fiscal revenues before W.W.I. Added to the policy of coercion through squatting 
and taxation was the psychol9gical policy of paternalism and demeaning of Africans who 
were publicly considered as unable to take care of themselves. 
During this period there were two kinds of struggles. The first category was over 
settler versus metropolitan interests. The second kind of struggle was between settler and 
Africans seen at two levels: alienation of African land by the settlers, and commodity 
production because African production competed with settler production. On each side the 
state sided with the settlers to protect their interests that were vital to the economy of the 
colonial state (see TABLE I). 
The 1920s. The 1920s' period started with an increased coercion of Africans to forced 
labour by the colonial state. Between the year 1919 and 1922, hut tax on Africans 
increased while wages paid to Africans ~orking in state projects were very low. The tax 
revenues went to support settler agriculture after the minor depression of 1921-1922. It 
can be understood that increased taxation was used as means of controlling African 
production and to coerce them to labour for the settlers (squatting to pay taxes). Another 
method of control was the establishment of official boundaries on African reserves. 
A contradiction emerging from this policy was that on one hand the Provincial 
Administration wanted to protect Africans from further land alienation and on the other 
used them as labour supply for the settlers. Another contradiction that the state faced 
stemmed from its claim of neutrality while it favored settler interests against African 
intere5ts. As a consequence in 1921-1922 an African protest was led by Harry Thuku that 
marked the birth of the first forms of African political awareness through political 
organization. 
TABLE I 
KENYA'S COLONIAL ST ATE: CONFLICTS 
Conflicts 
(1) 
Clash between 
interests 
(2) 
Economic 
(3) 
Political struggle 
between Africans 
and the colonial 
state/settlers 
Within the colony 
- Africans versus settlers over (I) 
confiscation of African land. (2) 
destruction of African economies to 
force them into colonial economy, 
and (3) control of African 
production to favor settler 
production. 
- Opening access for Africans to the 
leadership apparatus in the colonial 
state. 
-Within the colonial adminis-
tration: between the Central 
Administration based in Nairobi 
and the Provincial Administration 
in the "African areas." 
- High taxes and forced labour on 
Africans, and low wages to African 
workers. 
- Failure of the colonial state to 
give benefits to the ex-askaris 
- Destocking policies against 
Kamba cattle in favor of settler 
meat oroduction. 
- Banning of African political 
activity by the colonial state. 
- African struggle for access to the 
apparatus of the colonial state. 
- The Mau Mau armed insurrection. 
Outside colony 
- The colonial authorities in Kenya 
and the metropolitan authorities in 
London over policies of the 
colonial state. 
- Between metropolitan business 
interests and settler/colonial 
economic interests: the colonial 
state favored settler production that 
was the back bone from which the 
colonial state derived income from 
exports. Until W.W.11, the 
colonial state prohibited African 
production of cash crops that would 
have been bought cheaper by 
metrooolitan merchants. 
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During the 1920s the Kenya administration was a conservative apparatus of control. 
The government was elitist, paternalistic towards Africans, authoritative and used the 
ideology of psychological domination of Africans. The paternalistic attitude insisted on the 
helplessness and the incapacity of the ruled Africans to govern themselves and to achieve 
their own interests. However, the colonial state faced the dilemma of satisfying settler 
interests versus African interests while maintaining its autonomy. 
TABLE IT 
KENYA'S COLONIAL STATE: CONTRADICTIONS 
Contradictions 
(1) 
Mission versus 
practice 
(2) 
Governance 
(3) 
Racism and 
segregation 
(4) 
Primacy of state 
control over the 
economy 
Within the colony I Outside colony 
- The colonial authorities claimed neutrality To be a neutral player between 
and to protect African interests. Instead they settler interests and metropolitan 
aided settlers to confiscate African land, to interests, yet the colonial state 
force Africans to labour for settlers, and to favored settler economy versus 
pay more taxes to the state for infrastructures metropolitan business interests. 
that did not benefit them. 
- The colonial authorities claimed to protect 
Africans from settler brutality, yet they used 
military force and coercion to force Africans 
to labour for settlers. 
- The colonial authorities claimed to protect 
African culture and societies, yet they broke 
their way of life. Their paternalistic attitude 
and racism demeaned Africans and destroyed 
their self-confidence. 
The colonial government wanted centralized The colonial authorities and the 
control over the life of the colony. Yet it metropolitan authorities in London 
implemented a dualistic system with two over mistreatment of Africans, for 
parallel administrations: the Central example. 
Administration based in Nairobi and the 
Provincial Administration in African areas 
whose policies and authority often collided 
over African interests and issues. 
The colonial authorities vowed to help 
Africans in a paternalistic attitude, yet the· --
relationships in the colony became 
increasingly racist and segregative of 
Africans. 
Created much burden to the economy 
particularly indebtedness because of railway · --
construction and other spending of the 
colonial state over infrastructures. 
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The 1930s. The period of the 1930s was marked by the Great Depression in capitalist 
economies. Kenya's economy, dependent on exports to Britain was hit hard. Settler 
production decreased because of debts. The state, because it relied on settler exports and 
metropolitan capital, was heavily indebted; it had enormous debts incurred on public works 
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and the loss of revenues from imports and exports. Influenced by Keynesian economists, 
many governments in the world including the United States embarked in strong state 
control of economies; Colonial Kenya did not escape the trend. 
In order to keep the economy afloat, the government engaged in a contradictory policy 
of encouraging African production of cash crops by the most wealthy petty African peasant 
bourgeoisie of collaborators and squatters. They were allowed for the first time to grow 
the most profitable cash crops such as tea that remained the most profitable crop during the 
Great Depression. The increase in African production attracted metropolitan merchants 
who preferred cheap African commodities over settler commodities. Therefore, this 
negative extemality put the state in a dialectical situation of promoting an increase in African 
production and at the same time controlling it to protect settler production. 
The Government during this time engaged in similar policies to protect settler 
production and interests. Such policies were the destocking of Kamba cattle in 1938 
(Myrick 1975) which drew a wide protest by the Kamba. Along side this line the 
government declared the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) illegal and used repression 
against the increasing political organization of Africans. However, until the 1952 crisis, 
metropolitan and settler interests dominated the political arena in Kenya and directed the 
development of the political economy of the colony. 
The 1940s. This period saw increased political awareness and political organization of 
Africans. Because of statewide political awareness and organization, rebellion broke out in 
1952. It triggered a wave of reforms from the colonial state to the benefit of Africans. The 
reaction of the colonial state was of increased repression. Some reforms started by Eliud 
Mathu 8 led to some liberalization, mainly the increase of access by Africans to the 
Legislative council. However, discontent in African reserves due to scarcity of land and 
land alienation from the Africans caused the Kikuyu-led Mau Mau revolt engineered by the 
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KAU in 1952. This revolt severely eroded the legitimacy of the colonial state which used 
brutal force and the help of metropolitan forces to crush the rebellion. However, because 
of the fear of total political collapse in the colony, the loss of British economic power and 
British involvement in the S1:Jez crisis, and social pressure in Britain favoring the removal 
of colonial grip over Kenya, the colonial state disappeared in the late 1950s. 
The 1950s. The most important development in Kenya during the 1950s was the eclipse of 
the colonial state with decolonization process of Kenya from 1954 to 1963. As Berman 
suggests, decolonization of Kenya was mostly due to the change in the political economy 
of the colony and its integration in the unstable world economy. The character marking the 
change was determined in the articulation of international capital with indigenous social 
forces, particularly the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. What explained this change 
was not only the rise in Kenyan nationalism but also changes in the political economy of 
the colony and the emergence of social forces such as the African petty bourgeoisie class. 
The climax of the change came in 1954 with four new major state policies that transformed 
the politico-economic structures of the colony (Berman 1990): 
1. The Swynnerton Plan for the development of African agriculture 
The Plan released restrictions on commodity production by Africans in the reserves. 
It accepted the development of capitalist forms of property of land and production in 
the reserves through the active promotion of cash crop production. The Plan 
removed previous restrictions on African production of the most profitable cash 
crops such as coffee, tea and pyrethrum. It envisaged an expansion of African coffee 
production and provision of credits to Africans. However, the Plan recognized that it 
would lead to a formation of classes among the Africans: the land rich and the 
landless. It was assumed that the landless would work as a labour-wage force for the 
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wealthy peasants. However, the ones who benefited the most were the collaborators 
of the colonial state among the Africans. 
2. The Report of the Carpenter Commission on African wages 
It accelerated the transformation of relations of production in the colony to meet the 
need of growing industrial investment by international capital. 
3. Shift of political control of African reserves 
During the rebellion political control shifted from the paternalistic Provincial 
Administration to the Central Administration in the practice of control and 
collaboration. Hence, the dual administration that had prevailed before 1952 
eclipsed. 
4. Constitutional changes 
They encouraged the emergence of an African petty bourgeois African nationalism 
and fostered direct collaboration between the natives and the metropolitan authorities. 
The S~ynnerton Program brought an unprecedented economic lift to Kenya. The GDP 
increased 6% between 1954 and 1964 (see Figure 6). However, the contribution of 
agriculture to the GDP did not change much (30.9% in 1954 to 31.3% in 1963; see Figure 
7). The consequences of state policies were the major reason of its dismissal in the late 
1950s. 
Three main aspects can be investigated. First, the state economic policy that relied too 
much on cash crop production for exports made of the Kenyan economy totally dependent 
on great Britain. The economy, therefore, suffered the fluctuations of world economy, 
especially the imbalance of terms of trade in commodities. The shocks of the 1921-1922 
depression and the Great Depression on the settler-dominated economy can be taken as 
cases to justify the dependency claim. 
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Second, the policy of the state favored the settlers, dispossessed Africans of their land, 
and exploited them through an unfair system of taxation, forced labour, and production 
control. Therefore, it brought resentment of Africans against the colonial government and 
its legitimacy. The rise of African political consciousness and political organization starting 
from 1920s and increasing nationwide in the 1940s, ended with the Mau Mau rebellion of 
1952 that started the decline of the colonial state. 
Third, the government reforms of the Swynnerton Plan after the state of emergency in 
1954, brought a rapid growth of African commodity production and decline in importance 
of settler agriculture. Two major consequences followed the reforms. First was the 
creation of class differences among Africans in African areas. The Swynnerton Plan with 
land reform and commodity crop liberalization offered the possibility of African individual 
ownership of land in those areas and increased the class differences among Africans. The 
immediate consequence was the Mau Mau peasant uprising against the settlers and the land-
rich African. However, those who were favored the most by the Plan were the 
"collaborators" of the colonial goverm:p.ent, especially chiefs and headsmen. They soon 
became a class of land rich and petty peasant bourgeois, while a class of landless emerged 
who worked in farms for wages or as squatters. The consequences of creation of African 
classes continued with the independence. For example, after the land transfers from the 
settlers to Africans in the late 1950s, people who bought the settler farms, plantations and 
estates were among the petty peasant bourgeoisie and the elite in the Kikuyu group mostly. 
Second, the policy of cash crop liberalization drew many peasants to cash crop production 
at the expense of food crop production as will be analyzed in the next sections. 
Some elements and circumstances helped the colonial state to achieve its policies and 
goals. The pillars of what helped the colonial administration in controlling Africans were 
found amongst the collaborators of the Provincial Administration and Africans themselves: 
the chiefs and headmen, the courts or Native Tribunals, and the Local Native Councils. 
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The African chiefs helped the colonial authorities in mobilizing African labour and 
production for the colonial economy, and played a role of spokesmen for Africans. 
The colonial administration used prestige as another tool to dominate Africans: 
stereotypes, segregation and paternalistic attitude to demean the natives. The Africans 
were~ therefore, convinced that they were not able to take care of their own governance and 
welfare. This paternalistic attitude justified the actions of the colonial state on behalf of 
Africans, which instead of helping the latter exploited them at the benefit of the settlers. 
The paternalistic strategy of the colonial state was achieved by the Provincial 
Administration that was in charge of African districts. The colonial state in addition 
withheld information from the mostly illiterate African populations to foster control and 
domination. 
The existence of the colonial state can be summarized within the context of a class 
struggle and a struggle for control. The class struggle can be found at two levels: (1) 
between the settlers and Africans over land alienation, crop production and economic 
power share, and (2) among the wealthy and land-rich Africans versus the poor, 
dispossessed and landless Africans. The struggle for control was centered on the colonial 
state itself. First, the colonial state controlled the Africans to create its own legitimacy. 
Second, it controlled and coerced the Africans to protect and promote settler economic 
interests. Third, the colonial state was in a struggle of control and legitimating between 
two sets of contenders at the political and economic levels. At the political level the crisis 
of control between the settlers and the Africans over representation in the organs of the state 
moreover in the control of land. At the economic level the state used control upon African 
production to favor the settlers on one hand. On the other hand the state controlled the 
struggle between metropolis capital and investors versus settler capital; settler interest was 
given more priority by the colonial state. 
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The crises of the colonial state developed as Myrick suggests on three aspects: (1) 
confrontation between the government and natives at the local level, and between settler and 
natives over land alienation and confiscation, (2) the issues of labour market in the colonial 
state, coercion of African lab9ur, and demobilization-remobilization of ex-askaris, 8 and (3) 
the political struggle for more representation for Africans in the state apparatus especially in 
the Legislative Council. 
THE EVOLUTION OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 
Early signs. African political organization surfaced in 1922 as a reaction to forced labour 
and coercion by the colonial state to satisfy settler interests (Berman 1990; Macphee 1968). 
Between year 1919 and 1923 serious challenge to the colonial statusquo by the Kikuyu and 
the Luo came from the reserves. They had for long time felt deep resentment toward the 
government since 1914. Political activity started among these two groups. In Nyanza a 
Young Kavirondo Association was formed. In Kikuyu areas Harry Thuku founded an 
East African Association in Kikuyu areas. Both organizations emerged as reaction to ( 1) 
increased taxes on Africans, (2) unpaid compulsory labour on public works by the state, 
(3) the use of coercion on Africans by the government to work on settler farms, ( 4) the 
"kipande" registration system for Africans, and (5) the alienation of tribal land to white 
settlers. Violence and demonstrations in 1922 erupted as a result. 
In 1922 the· KCA (Kikuyu Central Association) was formed by educated young men 
involYed in opposition against African chiefs and collaborators of the Provincial 
Administration; its headquarters were in Nairobi. KCA claims focused on distribution of 
land in the reserves and security of Kikuyu land from further alienation. In 1928 Jomo 
8 The askaris were Africans enrolled in the British armed forces in East Africa (Myrick 1975; Shiroya 
1968). 
41 
Kenyatta became the general secretary of the organization. The KCA also resisted 
missionaries by strongly supporting the preservation of African customs. Jomo Kenyatta 
presented grievances of the KCA to Colonial Office in London. It proved for the first time 
that Africans were able to organize themselves effectively and challenge the paternalism of 
the Central and Provincial Administrations. 
Rise of political consciousness. During most of the 1920s and early 1930s, African 
political organization had not emerged state wide. It concentrated in rural areas among the 
land-expropriated ethnic groups mainly the Kikuyu. The state used co-optation to control 
Africans and increased repression of nationalist movements. Elements of co-optation 
included encouraging Africans to produce cash crops during the Great Depression while at 
the same time the government controlled their production and imposed almost 70% of total 
tax burden on Africans. 
African political organization did not begin to emerge as a colony-wide organization 
until late 1930s with events such as the Mombassa workers strike of 1937 /1938, land 
shortages in the reserves, and the destocking crisis in the Kamba area in the Machakos 
District (Myrick 1975) which furthered more political awareness among different ethnic 
groups in the colony. 
Widening of the African struggle and political organization: the Mau Mau rebellion. In the 
1940s. political consciousness of Africans increased due to three kinds of factors. The first 
factor was the influence of the ex-askaris on nationalist movements.9 Keys to the 
9 See Okele J.E Shiroya (1968) and D.L Easterbrook (Myrick 1975). Segregation in the armed forces 
and the feeling of inferiority increased the askaris's resentment against the British. Most of all, they had 
fought hard in North Africa to expel the axis forces, and in India and Ceylon. They expected reward from 
the colonial administration granting them more concessions, better pay and right to engage in business. 
They had been exposed to new ideas in their contacts with British and allied soldiers (for example Black 
American soldiers) and they had seen the way of life elsewhere. In 1944 the problem of demobilization of 
the ex-askaris was an issue for the colonial administration and the settlers who feared their influence on the 
growth of natiw Kenyan nationalism. 
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emergence and spread of African nationalism in the 1940s were the ex-askaris. The war 
time experience of the ex-askaris had raised their political consciousness against British 
colonization and their expectations of reward for services. However, after the war, 
demobilization policies did not really satisfy their expectations. They spread political 
awareness among the populations and many participated in workers strikes such as the 
Mombassa strikes of 1937/1938 and 1947, and fought along the Mau Mau. 
The second element is that the period 1944-1952 was marked by deep political struggle 
and a crisis in the colonial state (Berman 1990). Colonial wartime production and demands 
accelerated the physical deterioration of the soil in the reserves, making subsistence 
agriculture difficult for Africans. A consequence was an accentuated gap between Africans 
and the increasingly prosperous sectors of the economy controlled by the Europeans and 
the Asian traders. Mass political activity began to emerge as African nationalism in the 
reserves began to spread nation-wide. The Provincial Administration tried to contain 
Africans in the reserves by using paternalistic welfare methods. The result of this was the 
emergence of a wealthy class of peasant who were given access to land and cash crop 
production. 
The third element was the increasing access of Africans to central organs of the colonial 
state apparatus. In 1944, Africans gained first access to the Legislative Council when Eliud 
Mathu was appointed. Mathu's program for government reforms included education for 
all, land reform, labour reform, agriculture reforms, and increase of African representation 
in the Legislative Council. 10 Mathu succeeded in most of these policies during his time as 
However, the expectations of the ex-askaris were not met by the colonial state. They were put in 
reserves and controlled by the colonial state, what prevented them from forming a political organization. 
One source of weakness of the ex-askaris was their high degree of illiteracy. However, they spread 
awareness among the populations who respected them for their war experience. Some participated in the 
KCA, strikes and fought in the Mau Mau uprising. 
lO J.R. Roelker (Myrick 1975). Eliud Mathu's policies were based on humanistic, pragmatic and 
non-violent method. He promoted a policy of self-help for Africans at the same time envisaged a multi-
racial society culturally based on model of British society and organization. These tenets would be 
embraced by Kenyatta after the independence. Mathu sought an educational reform for multicultural school 
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African representative in the Legislative Council. His policies were continued or granted 
with the Swynnerton Plan and the Carpenter Labour Commission. However, with the 
failure of land reform policies, struggle increased within African political organization. 
Therefore, expansion of African political struggle grew. 
Post W.W.II African nationalism had its origin in the Kenya African Union (KAU) 
which was founded in 1944 as Kenya African Union (Duignan and Jackson 1986). Jomo 
Kenyatta led the KAU after his return from England in 1947. The KAU fought to promote 
African interests and most of all concentrated on the issue of land alienation, which put 
them at odds with the Provincial Administration. 11 The Provincial Administration reacted 
with increased oppression of the Kikuyu and KAU members. Therefore, it led to the Mau 
Mau oath supported by Kenyatta. In 1952, the oath was made illegal by colonial 
system open to all. He also proposed the change of the kipande system to a national registration system 
that passed. He advocated land reform. However, this measure failed because the government wanted to 
maintain a dominant European community in the colony. 
Eliud Mathu sought the restoration of at least part of the confiscated Kikuyu land. He recommended 
removal of restrictions on cash crops to Africans as well as assistance to African farmers. Some of the 
failed initiatives, at the exception of the restoration of Kikuyu land, were embraced by the Swynnerton plan. 
Mathu fought for increased representation of Africans in the Legislative Council. He sought also the 
improvement of conditions of African labour and the attitude of European settlers towards African labour. 
As a result in 1945 some Africans were allowed to buy a store in Nairobi, and wages were increased after 
the Mombassa strike of 1947. 
In re.suit Mathu's policies succeeded except the land reform. His leadership provided a solid ground for a 
change in African politics. The number of Africans in the Legislative Council grew to 6 in 1952. He was 
defeated in the 1957 elections. 
11 The KAU's objective was to promote African interests and provide support to Eliud Mathu in the 
Legislative Council (Duignan and Jackson 1986; Berman 1990; Macphee 1968). KAU became a central 
forum c1f African political activity nation-wide and claimed access to central political institutions of the 
colony. Externally, KAU sought support of sympathetic British politicians and organizations, and 
established links with fellow nationalists in Uganda, Tanzania and Ghana. It placed importance on the issue 
of land alienation and the abolition of the kipande registration system. KCA was banned in 1940 because 
its members had supported the 1939 Mombassa strike. However, they continued political activity within 
KAU but had more influence among peasants in the Kikuyu reserves and the squatters in the Rift Valley. 
KAU a('tion developed with the support of the 1947 Mombassa strike which sought wage increase for 
African workers. The colonial state reacted with neglect of KAU requests and more repression. 
The KAU strongly opposed the policies of the Provincial Administration who qualified them as bad 
guys. The increased oppression led to a new form of political movement within the KAU: The Mau Mau 
oath. It was a unification among Africans to fight oppression. Kenyatta encouraged the oath in the sectors 
of the proletariat and the populations in Nairobi and other cities. In 1952 the oath was made illegal and 
many Africans were imprisoned among whom prominent leaders of KAU. British troops were sent to the 
colony. Kenyatta and 145 other leaders most of them Kikuyu were arrested and jailed. The state of 
emergen-:y was declared in October 20, 1952 and the state used naked forces to restore control. 
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authorities. As a result Kenyatta and other African political leaders were arrested for 
subversion and imprisoned. The KAU was subsequently banned in 1953 following the 
declaration of the state of emergency. 
The Mau Mau started .a series of violent attacks against settlers and African 
collaborators such as chiefs and headmen. The first phase of military operation started in 
1952. With metropolitan political and military backing, the colonial state moved to crush 
radical challenge through massive force and imposition of direct administrative control. 
Many among the Mau Mau and the civilian populations were killed or wounded. The 
weakness of the Mau Mau was that they were poorly armed and poorly trained in warfare. 
The Mau Mau were crushed in 1954 with many killed or imprisoned. 12 In 1959 under 
pressure from British public opinion and sympathizers among officials, the Mau Mau 
fighters at the exception of political prisoners were released. Essentially, the Mau Mau was 
a peasant uprising against land alienation and coercion. The rebellion can be analyzed as a 
class struggle, i.e., an uprising of the "have not" against the "have," indiscriminately 
European settlers, Indians, or Africans. 
Political and economic reforms. Between year 1953 and 1954 the colonial government 
began programs of reconstruction of the Kikuyu society to restore order. The Provincial 
12 In 1953 some 15000 Africans mostly Kikuyu, but also Meru, Embu and Kamba, Maasai entered 
the forests in resistance groups under the leadership of Dedan Kimathi and Stanley Mathenge into a Land 
Freedom Anny around Mount Kenya (Berman 1990). The Mau Mau was portrayed as a savage organization 
of bandits by the Government and Kenyatta seen as the chief organizer. The media often dehumanized the 
Kikuyu fighters to draw allegiance from the civilian populations. 
The Mau ?\fau conducted attacks against the settlers, colonial police and collaborators of the African 
upper class such as chiefs. However, they had weaknesses: lack skills in warfare especially guerrilla, and 
organizational problems. As a result they suffered heavy losses in 1954 when As of 1954, reinforcements 
were sent from Britain in 1954. Government troops conducted indiscriminate killings against the civilian 
populations in the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru districts. By mid-1954 Mau Mau resistance began to wane 
down and their raids ceased. By the end of 1954 18,069 Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru were imprisoned and 
close to 1000 were executed for participation in killings. By 1956 the military operations of the 
Emergency ended. The total figure was 11,503 Mau Mau killed, close to 3000 captured, 95 Europeans 
killed, 2000 loyal Africans killed and others wounded. The Government soon after engaged in a campaign 
of deconstructing the Mau Mau. However, pressures from the metropolis media and public opinion 
demanded the release of the Africans. In 1959, the colonial government released the prisoners. 
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Administration worked to control the peasants by regrouping them in villages and started 
issuing individual titles to land. Furthermore. prohibition of African production of coffee 
and pyrethrum was removed in the reserves and replaced by control of the production. 
After the Swynnerton reforms of 1954, the weakening of British economic power, 
increased pressures from Africans and their access to central organs of the colonial state 
(six representatives in the Legislative Council) combined to give way to the first open 
elections in 1961. During the 1952-1960 emergency period, the role of the Provincial 
Administration had resurfaced. However, the declaration of the State of Emergency (1952-
1960) was synonymous to the evaporation of the colonial state's legitimacy and collapse of 
its control in Kikuyu reserves, the African locations of Nairobi, and the countryside. The 
colonial authorities confronted not only a resistance movement but also a growing class 
struggle in the reserves. It can be suggested that the Emergency had its roots in the 
accumulation of contradictions emerging from the distribution of land, relations of 
production, and the process of class formation. 
Pre-independence: Africans in political leadership. The general election of 1961 was 
overwhelmingly won by the Kenya African National Union (KANU) whose presumptive 
leader~ Jomo Kenyatta, was still being detained by the colonial authorities as the alleged 
leader of the Mau Mau movement. KANU refused elections without its leader Jomo. The 
KADU minority (Kenyan African Democratic Union) agreed to form a decentralized 
government with the Europeans and Asians, and drafted the "Majimbo" provincialism 
constitution that was designed to protect the ethnic minorities. 
Pre-independence elections were held in June 1963. They were won by KANU, which 
formed what was to be the first independent African government of Kenya. Kenyatta who 
had been released from detention in August 1961 became Prime Minister. The "Majimbo" 
provincial constitution was not substantially implemented by the Kenyatta government 
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whose basis of political support was the majority ethnic groups, particularly the Kikuyu 
and the Luo. In December 1964 the emergent state was transformed into a unitary republic 
with Kenyatta as its first president. Kenya became de facto a single party state then, for, 
many KADU leaders joined KANU in the knowledge that otherwise they would not 
participate in the patriarchal government of Kenyatta. 
THE ECONOMY OF COLONIAL KENYA: MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS 
The economy of colonial Kenya was essentially based on agriculture for exports of 
cash crops such as coffee, tea, sisal, pyrethrum, maize (Berman 1990; Ochieng 1990). 
These products were exported to England and a portion of the revenues was used by the 
state on public projects. Until the reforms brought by the Swynnerton Plan in 1954, the 
export economy was dominated by the settler production because the settlers had monopoly 
over production of lucrative cash crops such as coffee, tea, sisal, wattle, pyrethrum. The 
settler economy achieved a surplus because they used free African labour. It is also 
essential to note that before the mid-1930s British policy strictly restricted competitive 
manufacturing in the colonies. This means that manufacturing and industrialization were 
practically non-existent in Kenya before this period. However, during the Great 
Depression British firms and authorities allowed production in the colonies to counter the 
high penetration of Japanese products, especially in East Africa. It is after this 
liberalization of colonial policy that industrial capital investment began to penetrate Kenya 
in the years following the second world war. 
Two key characteristics of the economy as stated at the beginning of this chapter were 
its cash crop export base and its dependency on the metropolis (England) for capital and 
market. Added to these two characteristics were the increased state control and intervention 
in the economy, mostly with policies to protect settler production by controlling African 
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production. It should also be noted that settler interests often conflicted with metropolis 
capitalism, especially regarding the price of commodity exports. Therefore, cheap African 
commodities presented a great competition for settler products. 
The young dependent ecqnomy of colonial Kenya was by its nature very vulnerable to 
fluctuations in the world economy, especially the international economic depression of 
1921-22, and the Great Depression of the 1930s. Government policies often changed 
dramatically to respond to these fluctuations. Berman's study provides a broad view of 
Kenya's colonial economy from the on-set of the colony to the independence years. The 
analysis in this section borrows from Berman's study to discuss major developments in 
Kenya's economy during the colonial period. 
Before W.W.I. It was suggested earlier that from the on-set of the colony, Kenya's 
economy became a cash crop export economy dominated by settler production. The 
revenues from exports of cash crops provided roughly 16% of total GDP of the colonial 
economy. African production of_ less lucrative crops such as maize and simsim of African 
origin provided the basis for domestic consumption, and its output far more exceeded 
settler production in those areas. The boom and bust in the world economy in 1921-1922, 
due to an attempt to restore the gold standard hit the Kenyan economy, especially settler 
production. Settler agriculture because it was dependent on forced labour from Africans 
suffered tremendously. As a consequence, the state increased coercive policies of forced 
labour and a total control of African production to protect settler production. However, 
during the late l 920's settler production began to decline because of ILO (International 
Labor Organization) regulations on the treatment of labour force. The settlers had now to 
pay a meager wage to African labour. 
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The Great Depression years and after the Second World War. The Great Depression hit the 
economy harder, due to the lack of capital investment. The colonial economy as a whole 
and the settler economy particularly became indebted. Therefore, the government under 
pressure by metropolis capital encouraged African production of non-lucrative cash crops. 
Many metropolitan companies following government reforms, started investing in Kenya 
after W.W.II. After the Mau Mau uprise in 1952, government reforms, particularly the 
Swynnerton Plan removed restrictions on cash crop production by Africans. Production 
increased for both Africans and settlers as a consequence and an African bourgeois class of 
merchants, smallholders and wealthy peasants emerged. Also as Berman suggests, by the 
times of independence in 1963, government policies encouraged foreign investment by 
multinational corporations and the economy acquired a sizable industrial sector. This 
aspect made the third characteristic of the Kenyan economy--a high degree of foreign 
investment in the industrial sector by multinational corporations. However, the Kenya 
economy after independence remained heavily reliant on commodity crop exports, 
especially coffee and tea. 
THE AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
Since the beginning of the colony as has been covered above, agriculture has 
constituted the backbone of colonial Kenya's economy. From the on-setting of Kenya as a 
colony up to the early 1930s, agriculture development policy was almost entirely dominated 
and controlled by European settlers because of their overwhelming influence on the colonial 
state (Heyer et al. 1976). In spite of the Great Depression and W.W.II which forced the 
government to encourage African agricultural production to keep the economy afloat, 
European settlers dominated the formation of agricultural policy. Key aspects of 
agricul rural policy undertaken by the state are examined in this section. 
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Settler farming: key sector of colonial economy. Before the State of Emergency in the 
1950s, settler farming was the backbone of the Kenyan economy as Heyer's study and the 
others referenced previously, suggest. Settler oriented policy in summary sought to give 
settlers surplus production and a total advantage over African production. The policies can 
be classified under six categories: land alienation, control over labour supply, control over 
crop and livestock production, control over research and advisory services, control of fiscal 
policy, and control over transport policy and freight rates. 
The policy of land alienation that started at the beginning of the century put 20 per cent 
of the total usable land area for exclusive European use as the studies cited have shown. 
The consequences were (1) increased pressures in the African reserves for land, (2) 
increased conversion of peasants to squatting for settler farms to have access to land, and 
(3) serious problem of soil erosion in African reserves due to high population density. 
The policy of control over labour supply was aimed at providing settler's farming with 
free or cheap African labour that guaranteed settler. surplus production. Settlers and 
colonial authorities used four kinds of strategies to obtain African labour force. First was 
the imposition of a high hut tax on Africans introduced in 1901 for all male over sixteen. 
The tax. policy pushed Africans to the cash crop economy and to work for settlers to pay the 
taxes. The second strategy was the 1909 'resident labour' or squatter system. African 
families were given settlement on European farms and worked for the settlers in exchange 
for the right to cultivate land and graze livestock. In the 1920s both the Kikuyu and the 
Kamba increasingly turned to squatting. The third strategy was the mandatory registration 
system for males, the "kipande" in 1921 to respond to the decline in labour supply of the 
settlers. All males were required to show a registration certificate of employment for the 
last six months or they were drafted in the army. This pushed many to work for the settlers 
to avoid the draft. The other obvious form of labour supply was coercion of the recalcitrant 
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by the state forces, and the labour force provided by chiefs and herdsmen (collaborators of 
the Provincial Administration) who used ethnic paternalism to obtain compliance of their 
subjects. 
The policy of control ove.r crop and livestock production opposed African production of 
certain crops to protect settler leading advantage. Such crops were the lucrative coffee and 
tea. Also, European settlers aimed at controlling native production of meat that was far 
dominant in numbers and in pre-colonial Kenya was the main mode of production for the 
pastoralist. 
Control over research and advisory services implied that the Agriculture Department 
before 1923 exclusively concentrated on the "scheduled" (settler) areas. It is only starting 
from 1923 that a handful of officers were sent to the "non-scheduled" (African areas). 
Control over fiscal policy implied as covered previously that increased taxation was 
imposed on Africans either to force them to labour for the settlers or to pay for the cost of 
public infrastructures such as roads and railways that benefited European settlers and 
Indian petty traders the most. Between year 1920 and 1923 70% of the tax revenues of the 
state was contributed by Africans (Heyer et al. 1976). 
Control over transport policy gave advantage to the settlers to use the infrastructures 
paid by the revenues of taxation upon Africans. Those infrastructures, particularly the 
railway and major roads helped settlers to transport their products for distribution and 
exports. Settlers were given priority use of these infrastructures. 
The policies discussed above changed sig-nificantly starting from the on-setting of the 
second world war. The government liberalized cash crop production a bit to complement 
the settlers' domestic production that had declined because of indebtedness starting with the 
Great Depression. 
In 1946 a Ten Year Plan launched the start of economic incentives for Africans. 
Definitely the 'Agrarian Revolution' of the 1950s increased economic incentives for African 
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production of market crops. The Emergency of 1952 provided a stimulus to accelerate 
development of African agriculture (Heyer et al. 1976). The plan in 1953 was to increase 
productivity in African reserves and to provide employment to the Kikuyu. The 
Government decided to draw up a plan for accelerated agricultural development of the 
Native Land Units. A plan was compiled by the Assistant Director of Agriculture, R.J. M. 
Swynnerton. The tenets of the Swynnerton Plan (which applied mostly to High and 
Medium Potential areas, i.e., the forest and highland areas) as covered in the other studies 
previously cited were: ( 1) land tenure which stressed liberalization of the sale of small 
parcels of land to peasant families in the reserves in order to allow them to produce food for 
subsistence, (2) consolidation and registration of holdings; the philosophy was that 
consolidation of smallholdings would increase the output of food production and 
agriculture, (3) the extension of agricultural services where teams of agricultural 'experts' 
would be in charge of districts, ( 4) agricultural research that had been confined to European 
farmers, (5) provision of agricultural credits to farmers by establishing a Loan Bank for 
African Farmers that became a recommendation of the World Bank in 19q2, and finally 
marketing policies were to be organized through a marketing board system to avoid 
competing of settler and African production. 
Agriculture reforms: the Swynnerton Plan. The Government reforms of the Swynnerton 
Plan have been praised for liberalization of cash crop production to Africans. Also land 
reform gave individual ownership of land to families. However, many critics have accused 
these policies of creating problems more than the intended benefits. For example, Berman 
accuses that the land tenure liberalization and land consolidation created a class of landless 
peasants, therefore, two classes within the peasant population: the landless, the land-rich 
peasants and the smallholders. Berman suggested that a proletarianization of the peasants 
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followed as the landless had no option but to work for wages in the farms of the rich 
peasants. 
Heyer et al. accused the policies of land tenure of creating disruption within the African 
system. Pre-colonial land tepure was 'communal' rather than individual and land was the 
primary mode of production. The disruption brought by land confiscation and land tenure 
reforms displaced pastoral and agricultural communities. It was accompanied by many 
problems of human adaptation: severe famines, livestock disease and plague, soil erosion. 
The land tenure policies created vast population of landless in the 1950s and 1960s and 
caused increased African consciousness over the land issue. 
Colonial policies disturbed ( 1) the already existent establishment of ethnic boundaries, 
(2) the patterns of sustained economic activity within and among these ethnic groups that 
had existed before colonization, and (3) the equilibrium in the patterns of land use and 
availability, a balance that had been maintained in the shifting cultivation. The 
consequences of land fragmentation were soil deterioration through erosion and 
overstocking. To this extent some critics namely the Underdevelopment School (Leys 
1975) 13 accuses that colonization contributed not to the development or improvement of 
13 Leys ( 1975) tries to answer the fundamental question about the significance of independence for the 
mass of people in former colonies, particularly in Kenya. This book is an examination of 
underdevelopment in Kenya. It starts with an inquiry into the relationship between 'private sector' in the 
Kenyan economy and the pattern of national development after independence in 1963. Leys suggests two 
starting points. First, the relation between the 'private sector' and the pattern of post-independence 
development could not be understood purely in Kenyan terms without taking into account international 
forces that came into play in the colonial setting of the country. Second, he suggests a critique that 
Modernization school and the economists tend to totally separate 'economy' from 'the political system' 
when it comes to ex-colonies. He contends that such views have often concentrated on the 'leadership' of the 
ex-colonies without an analysis of the way in which the different patterns of development embody different 
combinations of class interests and class struggle. 
Leys follows with the examination of the relationship between neo-colonialism and underdevelopment 
applied to the case of ex-colonies, particularly Kenya. To start he defines neo-colonialism as "the formation 
of classes, or strata, within a colony, which are closely allied to and dependent on foreign capital, and which 
form the real basis of support for the regime that succeeds the colonial administration." He suggests that 
neo-colonialism can be applied not only to particular mode of imperialist policy applied to ex-colonies (All-
African Peoples' Conference of Cairo) but also as a characteristic form of the political, social and economic 
life-or of class struggle in certain colonies, i.e., where the transition from colonialism to independence 
permitted and efficient transfer of political power to a local elite that was closely linked with external 
interests formerly represented by the colonial state. Leys suggests that Kenya fell into this category of neo-
colonial state between year 1954 and 1963. On the other hand he considers it as a phase in the development 
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the way of life of the Kenyan people, rather it disturbed what was sustainable to them, and 
left them impoverished and dependent on external market forces. 
FOOD PRODUCTION FOR DOMESTIC NEEDS 
Traditionally, Kenya has been primarily an agricultural country. From the ancient times 
(Ochieng 1990), food production in the region around Mount Kenya has relied mostly on 
subsistence agriculture of food crop, and livestock raising. Shortages of the food crop and 
livestock commodities due to droughts or epidemics caused the nomadic pastoralist tribes, 
the Maasai especially, to engage in raids and wars against the agrarian groups such as the 
Kikuyu. Before the arrival of colonization and capitalist economy the abundance of these 
commodities was the backbone of a prosperous internal trade among the major ethnic 
groups. For example, the nomadic and pastoralist Maasai and Kamba exchanged cattle 
against food crops from the sedentary agricultural groups such as the Kikuyu and the Luo. 
In this section, the thesis doesn't present statistics about production and supply for this 
time. RatheL it tries to underline some policies of the colonial government over food 
production that can provide a basis to understand the food crisis in modern Kenya. 
Particular attention is put on the works of Berman and Ochieng. First, methods of food 
production are investigated and the impact of capitalist economic mode on those methods 
of particular ex-colonies. Therefore, neo-colonialism is not seen as "the last stage of imperialism" ( as 
Kwame Nkrumah suggested) but as stage that gives way to other forms of imperialism as the result of two 
kinds of processes. 
"On one hand, neo-colonialism reproduces and further extends underdevelopment, giving rise to new 
forms of class struggle with an indirect and subtle form of domination may prove inadequate to contain, 
giving way to more direct and crude forms. On the other hand, the process of neo-colonial 
underdevelopment seems bound to modify, and to be increasingly likely to disturb, the initial close 
relationship between domestic and foreign ruling classes which is its essential feature. Under most 
circumstances this implies that it is likely to give way to forms of 'dependent capitalist development' which 
resemble the old 'colonial system' less and less closely." 
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assessed, then a discussion of the influence of government policies on food production is 
conducted. 
R.M. Maxon (Ochieng 1990) suggests that since the earliest times agriculture has held a 
central role in Kenyan history more than pastoralism and had supported greater 
concentration of populations. Before the arrival of colonial rule, sedentary agriculture was 
practiced in communities using shifting patterns of land cultivation. The household 
practiced shifting cultivation on a piece of land rented to them by the community. 14 The 
labour for agriculture was determined by kinship relations and was composed of the 
women in charge of cultivation and harvesting while the men were in charge of clearing the 
land for planting and cared for livestock. Therefore, the system was that of agrarian 
household production. The crops were mostly grain crops (millet, sorghum and maize) 
and vegetables. Most communities produced sufficiently for subsistence and exchanged 
their surpluses with other groups for commodities such as salt, weapons, artifacts, and 
meat. 
The arrival of colonization altered the traditional patterns of agriculture in Kenya for 
three main reasons. First, it brought the capitalist system of production and exchange. 
Second, colonization caused confiscation of land from Africans. It also changed the pattern 
of land tenure, from community to individual ownership in African areas (1940s). Third, it 
created a dual agricultural economy, African and European. Mostly, European agriculture 
in the "White Highlands" was for exports of crops such as maize, coffee, tea, sisal, wattle, 
cotton, and pyrethrum to England. Until 1914, African commercial production in 
agricultural commodities was limited to crops such as maize and simsim. 
With the coming of colonial rule, household production of crops such as maize, 
cassava and simsim increased in output, creating more dilemma and competition for settler 
14 There was no individual ownership of land. Rather, the land belonged to the tribe who distributed a 
parcel of land to each family within the tribe. 
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production of similar crops. Although land was confiscated from Africans, squatter's 
production in the "White Highlands" was increasing in output. In the 1920s, they 
produced most of the grain, vegetables, and dairy products for internal markets in the 
regions of Kiambu, Murang'a, Nyeri, Nyanza and Machakos. However, in the 1930s, the 
Great Depression hit the settler and African production. Particularly, in African areas, 
severe droughts and population growth caused severe shortages of arable land. In the 
1940s, there was a crisis in African agriculture, mainly because of shortages of land, 
moreover the emergence of a class of wealthy African peasants who owned all the land. 
The class struggle for land ownership in African areas was a direct cause of the Mau Mau 
rebellion in the 1950s. 
The government encouraged a substantial increase in the production of foodstuffs 
during the war as a measure of providing self-sufficiency during this critical period (Heyer 
et al. 1976). This effort led to an increase in the production of food crops, especially the 
important maize for sale by African farmers. The Swynnerton Plan in 1954 provided 
individual ownership of land in African reserves and encouraged cash crop production in 
African reserves. This unfreezing of land restrictions in the reserves increased divisions 
among Africans over land ownership, but led, however, to an increase of the yield of cash 
crops and food crops in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
M.A. Ogumu (Ochieng 1990) discusses cattle and livestock raising as another pattern 
of food production in pre-colonial and colonial Kenya. Since the early times, the cattle and 
livestock raising were mostly done by the Maasai, the Somali, the Luo and the Luyia. The 
cattle were needed to provide milk, ghee and meat. Nomadic pastoralism was mostly 
practiced by the Maasai, the Somali, Oromo and Rendile while the Luo and the Luyia 
practiced sedentary pastoralism. These groups as mentioned earlier practiced an exchange 
with sedentary agricultural groups such as the Kikuyu, Kamba, and Kalenjin. The colonial 
period introduced a commercial aspect to cattle raising by European settlers. The meat was 
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now sold in modem butcheries in the cities and in local markets. Also the settlers brought 
animal veterinary services that helped the natives to fight animal diseases and diseases 
which at some times created shortages in Maasai stocks and triggered raids. As a result 
African livestock production increased. The settlers also practiced commercial ranching in 
the grassy areas of the Rift Valley. 
Two issues related to pastoralism brought conflicts between the Africans and the 
settlers/government in the 1930s. First, overstocking in the Ukambani area in the 
Kambaland (due to improvements in animal care against diseases) competed with settler 
production and further rendered the Africans in those regions more reluctant to join the new 
forms of capitalist economy dominated by the settlers (Myrick 1975). Second, 
overpopulation of livestock by the squatters in settler estates and in the Kamba reserve 
(Machakos District) exacerbated soil erosion and competed with settler production. These 
two reasons pushed the colonial government under pressure by the settlers to pass the 1937 
Resident Labourer's Ordinance in favor of protecting settler ranching. The policy 
eliminated squatter.ranching in settler estates and forced destocking in the Ukambani and 
Kamba areas. The government confiscated and sold the Kamba cattle to settler meat 
companies, and used great quantities of animals to feed army soldiers in the armed forces. 
Primarily dependent on cattle-based subsistence and economy, the Kamba reacted to the 
destocking policy by refusing to cooperate with the government. This incident ended in a 
crisis in 1938 known as the destocking crisis (Berman 1990; Myrick 1975). The incident 
raised political awareness of the Kamba that led to the creation of UMA (Ukamba Members 
Association) by S. Muindi Elijah Kaoulu. The organization established close links with the 
Kenyan Central Association dominated by the Kikuyu in Nairobi. With continued 
resistance of the Kamba, and the fear of extension of the protest to other groups, the 
government abandoned the policy in the end of 1938. 
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A conclusion can be drawn from the three studies (Berman 1990; Ochieng 1990; 
Duignan and Jackson 1986; Myrick 1975) that Kenya was self-sufficient in food crop and 
livestock production for domestic needs during the whole colonial period. Although, the 
land reform of the Swynnerton Plan did not eliminate the problem of the landless among 
Kenyan Africans, production in food crops, livestock, and cash crops had increased. 
Also, the population mostly rural and peasant at this time as the guess estimates show ( 4 
million roughly from 1930 to 1948) 15 was not that big regardless of the considerable 
growth rate averaging 3% per year from 1954 to 1962 (see Figure 8). However, 
considering the studies of Berman, 16 Heyer et al, and Davidson to highlight that certain 
government reforms, especially land tenure and expropriation policy as well as cash crop 
policies, had an adverse impact over Kenya's self-sufficiency in food production and the 
way of life of the Kenya people. What happened was the increased dependency of 
peasants on cash crop production for their living either to earn money of their own, to pay 
taxes, or to work compulsory labour. In either case, the cash crop farms took labour and 
land away from food crops. It followed a gradual erosion of the self-help base in food 
production to meet the needs of the population that kept growing fast. 
The first major government policy in the colonial state was the introduction of new 
capitalist mode of production and economy. As can be understood, the introduction of this 
new method of production and trade has had an impact on the peoples of Kenya. For 
example, Ochieng' suggests that before the arrival of the Europeans, agriculture and raising 
of livestock production was household production. However, with the new economy, 
trade was no more based on exchange of commodities among tribes, but on sale of 
commodities at the market to earn money as means of exchange. The impact on food 
production can be noticeable in the sense that food security that had been domestic since 
15 See (Ochieng 1990, 19-21). 
16 See also ~Duignan and Jackson 1986). 
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was now linked to the world economy (foreign currency) by way of the capitalist mode of 
economy. In some areas the price of food became a burden for the increasing proletariat. 
Also, forced labour in government public works, the settler estates, or recruitment in the 
Kenyan African Rifles deprived tribes with young men to work in farms and provide food 
supply for their tribes (Myrick 1975). 
The second policy, was the expropriation of African land, especially in the Kikuyu and 
Maasai areas and the subsequent confinement in the reserves. Land confiscation deprived 
these groups of rich fertile lands in the Rift Valley where they used to practice subsistence 
agriculture. For the pastoralist nomadic tribes such as the Maasai, land confiscation 
disrupted their way of extensive cattle grazing. This policy deprived those groups with 
their essential primary mode of production, the land. As Duignan and Jackson's study 
supports, scarcity of arable land in the reserves, overpopulation and the cattle grazing 
provoked a decline in food production, therefore, household self-sufficiency in food 
production declined during the 1940s. Furthermore, the policy of the Central 
Administration did not specifically emphasize food production in any of the studies covered 
in this thesis. However, Berman suggests that the Provincial Administration insisted on 
self-sufficiency of Africans in household food production in African reserves. The 
Provincial Administration feared that food shortage could cause a social breakdown of 
African societies. Therefore, it would endanger the stability of the colony by rendering the 
provincial areas ungovernable. 
The Swynnerton Plan of land reform and ·commodity crop liberalization offered the 
possibility of African individual ownership of land in African areas. However, those 
favored were the "collaborators" of the colonial government, especially the chiefs and 
headsmen. They soon became a class of land-rich and petty bourgeois peasants, while a 
class of landless peasants emerged who did not have any basis for food production. The 
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landless worked for low wages as squatters in settler farms or for the wealthy landowner 
peasants. This by itself reduced their food supply because it depended on their wages. 
Furthermore, a consequence that has captured particular attention in this research is the 
impact of cash. crop liberaliz~tion of the Swynnerton Plan on household food production. 
Although many Africans became landless, the government encouraged the landless to 
work for the wealthy farmers. The plan envisaged increased African production of coffee 
and credits to African farmers. Therefore, from the late 1950s, tens of thousands of 
peasants entered the lucrative commodity production (Berman 1990; Duignan and Jackson 
1986). The consequences included accentuated regional and class differentiation, inter 
ethnic inequalities, and most of all the drift away from the primary subsistence production 
of food crops. This caused significant decline in food production and growing reliance on 
market subsistence. As the international capital became linked with the petty bourgeoisie, it 
encouraged an elite class of African businessmen and politicians to cooperate with external 
corporate capital. This directly made the traditionally self-sufficient (in food production) 
peasant dependent on the internal/external market for _subsistence. Therefore, a high level 
of capitalist penetration stressed by Berman characterized colonial Kenya. 
It can be understood that colonial policy of cash crop production created a dramatic shift 
from sustained household food production to cash crop production for exports. The shift 
necessarily gave ground to a decline in food production, which was exacerbated with the 
doubling of the population at the independence (8 million in 1962.) An analysis of food 
production and supply during the post-colonial and contemporary Kenya deems helpful to 
justify this conclusion. 
IMPACT OF POLITICS ON FOOD PRODUCTION 
IN THE COLONIAL STA TE 
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The analysis in this chapter reveals that three political forces entered into play in the 
Kenyan colonial state. Those forces were the settlers, the native Africans, and the colonial 
government itself. Clearly, the settlers were the most influential group in the colonial state, 
both economically and politically. The three forces often collided over divergent interests. 
To understand the impact of these forces on food production during the colonial period it is 
necessary to identify the interests of these forces and their interrelationships within the 
institutional framework of the colonial state. 
It should be also considered that external forces came to play in the colonial state, not 
only forces to maintain British colonial empire, but also metropolis capitalism. Metropolis 
merchants tried to lobby the colonial state to encourage African production of cash crops 
which would be purchased at lower price than the settlers' commodities. However, the 
state was heavily influenced by the settlers and this did not work. The pressure came 
stronger during the Great Depression. Metropolitan merchants could no longer afford 
expensive rates proposed by settlers. Also, settler production had decreased. Therefore, 
the state encouraged controlled African production of cash crops to supplement settlers 
production. 
External forces also came into play in the late 1950s under two forms. First, some 
philanthropic political and citizen groups in England were alarmed by the extreme violence 
against Africans during the Mau Mau uprising. They pressured metropolitan authorities to 
grant independence to Kenya. Also, after 1952, more foreign investment flowed into 
Kenya from British companies. The extent of this capital infiltration in Kenya combined 
with the rise of an African elite of merchants, politicians, and a nationwide African political 
movement to reduce settler stronghold of the economy and politics in Kenya. 
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Interest of the different political forces in the colonial state. The interests of the colonial 
state were clearly to maintain the integrity of the colony and to raise enough revenues to 
build infrastructure, particularly the vital railway to the coast. The state couldn't rely on 
help from the Colonial Office in London due to British economic problems at the time 
stemming from decline in hegemonic power, the Great Depression, and W.W.11. 
Therefore, the policy of the London Colonial Office was to have colonies pay for the cost 
of their own operation. The colonial state in Kenya relied on revenues from settler 
agriculture and the income tax to finance infrastructure development and the colonial state 
apparatus. On governance, the colonial state had a vital interest in preserving the colony 
itself from disintegration and chaos. In this endeavor the colonial government had to tame 
down African uprising and political movement, and prevent social breakdown in African 
reserves. 
The settlers had an interest to maintain their economic domination over the colony. 
They needed protection of the state from competition of metropolitan capital as well as 
African competition. Because their agriculture was not mechanized, settlers needed to 
minimize the cost of the inputs of their production. The economic power of settlers and the 
vitality of their agriculture to the revenues of the colonial state, gave settlers a greater 
political leverage and power over the colonial government. Therefore, they used the 
colonial government ( 1) to confiscate rich agricultural land from Africans, (2) to provide 
forced African labour for their farms, (3) to impose hut tax as a means to finance 
infrastructure (such as roads, hospitals, and other the colonial state), (4) to force Africans 
to join the modern economy by destroying their economic base through confiscation 
(destocking of African cattle), (5) to close economic competition to Africans through 
prohibition of cash crop production, denial of trade licenses and credits, and confiscation of 
cattle as examples. Until after the Mau Mau rebellion in 1952, settlers had almost absolute 
power in the colony. 
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The Africans' interest during the colonial period can be understood as two-fold. 
Economically, they struggled to gain back the land they had lost for the settlers, to gain 
access to economic activity (cash crop production, trade, commerce, better paid jobs), and 
opportunity to the resources- of the state (education, health care, sanitation). Politically 
Africans wanted a better treatment in the society as equal citizens. Also, they wanted to 
gain access to central organs of the colonial state: the Central Administration and the 
Legislative Council in Nairobi, and the Provincial Administration. This access necessitated 
political organization of Africans. As covered earlier, these opportunities were denied to 
Africans and their interest was played down by the colonial state in favor of the settlers. 
Allocation of power in the colonial state. The allocation of political and economic power 
by the colonial state favored the settlers to the detriment of Africans. The state used 
coercion to confiscate African land and to force Africans to labour for settlers. In addition, 
the state blocked access to Africans not only to economic resources (land confiscation, 
forced labour, slave wages, prohibition to farm cash crops) but also to political institutions 
that would have allowed them to participate in decision making. 
At times, however, the colonial state was caught in a need to secure its own source of 
revenues and favored African production. For example, following the abolition of forced 
labour by the ILO and the Great Depression, the colonial state was very indebted. It 
favored African production of minor cash crops (maize, sisal, pyrethrum) and to some 
extent some important cash crops such as coffee and tea to supplement declining settler 
production. 
The Swynnerton Plan of cash crop liberalization and land reform sought to preserve the 
colonial state from disintegration after the devastating Mau Mau rebellion and the 
widespread African resentment of colonial rule. As Berman (1990) suggests one can 
understand these reforms as a means of the colonial state to avert its own destruction by the 
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growing African political force. The state and settlers, in a desperate move, wanted to lure 
Africans to a multicultural state dominated by white settlers and Asian traders. The 
institutional framework designed by the colonial state systematically blocked access of 
Africans to politics, political organization, and economic opportunity. 
Institutional framework in the colonial state. The institutional framework was designed to 
block the access of Africans to political institutions of the state, political organization and 
economic resources. Before 1944, all central organizations of the colonial state (Central 
Administration and Legislative Council in Nairobi) were closed to Africans. African 
political organization was repressed at the example of the banned KCA, the underground 
KAU, and the denial of political organization to the ex-askaris. Institutions enacted laws 
imposing a hut tax on Africans as a means to coerce them to labour for settlers. Also, the 
same institutions prohibited Africans from producing cash crop, denied trade and 
commerce licenses to them, imposed slave wages, and controlled African production of 
competitive commodities. 
Until 1944 Central organs of the colonial state (the Central Administration and the 
Legislative Council) were closed to Africans. Therefore, participation in the political 
process was denied to them. It is only in 1944 that Eliud Mathu was (Berman 1990) was 
nominated as the first African representative in the Legislative Council. His contribution 
opened the way to other African representatives not only in the Legislative Council but also 
in minor positions in the Central bureaucracy. Mathu initiated many reforms, among others 
land reform, liberalization of cash crop production to Africans, removal of license 
restrictions to Africans, free education for all, better wages and improvement of work 
conditions. Of these initiatives free education, removal of license restrictions, increase in 
wages and improvement of work conditions were successful. However, the Swynnerton 
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Plan reforms drew much from Mathu's initiative, particularly on land reform and cash crop 
liberalization for Africans. 
Africans participated more in the Provincial Administration in rural districts. However, 
they served mostly as collaborators of provincial administrators. The Provincial 
Administration as an institution of the colonial state was designed to keep Africans 
contained in reserves. Their seemingly interest to African welfare was nothing of good 
will. Their goal, as Berman suggests, was to avoid a societal breakdown in African 
reserves that could jeopardize the integrity of the colonial state. 
Until the Mau Mau rebellion in 1952, political and administrative institutions repressed 
African political movement and political organization. For example, the KCA was banned 
in the 1920s and the KAU was pushed underground existence. Also, the ex-askaris were 
prevented from forming a political organization, what many had hoped to do after their 
demobilization. 
The Mau Mau insurrection in 1952 represents the gaining of political power by Africans 
and the widening of their political movement. At this time the underground political 
movement had reached a nationwide scale with the KAU. Also, the contribution of ex-
askaris in the socialization of political sentiment was noted by Myrick (1975). 
African political movement came as a reaction to land alienation and mistreatment of 
Africans. Some incidents such as the Mombassa workers strikes gave opportunity to the 
KAU to recruit more members and to show solidarity of Africans against the oppressing 
white domination. Also, the nomination of Eliud Mathu as the first African representative 
to the Legislative Council represented a great change in decision making for Africans. His 
efforts opened access of Africans to central organizations where most decisions were made. 
An African political and economic elite emerged after political and economic liberalization 
following the Mau Mau rebellion in the 1950s (the Swynnerton reforms). This elite dealt 
directly with metropolitan authorities and capital, and bypassed colonial authorities and the 
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settlers. However, land confiscation and cash crop economy had a serious impact on food 
production starting with the colonial period. 
Impact on food production ... However, the effect of political struggle and institutional 
setting in the colony can be understood to have affected food production. On different 
angles, the consequences are visible. First, Africans were ripped off of the land that 
provided the main resource for crop cultivation and cattle grazing. Forced labour or 
squatting in settler farms removed large populations of Africans from subsistence 
agriculture. 
Second, African subsistence economies were systematically destroyed to force them to 
modem economy. For example, confiscation of cattle (which was the main source of 
protein and food exchange for the Kamba and Maasai) had a significant impact on food 
base. Also, forced labour and military service took away large numbers of young men 
who made the work force in food production for the various tribes. 
Third, the significant penetration of capitalist mode of production, in the form of cash 
crop economy profoundly affected food production as more peasants engaged in cash crop 
production (rather than food crop production) following the Swynnerton reforms. In 
addition, the content of the Swynnerton Plan does not state specifically any policy that 
encouraged food production. 
Fourth, land reform benefited collaborators of the colonial government and elites. 
Before colonization ownership of the land was communitarian on tribal basis. With the 
Swynnerton reform, ownership of land became individual and land redistribution in 
African reserves provided only small parcels of land to single households. The agricultural 
return of small parcels of land could not yield enough output for sustained food crop 
production. Therefore, the expected agricultural output for each small producer couldn't 
but be small. 
CHAPTER III 
POST-INDEPENDENCE KENYA (1963 - 1990s): POLITICS, ECONOMY, 
FOOD PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY 
THE KENYATTA ERA (1963-1978) 
In this section, the thesis focuses more on food production and the policies of post 
colonial Kenya in that area. However, the characteristics of Kenya's politics and economy 
during this period are investigated. In the previous section, a thorough investigation of 
colonial Kenya has revealed key characteristics that the political economy of the country 
inherited from the colonial era. First, the government inherited a paternalistic type of 
governance dominated by elitism in the state bureaucracy and a strong rule by the head of 
the state. Second, capitalist penetration created classes even within the peasant 
populations. A class of wealthy Kenyan businessmen and traders appeared as well as a 
sizable proletariat. On the peasant side, there appeared a class of wealthy landowners and 
producers on one hand and a class of landless poor peasants on the other. The income 
differentials between the 'have' and the 'have not' has grown with years. Third, Kenya 
inherited a high level state control and intervention in the economy as well as a policy that 
attracted foreign investment. Fourth, the economy remained mostly a cash crop economy 
(Duigan and Jackson 1986; Berman 1990; Ochieng 1990) with a sizable manufacturing 
sector 1 mostly processing plants for cash crops and foodstuffs owned by Multinational 
Corporations) I (Leys 1975) . The influence of MNCs has not just been beneficial to the 
1 The important position of MNC investment in Kenya's economy dates from the war years of the 
1940s. Great Britain relaxed restrictions on production of manufactured products in the colonies (Berman 
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national economies of LDCs (Less Developed Countries) as some may suggest (Gilpin 
1987). Although many recognized that MNCS bring some level of capital investment, 
technology and jobs for LDC economies, they do not necessarily develop these economies. 
A reason is that all the profits are often expropriated back to their home base country due to 
the fact that ownership is external. Furthermore, as F. Wambalaba's thesis (Wambalaba 
1985) suggests, the impact of MNCs in economic policy and politics of LDCs is 
significant. Since these companies seek their own profit, it can be understood that they 
play sometimes a negative influence by distorting the politics and economies of many 
LDCs. They do not necessarily help policies to move on inward-oriented development 
priorities to serve the basic domestic needs. Fifth, it was put in evidence in CHAPTER II 
that the state policies of cash crop production progressively eroded the food production 
basis of Kenya. 
The pre-independence economic policy in Kenya encouraged cash crop production and 
attracted investment of private capital in the Kenyan economy. This policy led to the 
explosion of manufacturing plants for processed foods and drinks, tobacco products, 
shoes, chemicals, cement, refining of petroleum, etc. The post-independence government 
continued to emphasize on cash crop production for export earnings of the economy (30% 
of GDP see data on Figure 6.) The government also emphasized the private sector's role 
(attraction of multinational corporation investment) in development. Because of the focus 
of this thesis on food production (negative impact of cash crop economy on food crop 
production and development strategies stressing food production), the investigation focuses 
on commercial (cash crop) agriculture and food production policies. Furthermore, because 
of the specific focus of this thesis on food production, the food production sector is 
1990). From the late 1950s the Kenya state encouraged foreign investment in various sectors of industry 
(cash crops, food processing, textiles' industry, manufacturing, and other). These sectors have provided 
needed investment capital, technology, and employment to Kenya's economy (Wambalaba 1985). Also, 
since the late 1950s. Kenya has benefited a larger industrial sector than its neighbors (Tanzania and Uganda.) 
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analyzed separately from the commercial agriculture sector of the economy. Basic 
indicators of Kenya's manufacturing and banking sectors are covered for this period. 
Politics and government. Kenya at the independence inherited a centralized government 
with a single party the KANU. Paternalistic and authoritarian personal rule has 
characterized governance in Kenya since independence as many studies suggest (Delf 1961; 
Wiseman 1991; Duignan and Jackson 1986.). The structure of the government has almost 
remained the same since independence, i.e., a presidential government with a President and 
a cabinet of ministers, a National Assembly as the legislative body, a Judicial System and 
web of local governments depending on the central government. The structure of the 
government after independence reveals the same characteristic of high centralization as was 
in the colonial era. Jomo Kenyatta 2 was Kenya's first president and the dominant political 
figure in the country for almost three decades. 
Paternalistic rule and unchallenged personal authority characterized Kenyatta's regime. 
With the massive support that his charisma and position as "father of the nation" brought to 
him, he developed an almost monarchical rule as the high government office became 
dependent on personal loyalty to him. He was intolerant of any form of opposition, and 
his rule was mildly repressive. 3 Some events prove that there was significant opposition to 
2BL"irn in 1890 in Gatundu from the Kikuyu ethnic group, Jomo Kenyatta was educated in mission 
schools. He joined the East Africa Association (later the Kikuyu Central Association) in 1922. Very 
active in the KCA, he led a delegation to England in 1929 to press for African interests, especially over land 
alienatiL"in. He spent 15 years in the United Kingdom and returned in 1946 to assume leadership of KAU. 
Kenyatt3 was instrumental in extending the support base of KAND nationwide. In 1952 he was arrested and 
jailed until 1961 for leading the Mau Mau rebellion. In 1962 he was elected in the Legislative Council, and 
he bec1me prime minister after the victory of KANU in 1962. Kenyatta became Kenya's first elected 
presidem in 1963. 
3 During Kenyatta's rule there were political assassinations, for example, the deaths of Pio Pinto, 
Tom Mb-oya, and M.P.J.M Kariuki (Wa Thiong'o 1983). The underlying issue was the determination of 
Kenyatt~1 · s regime to avoid debate over political and economic choices pursued by the regime. As an 
example. the author Ngugi wa Thiong'o was arrested and detained by Kenyatta's government for sharp 
criticism against government paternalism and conformity to Western models. Arap Moi inherited this trend 
of paternalistic authoritarian rule from Kenyatta's regime. 
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Kenyatta's regime as can be proven by the breakaway of Vice President Odinga in 1966 to 
form the Kenya People's Union 4. On ideological side Kenyatta declared his dedication to 
socialist ideals, but taken a capitalist path to development. 
The major tenet of Kenyatta's economic and development policy after independence 
centered on "Kenyanization." Before independence the European and Asians had control 
over the economy (EIU 1991). The Asians particularly were dominant at every level of the 
business community (brokers and merchants). The "Kenyanization" policy required that 
non-citizens be replaced by citizens in all sectors of the economy. This policy sought to 
secure the interests of Africans by eliminating competition from better trained and 
financially advantaged European and Asians. One aspect of this policy limited immigration 
of non-Kenyans, reducing the population of non-native residents. Another aspect of the 
policy was the takeover by native Kenyans of retail trade and road transport dominated by 
the Asians. On land distribution policy, a large British economic assistance to Kenya after 
independence allowed the Kenya government to buy out European settlers' land through 
the Land Transfer Program to redistribute it to African farmers. "Kenyanization" also 
involved the development of an educated African elite bourgeoisie and the expansion of 
education. 
However. Heyer et al. (Heyer et al. 1976) have attributed some weaknesses of the 
Kenyan economy to this program of "Africanization". First, the government sector has 
grown very fast between the 1960s and 1970s creating a budget burden for the economy. 
The emergent economies of many former colonies of Africa uniquely produced raw 
materials and cash crops. Therefore, without a significant industrial sector to provide 
employment for the educated or the non- educated worker, the government became the 
major provider of jobs. 
4 The KPLT was banned in 1969 and its prominent members such as Odinga were detained after the 
assassination of Tom Mboya by a Kikuyu man brought enmity between the Luo and the Kikuyu (Nelson 
1984 ). The Luo saw his assassination as an ethnic affront. 
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Second, underdevelopment of African skill and entrepreneurship have been notorious 
since the colonial era. The authors conclude that inefficiency arises because the program of 
"Africanization" has put Africans without enough skills at senior positions throughout the 
government and private sector. One can refute this argument on the basis that Kenya, more 
than any other country in sub-Saharan Africa has invested heavily in primary, secondary 
and university education (Nelson 1984). It would make more sense to confine this 
argument to technical education, particularly in the manufacturing sector. 
Finally, the economy has inherited the inequalities of the old system, i.e., a class 
division between the "have" and the "have not" as seen earlier. Even though Africans have 
replaced Europeans and Asians in government and economy, the land transfers for, 
example, did not benefit all Africans, rather an elite. Because of the emphasis on the 
industrial sector, inequality was also expressed in the income differentials between the rural 
and urban incomes as well as between the smallholders and large farms. The authors 
conclude that Kenya has had a remarkably good growth, but has not had a good run with 
structural change, employment and income distribution. From the viewpoint of the 
Dependency School, this argument holds because the Kenyan economy, as many 
economies of sub-Saharan Africa, are dependent on developed economies and confined to 
cash crop and raw material production. Addressing the case of the former colonies of West 
Africa (Amin 1973), Amin accuses structural dependency as a continuation of neo-
colonialism to serve the needs of the core economies at the expense of the periphery. This 
situation creates inequalities of development between the core and the periphery at the 
international level. At the domestic level inequalities of development between rural areas 
and urban areas can be explained (Amin 1976). So are income inequalities between the 
elite and the lower classes. Structural dependency causes development policies in the Third 
World to be outward-oriented rather than inward-oriented. A resulting consequence is 
malde\·elopment of periphery economies (Amin 1990). 
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The economy: agricultural sector. Kenya's economy inherited its structure and direction of 
development from the British during the colonial period that emphasized development of 
settler production at the neglect of African areas. Therefore, African populations engaged 
more in subsistence agriculture and livestock raising than in cash crop production. As a 
direct consequence, until the 1970s, large farms provided the bulk of the export crop 
production. 
Between 1964 and 1972, the Kenyan economy maintained a good level with an 
averaged GDP growth of 6.5% (see TABLE III). A comparative examination of Kenya's 
economic performance in Africa during this period shows that Kenya did better than many 
African countries. TABLE IV and TABLE V show, however, that in the early 1970s 
Kenya's external debt increased from U.S.$1,475 million in 1977 to U.S.$5,453 million 
in 1987. The reason behind these figures is that the economy began confronting external 
and internal problems that limited the economic growth and caused a negative balance of 
payments (from a basic balance of+ £6.3 million in 1972 to -£6.3 million in 1974 as 
indicated by the data in Figure 9). A worsening balance of trade accompanied the economic 
decline from -K£62.9 million in 1972 to -K£142.9 million in 1974 as indicated in Figure 
10 and Figure 11. 5 The rising inflation and overall deterioration of the terms of trade 
caused growing negative terms of trade for the Kenyan economy. Domestic pressures 
from the need to provide social programs, education, a large civil service, and the military 
added to these factors to worsen the debt. 
5 Heyer et al. report that Kenya's economy faired well between 1963 and 1973 and was regarded as an 
example in Africa with a relatively favorable balance of payments: a basic balance of +2.0 in 1968, +6.3 in 
1972, and -53.1 in 1974 (see Figure 9). The rate of increase of the cost of living was low compared to 
other African countries, 2 percent per annum during that period. Kenya's total terms of trade deteriorated in 
1973 (from 99 in 1970 to 75 in 1974). The country experienced inflation at an annual rate of 15 to 20 per 
cent. The authors attribute the inflation to ( 1) the rising of import prices. (2) monetary factors within 
Kenya. and (3) the rising of food prices to keep up with export parties, and (4) the rising production costs. 
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External factors accused by Heyer et al. included the increase in world oil prices 
following the 1973 Oil crisis, and the subsequent worldwide inflation and recession that 
increased the interest rates on external borrowing and exacerbated Kenya's external debt. 
Another element was the collapse of the East African Community (EAC) which previously 
had allowed Kenya to export a sizable volume of manufactured goods and agricultural 
products (maize and wheat) to Tanzania and Uganda. 
The agricultural sector has played an important role Kenya's economy since the colonial 
time, especially considering the fact that the country has virtually no natural reserves of 
mineral. Agriculture has provided the country with stable and substantial export earnings 
and a base for industrial and commercial growth. Most manufacturing is based on 
agriculture products. Agriculture has accounted for some 35 to 40 percent of GDP versus 
10 to 12 percent from manufacturing, 10 percent from commerce, and 13 to 15 percent 
from the government sector (see data on Figure 7 and TABLE VI). Agriculture has also 
provided 75 percent of total employment in Kenya during the period 1964-74 (Heyer et al. 
1976) . Over 90% of the population lived in the rural areas between independence and the 
late 1970s, and depended primarily on agriculture activity for their livelihood. Most recent 
studies in the 1980s (Nelson 1984) show that agriculture occupies roughly 85% of the 
population and was the largest single contributor to the GDP (36% in the 1970s). The 
agricul rural sector has provided the country with a strong food base at least before 197 5. 
In the exception of drought years, Kenya has been almost self-sufficient in food during this 
period. The food self-sufficiency ratio was 1.23 in 1966-68 and 0.94 in 1981-83 (see 
TABLE VII). 
As many developing countries, Kenya has a dual agricultural system: a food production 
sector and a commercial sector. Peasant farmers constitute the bulk of the farming 
population in the food production sector, and they produce mainly staple food crops for 
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subsistence and little surplus for marketing. 6 Commercial farms make up the second 
sector and they produce cash crop for exports, and food crops for local and regional export 
markets. Within the commercial farms there exist a dualism between small scale and large 
scale farms. The large scale ~armers are located in the former "scheduled areas". 
The major strength of Kenya's agricultural sector has been its diversification. As 
opposed to other countries, Kenya does not rely only on a single kind of cash crop for 
exports. For example, while Uganda and Tanzania rely mostly on coffee for exports and 
Ivory Coast on cocoa, Kenya has coffee and tea as major export crops. The main export 
crops are coffee, tea, sisal, pyrethrum and horticultural products. Other export crops 
include wattle bark and cashew nuts. Cotton is grown both for local consumption and for 
exports. Since 1970 agricultural exports have made 70 percent of Kenya's total exports 
(see Figure 12). On average production of these crops has increased from 1968 on-wards 
(see Figure 13,14,15,16). The products are commercialized through marketing boards 
(Kenya Coffee Marketing Board, for example). 
However, the agricultural sector has faced many problems since independence as Heyer 
et al. have outlined. First is its total dependence on the climate. The agricultural map of the 
country comprises six ecological zones 7 (see Figure 17). The existence of this ecological 
setting implies that only 9 percent of Kenya is good agricultural land, 9 percent is 
6It should be noted that small scale and some large scale commercial farms produce also foodstuff 
products such as maize, sugarcane, and wheat. 
7 Zone I which is less than 1 percent of the total area, is barren and in high altitudes, Zone II is 
Kenya's highest potential agricultural area. It constitutes 9 percent of Kenya and embraces the bulk of the 
forests. The agricultural potential of this region is high, especially in the highlands where coffee, tea and 
pyrethrum are important crops at higher altitudes. Livestock in this region is farmed at lower altitudes. 
Zone III is a medium potential agricultural area. It covers about 9 percent of Kenya's land area. Most of the 
large scale farms in these areas produce hybrid maize, wheat and barley. The small scale farms in this 
region grow cotton, maize, groundnuts, pulses and oilseeds, cashew and coconuts. Livestock is raised also 
in the region. Zone IV covers about 9 percent of total land area and has marginal agriculture potential. 
Subsistence crop farming and livestock is the activity of smallholder farmers in the region. Zone V covers 
52 percent of Kenya's total area and is mostly an area of wildlife. Zone VI (Northern Kenya) covers 20 
percent of Kenya's total land area. In this region rainfall is sparse and erratic. The region is inhabited by 
nomadic pastoral people such as the Somali. 
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marginally suited for agriculture, and 18 percent of the country is better suited for livestock 
production. The remainder 60 percent of the country is semi-arid or arid and of no 
significant agricultural use. The second problem, which is due to the structure of Kenya's 
economy, is that the industrial sector cannot provide agricultural sector with cheap inputs of 
high quality. As opposed to Asian countries, the industrial sector has been mostly for food 
processing and cash crop mills, yet has not provided the agricultural sector with 
manufacturing or repairing agricultural equipment, nor has it succeeded to continually 
adapting it to the needs of the farmers. This is a serious limitation and implies that the bulk 
of the farm work requires human energy inputs. 
Per capita daily calorie consumption has decreased from 89% (1966-68) to 86% ( 1981-
83) of FAQ daily requirement (see TABLE VIII) because of low food intakes and cases of 
malnutrition in the country. The output of production from labour is not expected to be 
very high when people do not have enough daily calorie intake. The third problem is that 
government development programmes in agriculture were relatively low between 1960s 
and early 1970s, for example on irrigation and agricultural research. Another setback 
facing the agricultural sector is the high population growth rate, which since the colonial 
period has created a problem of agricultural land scarcity on the already scarce arable land 
resources of Kenya. High population growth also outmatches the capacity of the present 
food production sector to meet the demand. 
Another issue raised by Heyer et al. is that a large number of subsistence farmers are 
ignored by development efforts in the country, which reminds colonial policy neglect of 
subsistence agriculture. Therefore, it shows the negative effect of centralization on two 
levels. At the first level, total government control over economic activity and centralization 
of economic activities around key urban centers (especially Nairobi) as a legacy of the 
colonial period, causes the neglect of rural development. At the second level, the emphasis 
on large scale producers steals attention and resources away from small scale producers. 
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The economy: Government policies. Since the economic liberation of the Swynnerton 
Plan, the government from 1964 to 1978 had three major economic development programs 
(Heyer et al, 1976). The First Five Year Development Plan 8 (1966-70) emphasized on 
"Kenyanization" of the economy with political equality, redistribution of wealth with land 
transfers to Africans, and equal opportunities with increased economic growth. This plan 
encouraged heavy private ownership, and attracted MNCs and other foreign investors. 
However, the plan did not reduce the class inequalities and income differentials inherited 
from the colonial period. 
The Second Five Year Plan (1970-74) intended for improvement of the first. 
Particularly, it aimed at overcoming inadequate project preparation, scarcity of Kenyan 
personnel, insufficient co-ordination, lack of commitment to the plan, exclusion of local 
authority programmes, and inadequate organization of rural development. The main 
objective was to direct development to the rural areas where the majority of the poor and 
subsistence population live. 
The Third Five Year Development Plan (1974-1978) was a continuation of the second 
plan with more emphasis on employment, distribution of income, family planning, rural 
development. district planning, reorganization of production and trade, environment 
conservation. However, the Plan was revised because of the worldwide inflation of 1973 
8 The objectives were stated thus (Heyer et al. 1976, 36): 
The aims of the Government are clear -- to achieve high and growing per capita incomes, 
equitably distributed, so that all are free from want, disease and exploitation, while at the same 
time ensuring and guaranteeing: 
( 1) Political equality in the full Kenyan traditional sense of a right which is independent of 
economic status and divorced from stern tests and discrimination criteria. 
(2) Social justice 
(3) H1tman Dignity including freedom of conscience, and 
( 4) Eq1tal opportunities, without discrimination by race, tribe, or belief, but also without 
rrejudice to remedying the inequalities inherited from the past. 
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caused by the oil shock. The drop of the GDP growth rate from 6.3% (1973) to 3.6% 
( 197 4) also forced a revision of the Plan. 9 
Between year 1964 and 1974, the economy grew at an average 6% per year GDP 
growth rate. However, the data in Figure 9 indicate that regardless of the good economic 
growth, the country's balance of trade was negative with the market outside East Africa (-
K£ 48.5 million in 1964 and -K£ 182.9 million in 1974 ) while a positive balance was 
maintained with the East Africa region (K£ 17.0 million in 1964 and K£ 35.0 million in 
1974). The terms of trade also declined in extra-territorial trade (from an index of 97 in 
1970 to 68 in 1974). The trade deficit with the outside East Africa region (107 in 1964 and 
247 in 1974 of import price indexes versus only 103 and 152 export price indexes for the 
same years in Figure 18 and 19.). It can be unsderstood that the trade deficit was caused 
by the high cost of imported manufactured products and also the food imports (a total of 
K£5.867 million worth in 1964 to K£14.157 million in 1973 as indicated in Figure 20). 
Kenya increased food imports in time to alleviate the problem of droughts. One can 
generalize without exaggeration that the terms of trade with MDCs of the North are 
generally unfavorable to dependent economies of the South because the latter rely on 
commodity exports mostly. The price of these commodities is usually fixed by consumers 
of the )J" orth. 
9 The economic strategy devised to stimulate more growth from 1975 on-wards, as contained in Paper 
No. 4. was aimed at the following goals (Heyer et al. 1976, 40): 
I. To keep domestic price increases to no more than half of the increase in import prices. 
2. To hold wage increases and increases in other non-import costs of production to less than 
domestic price increases. 
3. To restrain imports. 
4. To promote exports. 
5. To stimulate production both in substitution for imports and to support exports. 
6. To choose policies for our crisis years which in so far as possible reinforce our longer 
term objectives of promoting growth, employment and an improved distribution 
of income. 
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Kenya's basic balance of payments sharply declined from+£ 17.3 million in 1969 to-£ 
53.1 million in 1974 (see Figure 9). This decline can be considered as a logical result of a 
sharp increase in government spending on the public sector, especially in education and 
public service. The decline can be also attributed to the increase in foreign debt to cover 
energy bills, and imports of machinery and food. 
The major government policy toward commercial agriculture has been the provision of 
services (for example, fertilizer, seed, chemical and farm equipment supply -- see TABLE 
XXIII) to peasant farmers as well as public infrastructures such as roads. The government 
invested considerably in the development of cash crop agriculture. Agriculture ranked third 
in items of government spending after education and infrastructures in the 1960s. IO This 
period was characterized by large public expenditures on the agriculture sector to buy back 
settler farms (75% of the agricultural budget in 1963-64 and 50% in 1968-69). 
Agricultural policy of post-independence Kenya has borrowed colonial characteristics, for 
example, the characteristics initiated under the Swynnerton Plan. For example, the land 
reform program was very prominent in the 1960s and the small farm programme was part 
of the Swynnerton Plan. Other major programmes of the 1960s were the rural water 
programme and the range development programme as a determination by the government to 
commit resources for development in problem areas. The rural water programme was a 
very significant item in government expenditures to provide rural areas with improved 
drinking water. The range development programme aimed at improving the standards of 
living rural populations. A major problem with both programmes was the shortage of 
funds for maintenance of the infrastructures. 
On irrigation, the government undertook a limited large scale irrigation scheme (8,500 
hectares in 1975) in the Upper and Lower Tana area and the Mwea Tebere regions. Small 
10 Ibid. 
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scale irrigation was organized under private control in areas growing coffee, sugar and 
horticulture. 
Regardless of the new directions, particularly development of infrastructures for rural 
areas, the government polici~s continued their colonial trend: inequalities in smallholder 
agriculture with the neglect of marginal areas and the neglect of food crop production. 
Another flaw of agriculture development policy in Kenya is that it overemphasizes large 
farms at the neglect of small producers. 
Another area of government policies is the important and crucial aspect of marketing. 
Heyer et al. suggest that marketing must be well organized for many reasons. First, it must 
keep pace with production of agricultural commodities. Second, better organization of 
marketing lowers the cost of commodity production and the cost of food. Furthermore, a 
better marketing can increase the foreign exchange earnings from exports by maintaining 
high standards of products to keep a good reputation in the international market (Ivory 
Coast cocoa, for example), or by manipulating international markets in the country's favor 
(Kenya with pyrethrum.) With an improved earning from exports, the welfare of the 
producers is increased as in the case of Ivory Coast. The authors concluded that the 
agricul rural marketing system in Kenya is well developed in certain respects such as the 
high quality standards of export crops (coffee, tea and pyrethrum) fixed by the boards. 
Many problems are faced by most LDC producers to achieve leverage at the 
intern3tional marketing level: disadvantageous bargaining power in international 
negotiations particularly in International Commodity Agreement negotiations, 
disadYantageous at the country's market entry, unsuccessful price or income stabilization 
policies, insufficient encouragement for export combined with aggressive import 
substitution policies, and unwillingness to compensate export producers for undervaluation 
of foreign exchange in the official exchange rate. Heyer et al. found that Kenya suffers 
from some of these common problems faced by many LDCs in agricultural marketing. 
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The market system in Kenya is centralized in control as originated from the colonial 
period. There are many marketing boards, almost one for each commodity (cash crop or 
foodstuff). The overall organization of cash crop economy through marketing and produce 
boards is a strength that provides more organization and more efficiency to this sector than 
its foodstuff counterpart. In Kenya exports are handled through a variety of marketing 
boards: 11 Coffee Marketing Board, Coffee Authority, Tea Board, Kenya Tea Development 
Authority, Pyrethrum Board, Horticultural Crops Development Authority, Sisal Board, and 
the Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board. Some big international companies with outside 
sales networks outside such as Brooke Bond and James Finlay and Company also 
participate in the marketing of cash crops in Kenya. 
The system of collection or delivery of export products from the growers depends on 
whether the latter are large or small. For small growers, collection can be made through 
cooperatives as in the case of coffee and pyrethrum, or by the authority as in the case of 
tea. Large growers on the other hand deliver and sometimes process their products on their 
own. 
Coffee is Kenya's most important export crop (32.7% of total exports in 1964 and 
29.2o/c in 197-1- as shown in Figure 12.) Coffee is produced by large scale growers as well 
as a large number of smallholders since the 1970s. Major exports are to United Kingdom, 
the United States, Sweden, Canada, Italy, West Germany, and the Netherlands. The 
production and marketing of coffee is overseen by two boards. First is the Coffee 
11 Export \1arketing Boards in Kenya originated in the 1930s. The goal of their establishment was to 
improYe the marketing of export crops and to get the best possible foreign exchange during the depression. 
Also. the reader (an understand that with the Great Depression, outside market favored the buying of cheap 
commodities, 5ome of which were produced by African agriculture government-encouraged. Without 
marketing board5. the settlers could not control the African production. 
The comn1L1n function of these boards is to license growers, to market and process products, and to 
advise the Mini5try of Agriculture, to enforce quotas, to levy taxes and to encourage high standards of 
production and marketing. For the case of coffee and pyrethrum where Kenya has a good ranking in the 
international market there are two boards: one responsible for production standards and the other for 
marketing. 
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Marketing Board that has the monopoly over the purchase of the whole coffee produced in 
Kenya. It sells coffee to exporters in Nairobi. Second is the Coffee Authority that sets the 
standards of the coffee product. The major problem in the marketing of coffee comes from 
poor marketing schemes an~ processing from the smallholder cooperative societies. The 
problem stems from the fact that in the smallholder areas, coffee cooperatives own and 
manage their own pulperies. 12 Therefore, keeping high standard of the product becomes 
problematic because of lower skill and lack of resources. Also the price incentives are not 
well tuned because of differences from one coffee cooperative to another. 
The second major crop is tea which in 1960s was as important in earnings as coffee 
(12.9lk in 1964 and 18.1% in 1972.) Tea is an important source of income for 
smallholders. Production is controlled by the Tea Board of Kenya, but the latter is not 
responsible for marketing. Instead, tea is processed and marketed by estates and by the 
Kenya Tea Development Authority that handles smallholder tea production. 
In summary export marketing of cash crops is well developed and organized in Kenya. 
However. because the quality of their product and their marketing efficiency are low, the 
smallholder cooperatives are a source of weaknesses to the national cash crop marketing. 
The economv: industrial and banking sectors. Kenya's industry is centered on agriculture 
inputs (for example sugarcane industries, canneries, meat industries, coffee and tea mills, 
etc.). The rest is light industry (such as cement, body products, household products, light 
steel products) as in most developing countries. The foundations of the industrial sector 
were laid do\Yn in the 1950s. Foreign investment was encouraged significantly after the 
Swynnerton reforms. Kenya continued to play a central role to serve the countries of East 
Africa (C ganda and Tanzania) with industrial outputs. Therefore, during the 1960s Kenya 
embarked in a program of increased industrialization. However, most industries are food 
12 In large holder areas, the CMB manages the pulperies. 
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processing (canneries and sugar mills), cash crop (coffee and tea mills) or light industries 
such as clothing, etc. Like the agriculture sector, the industrial sector is dualistic and 
involves a large proportion of overseas investment. One weakness of this sector is that it is 
based on capital-intensive pr?ducts and production methods. There is little proportion of 
industries of small scale as opposed to Asia. Also, centralization imposes that most of the 
industries are concentrated in cities, which perpetrates the underdevelopment of rural areas 
and exacerbates the growth of urban population. The manufacturing sector has contributed 
on average 11 percent of the total GDP between 1964 and 1974 (see Figure 7). 
The commercial and banking sectors are well developed since the early 1960s as a 
characteristic inherited from the colonial period. As seen earlier, Nairobi was the center of 
the British East African Protectorate. Therefore, these infrastructures were set to serve the 
whole region. 
Food production for domestic needs. Investigation of the colonial period has revealed that 
Kenya was self-sufficient in food production and supply during the whole colonial period. 
Despite poverty and a wide class of landless and poor ( 40% ), constant hunger and 
starvation were not a characteristic of Kenyan areas after independence. Most people in the 
rural areas produced their own food on a family unit basis and supplied cities with 
foodstuff products (Nelson 1984). 13 Production of maize was increased by the spread of 
hybrid maize cultivation (maize being the most important staple). On the cash crop sector 
during the 1960s and 1970s, an argument has been that cash crop production has largely 
benefited the Kenyan farmer and the peasant by providing more income to households 
(Kennedy 1987: Kennedy 1989). 
l .3\1ost of the statistics used in this part are extracted from (Nelson 1984 ). 
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Until middle of the 1970s the agricultural sector produced enough foodstuffs to satisfy 
consumption needs of the populations. Between 1964 and 1973, production grew at an 
annual rate of 4.2%. However, as for the whole economy, the growth rate of food 
production declined to an annual rate of 2.7% as the result of the 1974 world recession. 
Kenya imported foodstuffs and solicited food aid from outside to meet the needs of the 
population (from 2,000 tons in 1972173 to 35,000 tons in 1978179 in TABLE IX). High 
prices of agricultural inputs combined with erratic weather, production disincentives, 
inadequate producer prices, and the government's inability to handle bumper crops causing 
an increase in food imports to alleviate the shortage at the beginning of the 1980s. 14 Also 
flawed government policies did not provide enough storage facilities for food surplus. 
Therefore. food availability in the marginal areas decreased in the early 1980s. 
(a) Domestic food supply 
The domestic food supply is varied: maize (the most important staple), wheat, millet, 
sorghum. rice, beans, potatoes, oilseeds, cotton, and tobacco, sugarcane, cassava, 
bananas, beef. dairy products, sugar, poultry, eggs, fruit and vegetables. Sweet potatoes, 
cassava, yams, plantains, millet, sorghums and pulses are of minor volume. In rural areas, 
production of foodstuff has remained household production for their own consumption and 
the surplus is sold in the cities. 
1. Maize production did not meet the domestic market needs until the mid-1960s. 
Therefore. the country was forced to import maize (from K£ 2.305 millions worth in 1965 
to K£ 3 .692 million in 1966 in Figure 20). However, the introduction of hybrid varieties 
dramatically improved the yield and output of maize production. As a result of this surplus 
production. the government since 1966 had maintained a strategic stock of maize to meet 
domestic demands especially urban needs and emergencies such as droughts. In 1976 and 
14 Food aid reached 165,000 tons in 1982/83 (see TABLE IX). 
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1977, there was a bumper production of maize following government credit allocation to 
peasants and farmers. The consequence was a net surplus of maize in the market. 
However, the government could not buy the bumper excess harvest due to lack of storage 
facilities. A major disincent~ve for maize production followed. The farmers cut back in 
their production from 565,000 tons in 1976, 424,000 tons in 1977, to 236,000 tons in 
1978 (Nelson 1984). However, production slightly increased again in 1980 because of 
renewed government incentives by credit allocation to farmers. 
2. Wheat was introduced by the settlers and was the most important crop after maize. 
The policy in colonial period was to produce enough wheat to meet Kenya's internal 
demand and those of Uganda and Tanzania. This goal was attained in 1964 and 
consequently Kenya became a net exporter of wheat in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
However, with the rapid urban population increase in the late 1970s demand for wheat 
products rose more rapidly than production requiring wheat imports of 139 ,400 tons in 
1981 through World Bank assistance. 
3. Industrial crops consumed locally are sugarcane, cotton. oilseeds, and tobacco. The 
first commercial sugar mills were introduced in 1922 and the total output of the sugar mills 
reached 30,000 to 35,000 a year at the independence and largely met domestic demand. 
With the exception of oilseeds, the other industrial crops consumed internally are not 
mainly for nutritional use. 
4. Meat production until 1970s was mostly done at the household level. In that period, 
the principal provider of meat at the general market was the parastatal Kenya Meat 
Commission (KMC.) Commercial and dairy cattle herds in Kenya are mostly of European 
origin whereas indigenous herds are zebu or mixed breeds. As shown in Figure 21, cattle 
production declined from 184,700 deliveries in 1969 to 159,500 in 1974. Sheep and lamb 
production equally declined. 
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Although food production has increased in Kenya from 1964 to the mid-1970s, the 
supply of food has not followed the same trend due to a high population growth rate. Food 
availability per capita has declined as shown on the tables. Following the disincentives of 
1976-1977, food productioµ has sharply decreased and Kenya has gone from self-
sufficient to a net importer of in foodstuffs. This aspect is discussed in the next section. 
Marketing and distribution of foodstuffs. The major foodstuffs such as maize and meat are 
produced at large and small scale, and their marketing is done through boards (for example, 
the Kenya Meat Commission, the Maize and Produce Board, and the Kenya Dairy Board 
set up in the 1950s, the Kenya Cooperative Creameries before World War II) as for cash 
crop products. In most rural areas, the center of local trade is the village market to which 
the quantities of product are brought periodically. 
An important aspect of food production is the marketing and distribution system as 
stressed by Heyer et al. The crucial role of marketing in the case of foodstuffs is to lower 
their price and most of all to make the supply of foodstuffs more stable and predictable by 
an adequate distribution system. Familiar problems of food marketing (common in Third 
World countries) are unreliable food distribution systems and difficulties in the distribution 
of inputs. The concerns for a well developed marketing system for food are as equally to 
lower prices and to meet the needs of the growing agricultural sector than to meet the 
demand of the growing population. 
As covered earlier in this chapter, the food production sector suffers major problems 
that originate from government neglect of the food production sector, and the poor 
marketing and distribution systems. The first problem was inherited from the colonial 
period and has been emphasized during the post colonial era. Cash crop production and 
industry haYe been given the most attention by government policy. Because most of the 
foodstuffs are produced by small producers and households in the rural areas (at the 
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exception of maize, wheat, and sugarcane also grown in large scale farms) the income 
differential with industry has not favored food crop production. It can be understood that 
the Swynnerton Plan encouraged food production solely to achieve self-sufficiency at the 
subsistence (household) level_ to avoid societal breakdown in African reserve areas, but was 
not given enough emphasis to meet the needs of the fast growing population, particularly in 
urban areas. 
The marketing boards obtain their supplies through private traders, cooperatives, large 
scale farmers and ranchers. In the case of the Maize and Produce Board and the Wheat 
Board, agents are appointed by the government. For meat and dairy products, licenses 
may be required but anyone can be a supplier. The boards distribute the produce through 
wholesalers and/or through retailers. Wholesalers may be processors as in the case of 
millets, wheat, and maize. The Kenya Cooperative Creameries and the Kenya Meat 
Commission do the processing themselves, then distribute to the retailers. The Maize and 
Produce Board and the Wheat Board distribute through wholesalers and millers. 
The marketing boards are supplemented by cooperative marketing organizations that are 
of two kinds. The first kind is for large farmer cooperatives at national level (for example, 
Kenya Cooperative Creameries, the Kenya Planters Cooperative Union for coffee, the 
Horticultural Cooperative Union and the Kenya Framers Association Ltd.) The small 
fam1er cooperatives are organized under pressure from the government to improve quality 
of the product. 
Illegal trade (parallel economy) is another marketing method in Kenya that involves 
smuggling. Smuggling is most widespread in maize. Other cases include smuggling 
across the border of sugar, meat and milk in the urban areas. Illegal trade creates inequity 
and uncertainty of production and consumption as well as it distorts distribution. For the 
case of foodstuffs, a spread of illegal trade practices proves that government prices are not 
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favorable to producers. That is why they go elsewhere to gain more return for their 
product. 
A low cost distribution system for food is very crucial to a country like Kenya with a 
high population growth, yet ~ very small arable land. Heyer et al. contend that only with 
reliable market source of food can one expect people to move from subsistence food 
production to non-food production in the rural areas. In the cities, reliable food supply, 
marketing, and distribution are essential to avoid shortages or price hikes that would cause 
political instability. Also the ability of the distribution system to secure quality and variety 
is important. This argument is sound because the overemphasis on cash crops has caused 
the neglect of food crop production. Yet even when food is produced to acceptable 
quantities, poor distribution system makes it difficult to bring food from the farm to the 
consumer's table. This observation is particularly applicable to cases when food shortages 
occun-ed in marginal areas while the producing regions were flooded with product. 
Heyer et al. find that the food marketing system in Kenya has serious shortcomings. 
The first is that the cost of food is very high (see TABLE XIV). As Kennedy Eileen's 
study reveals, more than 40% of household income is spent on food alone. Second, food 
marketing is unreliable in many areas particularly the marginal land areas. Third, there is 
tendency in distribution to focus on big urban centers such as Nairobi and Mombassa. The 
flow of foodstuffs in rural areas tends to be from surplus food producing areas to the west 
and north (west of Nairobi, Nyanza, Western and Rift provinces), to deficit areas to east 
(Eastern, Central and Coast provinces.) The marketing of each important staple and 
foodstuff is discussed in the following. 
1. \1aize is the most important food crop in the diet of Kenyans as well as beef and 
milk. \1aize is the most widely consumed food in Kenya moreover the dominant staple for 
low income households. High income groups have heavy biases towards processed 
foodstuffs. Other tuber plants such as cassava, plantain, millet and sorghums supplement 
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maize. Maize marketing faces problems that include inability to supply deficit areas, and 
mismanagement of national stocks including decisions over exports and imports. For 
example, acute shortages were experienced in 1961, 1965, and 1971 causing a rise in 
imports. Other problems have been shortages in problem areas while there was plenty in 
producing areas. The Maize Produce Board has control over marketing of Kenya's maize. 
It operated thirty-three storage depots in 1970s. Licensed agents buy the product from 
producers and deliver it to the nearest depots. From depots the Board delivers maize to 
millers and wholesalers, and these in turn deliver to retailers who sell maize at a fixed price. 
One of the most important functions of the Maize Board is to ensure equitable distribution 
of maize from surplus areas to areas of deficit in Kenya. However, one can suggest that 
delivery through the state-run Maize Board is inefficient because of administrative inertia 
and the lack of competition. 
One other problem stems from the fact that the local market sales are more efficient and 
provide cheaper products than the board systems. In addition, illegal black markets are 
more efficient in providing supply of products at longer distances to marginal areas and 
abroad. 
The most serious problem is the inability of the Board and the Ministry of Agriculture 
to manage storage facilities. For example, some of the shortages in the 1970s were due to 
insufficient storage facilities. In areas of surplus production the pricing policy discourages 
production and incentives to sell to the Board. For example, the prices of the Maize 
Produce Board are high compared to their private and local counterparts. In areas of deficit 
production the price is high which gives incentives to people to produce their own maize. A 
conclusion can be reached that food pricing in Kenya is a problem. Also inefficiency 
comes from the licensed agents used by the Board to control the marketing of the produce. 
That is why illegal marketing in some cases and places has been more successful than 
marketing organized through government channels. 
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2. Beef is a luxury consumer good for many households, 15 especially in higher income 
groups. Beef and dairy products account for higher market prices than maize. However, 
beef is the most important source of protein in Kenya. The pastoral people, the Kamba and 
Somali, for example, are the. most producers of beef and rely on it for their cash income. 
On the other hand, the Livestock Marketing Division of the Ministry of Agriculture plays an 
important role in getting supplies from remote producers to the Kenya Meat Commission 
(KMC). However, the livestock marketing system is still relatively undeveloped 
particularly in the more remote areas. 
The market of beef suffers many problems. Among others is the lack of enough 
facilities to bring livestock from producers to finishers, processors and consumers. 
Furthermore, legal monopoly granted to the KMC in the urban areas kills competition and 
depriYes the customer of choice. Pricing policy adds to legal monopoly of KMC as another 
problem for the beef industry. The policy of lower consumer prices benefits the 
consumers but not the producers. 
3. Dairy products in Kenya are of substantial quantities and high quality. There is large 
consumption of dairy products in the diet of Kenyans; milk and milk products have been 
traditionally largely consumed in Kenya. The value of dairy products ranks second to beef 
among major foodstuffs. The most fundamental problem in the marketing of dairy 
products is the control over dairy marketing by the Kenya Cooperative Creameries that has 
a monopoly of powers. Another problem as in the case of coffee comes from the 
smallholder cooperatives which are inefficient. They suffer from similar problems as the 
smallholders in cash crop production: inadequate training of staff, inadequate control over 
the officials that leads to mismanagement of funds. 
l ~ See Ghai (Leys 1975). 
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4. Sugar is a significant component of the diet in Kenya. It is used not only at the 
household level, but also industrially for sweet drinks and others. Sugar is mostly 
produced in Western Kenya and a little at the coast where large scale factories were 
developed on estate produc~ion. The major problems of sugar marketing are: ( 1) the 
pricing policy, (2) underutilization of factory capacity, as well as excessive production 
costs, and (3) inefficiency of the distribution system. Other problems are met in harvesting 
and transp011ation of sugarcane because of undeveloped agricultural machinery. 
Heyer et al. conclude that although food distribution at the national scale as a whole 
suffers inefficiency. They acknowledge, however, that informal traditional distribution 
works better. This observation supports that the distribution of food that take place from 
private channels functions more efficiently as it is the case for the West Africa region and 
the rest of the developing world. 
In summary Kenya's experience with statutory trading authorities has been 
unsatisfactory in the food marketing and distribution. The problems are the incidence of 
pricing problems and the lack of market competition which cause high costs and poor 
quality of services as well as an inefficient distribution system. Clearly the problem lies not 
only in low levels of food production but also in the marketing and distribution systems. 
Pricin£ of foodstuffs. In Kenya, the government fixes the price of major foodstuffs at all 
points of exchange in the market chain (see Figure 22). Also, the government since the 
1920s has been involved in setting standards for marketing, for example, the introduction 
of the grading of maize. The main problems with excessive controls are operational 
inefficiency and high cost of foodstuffs. High cost may arise in two situations: lack of 
market competition in the production and marketing, and marketing through the smallholder 
cooperative. In the first case the lack of competition does not give a wide range of choices 
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to the consumer. In the second case smallholder cooperatives alone lack resources to 
organize efficient marketing at the national level. 
There are other problems associated with official price policy, two of which seem of 
interest. First, big produce~s because of their market share seriously influence prices 
regardless of the Produce Boards balancing position towards small producers. Second, 
prices do not follow supply-demand dynamism, which makes them inadequate sometimes 
to the consumer (Shapouri et. 1986). 
CONTEMPORARY KENYA (1979 - 1990s) 
Starting from 1978, Kenya continued to experience the after shocks of the oil price 
hikes of 1973 and the following world recession of the 1980s. These were manifested in 
( 1) the imbalance of the terms of trade due to increased energy bills, (2) increased price of 
manufactured products coupled with the decline of commodity export prices, and (3) 
increase in food imports to sustain domestic food supply. Especially in 1980, as seen 
previously, disincentives caused a decline in food production. The structures of Kenya's 
politic al economy from 1978 to the present have been laid by the Kenyatta regime. 
On the political side, Arap Moi continued with Kenyatta's legacy, and rapidly paved the 
way for his own rule. In 1982, an aborted coup pushed Moi into a dictatorial rule. On the 
economic side. the increased indebtedness of the country and the debt crisis (with a 
debt/export ratio of 342. % in 1987, see TABLE XVIII) transformed Kenya from middle-
income country in the 1960' s and early 1970s to low-income country in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s even to African standards (Nelson 1984; EIU 1991 ). Added to its increased 
population growth (3% per annum on average), Kenya has gone from a self-sufficient 
produ.:er of food crops before independence, a moderate importer/exporter of cereals after 
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1964, to become dependent on cereal imports in the 1980s. This part of the chapter will 
concentrate on these aspects, particularly on food production. 
The politics and government. The politics of Kenya and the structures of its government 
(see Figure 23) have not significantly changed after Jomo Kenyatta's death of (Wiseman 
1991 ). It can be said that the politics have gotten worse, especially with the crisis of 
governance and declining economic conditions starting from the beginning of the 1980s. 
Since independence Daniel Torotich Arap Moi has been a significant figure in post-
independence politics. He became President after the death of Kenyatta in 1978. Moi was 
born in 1924 in Baringo District (from a Kalenjin ethnic group of Kenya) and educated 
locally. In 1960, he became chairman of KADU, a party that was formed to represent the 
interests of non-Kikuyu Kenyan Africans. In the pre-independence government he was 
Minister of Education, then Minister of local government. In 1963 as Kenya became 
independent with KADU as the main opposition party to KANU led by Kenyatta, Moi was 
asserted as opposition leader. After KADU merged with the ruling KANU party in 1964, 
Moi was appointed Minister of Home Affairs. Of all the non-Kikuyu politicians, he 
became closest to Kenyatta, and in 1966 he became Vice President of the party. In 1967 he 
became vice-president of the country and leader of government business in parliament. On 
the death of Kenyatta in 1978, Moi became head of state in what was, to the surprise of 
some. a peaceful succession. 
Constitutionally Moi's succession was a normal procedure and he got the support of 
many Kikuyu politicians. He asserted his incontestable position when he was unanimously 
elected leader of KANU the same year he took power. However, Moi lacked the personal 
charisma that had made the success of Kenyatta and his regime. Therefore, to reinforce his 
own power base he projected himself as walking on the footsteps of Kenyatta when he 
pronounced his philosophy as nyayo (meaning 'footsteps'). This strategy was just aimed 
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at securing his power base because at the same time the political system became more 
authoritarian. The arrest and torture of political opponents have since damaged Kenya's 
reputation on human rights in the 1980s and 1990s, which in the past had been relatively 
good (Ntanda 1993). For example, the police and the army have been frequently used in 
Kenya to oppress and repress citizens' demonstrations and by that way have helped to 
maintain Moi' s statusquo. 
Because all legal opposition to the government was banned, opponents were forced 
since to use violent and subversive strategies. In 1982, an attempted coup led by sections 
of the air force and supported by students and other disaffected groups was put down with 
difficulty and followed by mass arrests, the disbanding of the air force, and closure of the 
university. Scholars were arrested and tortured (Wa Thiong'o 1983). 
More recently there has been considerable evidence of the existence of a large-scale 
subversive organization known as Mwakenya (a Swahili acronym for the Union of 
Nationalists to Liberate Kenya) which appears to have widespread support, although this is 
impossible to measure. Because of the nature of the Kenyan political system, open 
opposition to Moi seems doomed. Moi has used key positions in the armed forces, the 
government. and private sector to control the whole country. Loyal members of his clan 
have been placed at key management positions, which makes it difficult to challenge his 
authority. 
In foreign relations Moi has followed a pro-Western line as his predecessor, although 
sensiti \-iry to western criticisms of his record on human rights has sometimes strained 
relations. A diplomatic tug of war with the United States in 1991 (EIU 1991) is an 
example. Although not without problems, the Kenyan economy has continued under his 
leaders.hip to be amongst the strongest in Africa, a factor that underlies the relative stability 
of the political system and the continuity of the leadership. 
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Economic indicators. Kenya's economy has been predominantly agricultural since the 
colonial time. Sales of cash crops (coffee and tea as main ones) have provided revenues 
for the economy. However, in the 1990s the economy has been in decline. Kenya's 
balance of payments worsened after the mid-1970s (see TABLE XV and XVI) and since 
then the country has accused negative terms of trade and has been locked in debt burden. 
Indicators of Kenya's economic problems can be revealed in its debt burden. In the 1980s 
Kenya became one of the most debt-stricken countries in Africa and its status shifted to a 
low-income country. As indicated by the data on TABLE XVII and TABLE XVIII, the 
Debt/GDP ratio is alarming for Kenya (342.0% in 1987). It doesn't give a chance to the 
country to get out of the disastrous situation. 
Many reasons have been responsible for the downfall of the Kenyan economy. First, 
the oil shock crisis of the 1970s created a financial burden to Kenya with high energy bills. 
Second, following the oil crisis, a glut of agricultural commodity exports in the 
international market and the decline in consumption in developed economies stagnated 
Kenyan export folio income compared to the increasing import folio (see TABLE XVI). 
Therefore, the country experienced net trade deficit. Third, Kenya has been since locked in 
a debt cycle that makes it difficult for the country's economy to pick up because of debt 
servicing with a debt/export ratio of 342.0 in 1987 (see TABLE XVII and XVIII), a total 
debt servicing ratio representing 1.8% of GDP revenues, and 20.6% of earnings from 
exports of goods and services (see TABLE XIX). 
Kenya's economy has suffered tremendous decline, so has the food import increased as 
of 1980. Kenya in 1981-83 was listed among countries with sharp food needs (Shapouri 
et al. 1986). In 1990s, Kenya figures out as part of the hunger belt of Africa, especially 
with the fast growing population (Hanley 1992A; Hanley 1992B). The next section 
investigates food production and supply since 1980. 
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Food production for domestic needs 
Kenya was an importer and exporter of cereals occasionally since 1964. However, 
after 1973 Kenya began to experience food problems. Raikes ( 1991) suggests that Kenya 
developed a large-scale surplus of cereal and livestock production sector during the colonial 
period. which generated surplus for the economy from exports (maize mainly) and 
provided income and food supply for the populations. Howe\·er, with rapid growth of 
urbanization and population since independence, food surpluses experienced during 
colonial period rapidly disappeared. The study suggests that Kenya became a net importer 
of food in the form of commercial imports (see TABLE XX) and food aid packages mainly 
from the US PL.480 programs (see TABLE X and XI). Also the price of foodstuffs 
compared to other expenses was too high. 
Although. during 1969-1976 Kenya was occasionally exporter of cereals to 
neighboring countries, the period 1979-1984 saw an unprecedented food gap, especially 
caused by the 1978/79 disincentives and the severe drought of 1984. Kenya became reliant 
on food imports and food aid because internal production could not satisfy the needs of the 
fast growing population. Kenya's food aid dependency index increased from 4.8% in 
1966-68 to 7.4% in 1981-83 (see TABLE XII). These numbers clearly depict three 
periods: the period immediately after independence when Kenya had to import cereals to 
meet its domestic demands, the period 1971-73 when Kenya produced enough surplus of 
cereals and became a net exporter since 1969, and the period 1981-83 when the country 
experienced severe food shortages. 
Maj or reasons for the decline have been outlined by Shapouri et al. as (I) bad weather 
conditions, (2) lack of incentives to small producers, and (3) government's lack of interest 
in food production as the major component of the crisis. These reasons strongly intersect 
with orher studies such as Heyer et al. and Raikes. Both Raikes and Heyer recognize 
government neglect of the food production sector and lack of incentives to producers in 
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marketing and pricing of foodstuffs. Raikes recognizes the vulnerability of Kenya's 
agriculture to weather conditions due to the climatic and ecological setting of country (only 
9% of the total area are fertile land). In this sense Raikes particularly stresses the lack of 
efficient and significant irrigation to offset the negative effect of droughts on agriculture 
production. Raikes has gone further to accuse fast growing population and increased 
herding as contributing to food shortages and lack of agricultural land. The three studies 
have accused government neglect of food production in policies. However, Heyer et al. 
and Raikes have gone further to find roots of the problem in the colonial setting of the 
country's economy and the subsequent disruption of sustained traditional economies and 
way of life. 
In the following, food production methods and supply in Kenya are examined. 
Second, the food crisis in Kenya is investigated. Finally, government policies and some 
issues related to food production in Kenya are addressed. 
1. Production and supply. Kenya's food production has largely remained subsistence 
production done at the village level (Shapouri et al. 1986; Nelson 1984 ). With the 
exception of some smallholders and few commercial plantations of maize and sugarcane, 
mostly food production is done by women in the rural areas. Food products are 
commercialized in the cities and local markets in the countryside in exchange for cash. The 
tools have remained mostly traditional as indicated by the degree of mechanization of 
agriculture (3.6 tractors/1000 hectares) and irrigation (2.7% of total agricultural land area, 
see T ...\ .. BLE XXI). Although the use of fertilizers and tractors is not necessarily an 
appropriate indicator of sustainable food production capacity in LDCs, it is, however, a 
good indicator of the level of modernization of agriculture. It was pointed out earlier that 
the industrial sector has not helped with tools to facilitate labour and to increase the output. 
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Shapouri's et al. study shows a decline in food production and availability as well as 
the daily per capita calorie availability starting from 1978. TABLE XXII shows that food 
production per capita has declined from 92.7 in 1985 to 88.3% in 1987 while TABLE VIII 
indicates a stagnating calorie deficiency with only 86% of the average daily requirement. In 
addition TABLE XIV indicates that on average Kenyans spend 42 % of their household 
budget on the food they consume. 
Food supply should be taken in the present context as the sources of available food in 
the Kenyan market. There are two sources of food supply: food produced locally and a 
second category composed of food imports and food aid. Shapouri et al. clearly illustrate 
that Kenya has become a net importer of food and recipient of food aid in the 1980s. 
TABLE XIII indicates that on average food aid represented 6.32% of Kenya's total 
domestic food production between 1981 and 1983. The consequence of reliance on food 
imports and food aid to meet domestic needs are the worsening of the debt crisis and a 
threat to the political stability of Kenya. 
2. Understanding the Food crisis in Kenya. In the 1980s and 1990s as the statistics 
show Kenya faced food shortages and deteriorating food supply reserves. The study by 
• 
Shapouri et al. found two major reasons to explain the food crisis in many African 
countries including Kenya. The first point stems from the food production methods used 
in Kenya. Mostly, production has remained subsistence with the machete and the ax to 
clear a piece of land for cultivation, and the hoe or the manual plow as the major tools used 
to till the earth. The use of traditional tools demands intense labour and physical effort 
from the farmer, which added to the low calorie intake prevents a significant output to 
satisfy the needs of the fast growing population. Another problem facing the food 
production sector in Kenya stems from its total dependency on weather conditions. Poorly 
developed (or non-existent in some areas) irrigation system makes agriculture in Kenya and 
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many African countries extremely vulnerable to droughts as opposed to their counterparts 
in Asia and Latin America. 
The second major reason the study supports is that the government has neglected the 
food production sector by putting too many incentives only on cash crop production. The 
government has relied too much on food imports and food aid to "fix" the domestic food 
gap. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have inherited cash crop-based economies 
from colonial legacy. The food production sector has been given scant attention. The 
consequence for Kenya and the other 10 countries studied in Shapouri et al.'s study is that 
declining per capita food production has meant falling per capita food availability. A reason 
is that food aid or food imports cannot fill the food need gap required by the fast growing 
population. Other failures of government policies include the lack of incentives and credits 
to women for food production, the lack of storage infrastructures and the poor marketing 
and distribution systems. 
Governments of the region, Kenya's particularly have relied too much on food aid and 
food imports. As the study suggests the consequences are numerous. Reliance on food 
imports increases dependency and debt burden. Also, reliance on food inputs from outside 
in the long run creates disincentives to domestic self-help and affects tastes and patterns of 
consumption. In Kenya's case, food aid and food imports as the statistics show, have not 
solved the problem of food gap, instead the problem has exacerbated. The statistics in 
1989 and early 1990s show a further decaying situation that contradicts Eileen Kennedy's 
claims that income from cash crop production has significantly improved the food security 
of the Kenyan household. 
Eileen Kennedy's studies have focused on the effect of cash crop production on health 
and nutrition in Kenya (Kennedy 1987) and the income nutritional effects of 
commercialization of agriculture in southeastern Kenya (Kennedy 1989). In the first study, 
the author acknowledges that increased household income from commercial agriculture can 
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alleviate the hunger problem because more income to the household means more buying 
power for the food. Therefore, more food security and calorie intake for children are 
expected. The second study has found out the children of families working in the 
sugarcane industry in southern Kenya were malnourished on average. Her conclusion 
entails a small flaw about the relationship between income and food sufficiency in Kenya. 
First, she seems to ignore the cost of food compared to other living expenses. TABLE 
XIV shows that food-related expenditures for Kenyans represented on the minimum 40% 
of the household income, which is quite high. It does not leave the latitude to even those 
employed to save enough to satisfy other basic needs such as health and education. 
Furthermore, with such high cost of food, domestic savings cannot be accomplished. 
Second, Eileen seems to concentrate her study too much on food availability with the 
capacity to buy food, instead of basing her conclusion on the food supply per capita. 
Although agriculture production has increased as a whole in Kenya from 1985 to 1987 (see 
TABLE XXII), food production per capita on the contrary has sharply declined from 1985 
(92.7) to 1987 (88.3). Furthermore, Kenya is below the calorie requirement of FAQ (only 
86% of the daily calorie intake requirement). Third, the "proletarianization" of peasants 
have made them particularly vulnerable to international shifts in the prices of agricultural 
commodities. Instead of food security for the household, reliance on cash crop economy 
makes peasants dependent on urban centers for their self-help in basic needs. 
Another issue is the government dependency on food aid 16 or food imports to the 
neglect of more efficient policies to encourage food production (Shapouri 1986; Raikes 
1991 ). As will be discussed in CHAPTER IV and expanded in CHAPTER V, more 
fruitful and sustainable policy orientations to achieve self-help in food production and 
16 Kenya is a recipient of food aid from EEC, World Bank and USAID (Raikes 1991). However, 
World Bank and USAID are Kenya's major donors of food aid. For example, food aid increased in Kenya in 
1984 nc)t only due to drought. The preferential strategic importance of Kenya to the US interests in the 
region. 
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supply in Kenya (and by extension many countries of sub-Saharan Africa experiencing 
food crisis) are the following. First is the shift of emphasis from cash crop production by 
provision of incentives to men for food production and the empowerment of women. 
Second, curtailing of food imports needs to be implemented to force people to produce 
more food domestically. Third, improving marketing, distribution and pricing of 
foodstuffs is necessary to improve output levels. Fourth, re-organization and development 
of rural economies around food production activity when applicable will help rural areas 
and retain people there. Raikes' arguments are discussed in the following as alternative 
explanations for Kenya's food crisis in the 1990s. 
Raikes has identified five major reasons to explain the food problems in Kenya. First, 
he accuses the unequal distribution of fertile and cultivable land in Kenya. Kenya's fertile 
and high-rainfall land in the center and west covers only 20% of the whole land whereas 
arid or semi-desert areas cover 80% in the east, north and south. The Kitui District9 for 
example, is a dry area that faces severe food shortages. Excess of cattle grazing has added 
to arid soil to cause food shortages. Although cattle are the most economical and nutritional 
resource in the region, it cannot solve the food problems in time of shortages. Another 
region. the North-Eastern Province inhabited by the Somali pastoralists is more arid and 
faces food shortages as well. The pastoralists have practiced some sort of irrigation. 
Howe\'er, with droughts, water shortages prevent the very basic traditional irrigation from 
having any significant beneficial effect for crops. Other elements such as the large-scale 
Bura irrigation threatens the survival of the subsistence methods of these pastoralists. 
Better irrigation and food distribution can offset possibilities of food shortages due to bad 
weather in the sense that food surplus from agriculture-rich regions could be efficiently 
distributed to marginal areas. In addition, a better distribution system could provide 
cheaper meat from livestock-rich areas (Kamba district and the nomadic pastoralist regions) 
to the other areas. 
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Second, fast population growth has contributed to shortage of land and shortage of 
food even in areas of fertile land and high agriculture output. In the Kisii District located in 
the fertile highlands region, for example, the problem is not arid soil, but overcrowding 
which causes landlessness and poverty. Kisii has the highest rural population density in 
the country ( 400 per square km) and the highest population growth rate in Kenya ( 4 percent 
per annum.) The food is available but many families cannot afford it because it is very 
expensive compared to the household income. For those who have small plots of land they 
cannot produce enough to meet the needs of the family. Kisii, since colonial time, has been 
a major grower of cash-crops such as coffee, tea, sugar-cane, sweet bananas, fruits and 
vegetables. However, studies have shown that increased earnings from cash crops did not 
mean better nutrition, in particular for children in the Kisii District. Those studies, for 
example, Kennedy Elaine's study of the nutritional effect of sugar-cane and cash crop 
production on family's food security (Kennedy 1987; Kennedy 1989) showed that 
peasants household increased to attainable food security levels, but the kids were 
malnourished. Similarly, population growth in the cities, especially urban middle class 
population has increased the demand for more food. It can be supported that population 
growth is not always a problem if better policies for food production are put in place, 
because they could take advantage of cheap and abundant labour to produce more food for 
urban populations. l 7 
17 :\fany policy advisers in developed economies have pointed the finger at population growth in Third 
World countries as the major cause for widespread hunger and destruction of the environment. Therefore, 
they haYe pushed LDCs for more population control (Barbara Crossette, Sept. 4, 1994. U.N. Meeting 
Facimr . .\ngry Debate on Population. The New York Times. September 4. 1994. pp. 1.4.). 
The author of this thesis contends that population growth is not al ways a problem. Population growth 
is indeed a problem when the country does not objectively have any means to produce enough food for its 
populations. This thesis accuses the neglect of food production in government policies and economic 
experts advising as why hunger is spreading in Africa. The supporting fact for this argument is that there is 
much bnd, and cheap labour that is abundant even more because the industrial sector has not yet developed 
enough to absorb the excess labour. 
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Third, according to Raikes, colonization brought an abrupt disruption of societies, 
rinderpest; famine, etc., and the alienation of African land to the benefit of the settlers. 
However, even after independence the problem has remained. The class of rich peasant 
and land owners have the biggest chunks of land while the remainder of the population are 
either landless or have a very small portion of land that does not produce much output. For 
example, in fertile highlands, increased population has led to fragmentation of already small 
farms with reduced output potential or to landlessness. The argument of colonial 
disruption of the African way of life is sound. Although economic independence of 
African countries is still questionable, history and colonization, however, cannot be blamed 
forever for African ills while forgetting the important contribution of flawed government 
policies and mismanagement on the economic and political crises within independent 
African countries. 
Fourth, another problem that came with independence is the increase in herd 
populations with improved breeding and animal disease control. As a result, pastoralists 
have had growing herd populations yet inadequate rainfall and grazing resources. 
Therefore, peasants on the edges of cropping areas have been pushed into the pastoral 
Siding with Amin (1973) and other scholars (Davidson, 1989) of the "reformed" Dependency School, 
the present research supports that developed economies have increasingly put emphasis on the Green 
Revolution in the 1970s not necessarily with the states purpose to "help these countries rip fully the 
benefit of the niche by specializing in what they produce better -- that is agriculture". Rather, they have 
encouraged more cash crop production to make the prices of these commodities fall in the international 
market. particularly after results of cartel-like movements such as the oil crisis of 1973 have proved to be 
able to shake the world economy or to make consumers of the North dependent on producers of the South. 
The sharp decline in the price of these commodities as of the end of the 1970s can justify this logic 
conclusion. The contradiction of the Green Revolution movement is clear: it has encouraged agriculture to 
produce cash crop while neglecting food production that is primary to sustain human life. 
Addressing the issue of environmental degradation, extensive cultivation with forest burning and 
firewood consumption have been accused as the main causes of deforestation which in turn cause soil 
erosion. This premise seems sound. However, the real threat of deforestation, destruction of animal 
species· habitat. and effect on global warming comes from the need for hard wood products in MDCs, 
particulJ..rly Europe. The peasants in Latin America, Africa and Asia are not first responsible of the cutting 
down of old growth forests they are unjustly accused of. Except in some cases such as Thailand, wood 
exports mostly benefit consumers of the MDCs, MNCs, and the elites in LDCs even when revenues from 
these exports seem to provide foreign exchange and jobs for local economies. 
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margins and face hunger. This thesis differs with Raikes in that the problem with grazing 
is not due to the explosion in the number of herd heads. Rather, traditional livestock 
farming practices of the pastoralists and grazing can no longer be sustained with fast 
population growth. If grazil_"lg grass is cultivated as it is done in MDCs the problem of 
agricultural land degradation due to grazing can be solved. This would imply a change in 
the lifestyle of nomadic pastoralists from nomadic to sedentary and from extensive to 
intensive grazing. 
Fifth, in the fertile highlands, the adoption of cash-crop production for export and the 
government's total emphasis on this type of agriculture has caused a decline of food 
production for domestic consumption. A solution to this problem seems to encourage food 
production at home while curtailing the imports of food from developed economies. A 
problem with this solution would come from the opposition of MDCs (US, EEC, Canada, 
Australia, Japan and others) who benefit politically or economically from exports of cheap 
foodstuffs to LDCs. Expanding on this line, structural setting in the world market such as 
the reduction of trade tariffs imposed by recent GATT agreements (Uruguay Round) 
impose an "open door" policy to powerless LDCs as a prerequisite for obtaining loans from 
the IMF. These countries would face a dilemma: curtail food imports from the MDCs to 
develop their own food production sector and face trade sanctions or cutoff of aid, or 
continue to import food and become dependent on MDCs to feed themselves. This thesis 
supports to choose the lesser of the two devils, that is, the first strategy because in the long 
run domestic self-help in food production will be achieved as a benefit. 
Sixth, production methods have remained subsistence methods for small producers in 
general and peasants particularly. In addition, the role of food production has been left to 
women alone to feed the family and to take care of the household while the men have 
concentrated only on cash crops or off-farm jobs. Therefore, men's contribution to food 
production has faded because they no longer help women in this task as they used to do in 
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pre-colonial times. Added to diversion of male labour from food production, poverty has 
caused dispossession in certain areas. For example, privatization of group ranches in 
Maasailand has led to the selling of land by pastoralists. In the N arok District, the hunter 
gatherer Okiek sell their land to the Kipsigis and Gusii farmers to earn cash to pay debts, 
therefore, dispossess their families (women and children) from the main input source for 
food crops. 
Finally Raikes has accused government policies of causing a decline in food 
production: inefficient, capital intensive and environmentally non-sustainable projects such 
as the B ura irrigation scheme; inefficient distribution of food crops, flawed marketing 
policies; too much reliance on food aid and food imports which cut the incentives for self-
help domestically; the lack of infrastructures for storage and distribution of foodstuffs. In 
the case of Kenya, for example, there have been food shortages following very big 
harvests because of lack of storage, and food shortages have been experienced in problem 
areas while the rest of the country was having plenty of food.) This area falls in the sphere 
of policy implementation and will be expanded in CHAPTER V with a proposal of new 
strategies to boost food production. 
Other go,·ernment policies involve expensive large scale irrigation schemes that create 
environmental damage and add to the debt of the country. One of these schemes is the 
M wea \ Tabere Rice Scheme that was practiced by the government on large scale. It is a 
large scale scheme for production of irrigated rice on peasant plots through block-farming 
and under the supervision of a manager. The plots are contiguous rectangular blocks so 
that mechanized operations can be possible. This scheme is responsible of 70% of the total 
rice produced in Kenya for official market. The scheme undoubtedly has helped to increase 
production of rice. However, it is shown that the women who work in those rice schemes 
lack food security for their families, therefore, malnutrition has not been curbed for those 
families as hoped. The Bura irrigation system is based on the same principle as the Mwea 
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Rice Scheme. However, like many big irrigation systems in Africa, it is capital intensive 
and may not yield the benefits expected. 
The Bura large scale irrigation scheme has been granted financial support initially by the 
ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific countries group). 18 Of all ACP members, Kenya is 
the largest borrower from the European Investment Bank. The Government has been 
granted a number of agricultural projects among which the Bura irrigation scheme on the 
Tana River, of which the EDF (European Development Fund) is a part-financier together 
with others. However, delays in construction and other technical problems have threatened 
the project. First, production of hydroelectricity upstream has rendered unpredictable the 
flow of the river and level, which threatens the viability of that irrigation system. Another, 
a social problem involves local Somali pastoralists who used the riverside land for grazing 
during the dry season and stock water. With the irrigation system, the water is retained 
upstream by dams, cutting its use to the pastoralists downstream. The problems mentioned 
have discouraged some donors involved in the Bura irrigation project. 
Another project has been The Machachos District Development Programme. This 
programme has been directed to improving the marketing system for cotton. Other funds 
have gone to rural infrastructures, credit to farmers, food crops, water and health. 
Raikes has also accused Western multilateral institutions and donor organizations of 
supporting ill-thought projects; he gave two examples. The first is the World Bank 
Integrated Agriculture Development Programme in Kenya (IADP) in the late 1970s, which 
. turned to haYe a very negative impact on small farmers. The project worked in a sense that 
18 The ACP is African, Caribbean and Pacific countries group {Raikes 1991 ). These countries are tied 
to EEC through the Lome Convention signed in 1975. The convention is agreed at five-year interval and 
covers aid and trade. The European Development Fund (EDF) is the account out of which the project aid 
agreed under the Lome Convention is funded. The group is based around ex-colonial possessions of the 
member states of the EEC but has spread to include other independent countries in sub-Saharan Africa. EEC 
aid to ACP can be divided in two major parts. One part goes to Third World Countries that are not part of 
ACP. The larger portion of this aid is composed of grants for items other than food. This accounts for 40-
50% of the total aid. The rest of it is made of loans, capital spending, and administrative costs. Food aid is 
given entirely on grant basis. 
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it provided the peasants in small co-operative unions with credit to buy farm equipment and 
fertilizers. However, the cost of these imported products was high and not affordable in 
the long run by the unions. In particular, diminishing returns of agriculture sales since the 
late 1970s were due to a sharp decline agricultural commodities prices in the international 
market. Several co-operative unions went bankrupt. Although the program was initially 
meant to assist 'weak' co-operatives with credit, it left so many deeply indebted as to be 
virtually non-operational. Peasants became reluctant to sell their products to co-operatives 
in a fear that the proceeds would be taken for debt payment. In the following, many 
peasants became unwilling to take loans afterwards because of what happened. A direct 
consequence was the lack of incentives to food production that the country experienced in 
the late 1970s. 
Another flawed policy is the food aid policy of the World Bank and USAID towards 
Kenya: both are the country's major food and aid donors. Important food reform policy in 
Kenya concentrated on channeling food aid and other resources to the National Cereals and 
Produce Board through a government and multi-donor committee. 19 NC&PB has 
monopoly over pricing controls. Private traders are licensed in some areas, but most 
producers have to sell to NC&PB except for a small amount in the local market. This 
policy has encouraged contraband and hikes of prices in the market. For some it has 
created disincentives because producers are paid moths late by the government. The 
NC&PB deducts money from sales to pay back credits from donors to alleviate the 
pressure. By early 1988, in return to substantial EEC aid payments, the Kenyan 
Government had formally agreed to privatize part of domestic cereals' market. 
Raikes concludes that severe food shortages in the future seem inevitable unless the off-
faim jobs are increased drastically. However, he acknowledges that with present economic 
conditions, food is non-affordable to many because of its high cost. 
19 This policy is similar to EEC policy. 
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Conclusions drawn from the three studies (Heyer et al.. Shapouri et al.. and Raikes) 
The problems raised by the three studies are strikingly similar (see TABLE XXIV). In 
particular, all three have acc~sed (1) government neglect of the food production sector, (2) 
flawed government policies, and (3) the impact of structural setting of the world economy 
and its fluctuations on Kenya's economy. Particularly Heyer et al. and Raikes' findings 
have very much in common. Since both studies have been done almost twenty years apart, 
it can be concluded in the present research that not much has been done since the Kenyatta 
era to improve the food production sector in Kenya significantly. Other conclusion is that 
the colonial characteristics of Kenya still contribute a major part in the current problems 
faced by the country. 
Amin's critique of development failure in sub-Saharan African countries and the 
exploitation (through international economic setting and institutions) of these nations by 
developed nations has also insisted on similar points (Amin 1990). Davidson (1989) has 
demonstrated that a constant neglect of the food production sector in most sub-Saharan 
African countries is a result of the overemphasis on cash crop production. This trend is a 
legacy of the colonial setting of these economies. These economies were designed to serve 
the needs of the former metropolises in raw materials and agriculture commodities such as 
cocoa, tea. coffee and other. Raikes joins Davidson when he goes further than the other 
two studies to focus on the structure of Kenya's economy as a dependent economy setup 
for cash crop exports. Investigation of colonial Kenya proved in CHAPTER II that the 
current structure of the country's economy as a cash crop exporter was set up during the 
colonial period and has remained so for most countries in the region. Amin suggests the 
same thing when he denounces cash crop economies in West Africa as a continuation of 
neo-colonialism (Amin 1973). 
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While the other two studies have focused much on current leadership's responsibility in 
the African food crisis, Raikes and Amin, however, have dwelled much on blaming 
colonization of distorting the traditional economies of African countries. It is worth 
considering that historical ,analysis, although it should be considered in the search of 
solutions for deeply rooted social problems, should not preclude responsibilities of current 
policies on the problem. This remark applies much for the food crisis in Africa. This 
thesis acknowledges that blame should be put on the colonial setting of sub-Saharan 
African economies and the negative effects of colonization. However, dwelling too much 
on those may lead to neglect the important fact that African leadership has not done much to 
solve the problem due to mismanagement and lack of skill, particularly when other 
colonized regions such as South East Asia and Latin America, are developing at fast speed 
in the 1990s. In his theory of capitalist imperialism, Lenin recognized as Karl Marx the 
role of capitalism in developing the world, yet unevenly. Also it has been widely 
recognized in Development Economics and Modernization Theory that capitalism 
progressively destroys traditional methods of production, hence the way of life, to replace 
it with capitalist mode of production and lifestyles. 
Of the three studies only Raikes has addressed population growth as a serious issue that 
causes food shortages. This research sides with Raikes in the argument that food 
production should try to match population growth to avoid food shortages. However, 
contention can be raised that population growth is not necessarily a problem when the 
potentiality to produce food is dormant and has not been exhausted yet. What this means is 
that government policy, if it had encouraged food production the food crisis should have 
been lessened. Some may contend that more population depletes the environment. 20 This 
20 U.N. ~leeting Facing Angry Debate on Population. The New York Times. September 4. 1994. 
pp. 1 .+. (Barbara Crossette. Sept. 4 1994). The recent UN population conference has unanimously 
recognized population growth as a universal problem with the fact that in 20 years 2 billion people have 
been added to the planet. However, the author suggests that not much agreement has been reached on the 
implications of ropulation growth for natural resources. Many in the South accuse developed nations to 
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assertion suites more to cases when the use of the environment is done extensively rather 
than intensively as the new environmental protection trend dictates in developed economies. 
In addition, in a country such as Kenya where industrialization has not significantly picked 
up yet, the abundant and cheap labour should be redirected to food production hoping that 
with development of the industrial sector the surplus labour will be used in manufacturing 
and service industries. 
Another argument against blanket population control is that natural regulation of 
population (diseases) may reduce the population to irreversible low if the growth of 
population falls below levels that are not sustainable for the given country. For example, 
Sweden in the past encouraged excessive birth controls and found themselves forced to 
imp011 more immigrant labour and to encourage births because the population had become 
too old. It is agreed, however, that some level of population control is necessary, 
particularly in the cities where people are without jobs and cannot afford a large family 
anymore. This remark calls for supporting the point that the first two issues raised in this 
section (government neglect of the food production sector and flawed policies) and to some 
point the finger at poor populations in LDCs for responsibility in environmental degradation. In reality it 
is more the consumer in the North who is responsible for depletion of natural resources because of 
overconsumption. Barbara writes: 
"Can the earth sustain its present rate of population growth? Who is to blame for the 
destruction of natural resources. profligate consumers in industrial nations or desperate poor 
in overcrowded, underdeveloped countries who strip the land of vegetation in order to 
survive?" 
The present thesis supports that the major concern with population growth is not destruction of the 
environment per se in the South, rather it is the food supply and production to meet the needs of this 
population that worries policy makers. It is here that the neglect of food production by many governments 
is a serious problem. If more food was produced in LDCs, neither LDCs nor MDCs would be worried so 
much about "too many mouths to feed"; the problem would have been lessened at least a bit. 
The responsibility bears on everyone because even Western policy advisers have indirectly caused the 
neglect of food production in LDCs by pushing these countries into more cash crop production. Population 
control is needed in the long term because even in industrial nations, the outputs of mechanized agriculture 
have increasingly accused diminishing returns because of the overuse of soils and pollution. Therefore, 
supply of cheap foodstuffs from the North to the fast growing populations of the South is not sustainable 
in the long term. 
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extent the structural setting of the world economy and its institutions. These are real issues 
to consider in the search for solutions to the African food crisis in the 1990s. 
None of the studies cited in this section has addressed two issues of secondary 
importance but worth addre~sing in the search for causes of the food crisis in Kenya: ( 1) 
the change in food consumption habits and tastes of urban populations, and (2) the impact 
of the Green Revolution on self-help in food production. Addressing the first point, Heyer 
et al. have only alluded to the issue when they pointed out that as income grows, middle 
class populations in the cities tend to buy more expensive foods. In the case of Kenya, 
they have suggested that middle class families tend to buy imported cereals (rice, farina, 
and other), wheat products, and expensive meat versus consuming local staples such as 
com (which enters as the main staple in the menu of the average Kenyan) and root crops. 
Also, the psychology of tasting "products from developed countries" is not to be taken for 
granted when considered the critique that many have addressed to the Modernization 
School. That is, the reality that colonization has indirectly misled many in the colonies to 
think that products from the metropolis are necessarily of superior quality, good for their 
needs, therefore, a necessity to acquire for raising one's social status. 
It can be then suggested that penetration of the market by these "new foods," 
particularly easy-to-cook ones (rice and wheat products) has had significant adverse impact 
on the demand for local staples such as root and tuber crops. With the lessening of demand 
for the latter, it can be forecast based on the supply-demand dynamics that a lack of 
incentives to produce local staples follow. Also, it is widely accepted that capitalist market 
penetration not only affects traditional ways of life and production methods, but it also 
increases the tendency for new tastes. 
The second issue is the impact of the Green Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. The 
Green Revolution introduced the use of fertilizers in agriculture and high yield species. In 
the food crop sector notably it introduced high yield species of com and wheat particularly. 
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However, this thesis contends (see footnote in this chapter) that most of the policies have 
leaned on increasing the yield of cash crop production per hectare with the introduction of 
chemical fertilizers, insecticides, as well as high yield species of cocoa, coffee, tea, palm 
trees and other. The failure of the Green Revolution to provide self-help in food 
production for many sub-Saharan African countries in the 1990s justifies why this thesis 
concludes more harshly that these policies were not oriented towards food production 
specifically. 
Rather, they were more targeted towards increasing the yield of cash crops. 
Therefore, drawing from the fact that food production neglect by most countries in sub-
Saharan Africa has been continued while Western economic advisers have recommended 
growing more cash crop to earn foreign exchange, it is justified to conclude that the Green 
Revolution's apparent success in the 1970s was just a growing cancer for the food 
production sector of the economies of sub-Saharan Africa. It can be thought based on this 
argument that the Green Revolution was engineered by developed economies to glut the 
international market with cash crops so that their prices will drop down as dictated by 
supply-demand. 
CONCLUSIONS TO DRAW FROM COLONIAL LEGACY 
From this lengthy investigation on Kenya it can be concluded that the country has 
inherited important characteristics from the colonial period that still persist at all levels of 
the political economy of the country: governance and politics, the economy and food 
production in particular. 
On governance and politics the country inherited elitism, ethnic politics and paternalistic 
authoritarian mle (combined with personal mle in the hands of the President) as the regimes 
of Kenyatta and Moi have proved. These were the key characteristics of the Central and 
Provincial Administration during the colonial period. 
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TABLEXXIV 
CAUSES OF THE FOOD CRISIS IN KENYA 
Cause for food crisis in Heyer et Shapouri Raikes Amin Davidson 
Kenya al. et al. 
1. Structure of Kenya's NA NA A A A 
economy as agriculture and 
commodity exporter (Dependency (applied to 
applied to Africa in Africa in 
general) general) 
2. Colonial disruption of NA NA A A I 
native economies and way of 
life (Underdevelopment 
applied to Africa in 
general) 
3. Government neglect of A A A A I 
food production sector to (Maldevelopment 
emphasis on cash crops applied to Africa in 
general) 
4. Flawed government A A A A NA 
policies (poor production (poor (Maldevelopment 
methods and technology, production applied to Africa in 
marketing, distribution, methods and general) 
pricing) technology) 
5. Natural ecology of NA A A NA NA 
Kenya 
6. Population growth NA NA A NA NA 
7. Impact of Green NA NA NA I I 
Revolution policies 
8. Change in consumption NA NA NA I NA 
habits and tastes due to 
market penetration and new 
products 
9. Structural barriers set by I I I A A 
international economic (Unequal 
institutions which forces food development and 
imports (GA TI. CAP & US structural 
agriculture policies), impact dependency applied 
of international market to Africa) 
fluctuations 
Legend: A (addressed), NA (not addressed specifically), I (implied) 
The Kikuyu have continued to be very influential in politics and the political rivalry 
between Kikuyu and Luo on one hand and the minority ethnic groups versus Kikuyu and 
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Luo on the other. Also during Moi' s period a new rivalry has risen between his ethnic 
group (the Kalenjin) and other groups particularly the influential Kikuyu group. The reader 
can understand that these new rivalries mostly come from the crisis of control and 
corruption in the governmen~ and state institutions. The Kalenjin group has been favored 
by the regime to control key positions in the army, air force, police and administration (Wa 
Thiong'o 1983). Repression has continued with Arap Moi's detention of political 
prisoners and scores of human rights violations as well as repression of criticism of the 
government. The government has continued to play a central role in the political economy 
of the country with centralization, control, and attraction of foreign investment by the 
MNCs in the economy. 
On the economic side, the country inherited a dependent economy based on cash crop 
exports. It also inherited significant level of capital investment by MNCs in the industrial 
sector. On the agricultural sector particularly, cash crop production has increased, 
encouraged and subsidized by the government. Two immediate consequences have 
emerged. First is the weakness and dependence of the economy on cash crop commodity 
exports the price of which has declined since 1975, therefore, an ever increasing trade 
deficit. Second, there has been a decline in food production and quality per capita that is 
exacerbated by the fast growing population, scarcity of arable land and droughts. As a 
consequence. Kenya has become very reliant on food aid and food imports that add to the 
worsening of its debt crisis in the 1990s. This combination of factors places the country 
among the worse indebted of the continent and low income to world standards in the 
1990s. 
Of particular importance, some elements have been found in the research that prove ( 1) 
the emphasis of government agricultural policies on cash crop production since colonial era 
and, (2) the growing food crisis in Kenya because of government neglect, flawed policies 
and economic dependency. Particularly, the marketing, distribution and pricing policies of 
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food production have been detrimental to Kenya's self-help in food supply while the 
private and traditional market and distribution systems for foodstuffs have proved to be 
more efficient in feeding the populations. That little research has been institutionalized in 
the food production sector is _also a striking clue to explain government neglect. The most 
significant research endeavor accomplished in food production involved the production of 
hybrid maize and hybrid cattle species in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
Mostly, the task of feeding the populations has been left to smallholder and peasant 
producers (at the exception of maize that is also produced by large scale farmers). 
HoweYer, the throughput of peasant production, which employs traditional methods of 
cultivation and lacks better organization, cannot satisfy the needs of Kenya's fast growing 
population if considered that the country has also been for the past decade the host of 
thousands or refugees from neighboring countries and from the Horn of Africa (Somalia 
and Ethiopia.) 
The characteristics of the political economy of Kenya, the subsequent food and agrarian 
crisis of and economic decline in the 1980-90s reinforce the argument that most economies 
of sub-Saharan Africa have inherited a colonial setting and framework which (since they 
have continued with neo-colonialism and economic dependency on the West) plunge them 
in economic decay, particularly food crisis in the 1990s. 
The studies of Heyer et al. (1976), Shapouri et al. (1986), and Raikes (1991) have 
been done almost one decade apart from one to the other at periods that have been marked 
by panicu_lar conditions in the international economy and the economies of African 
countries. The 1970s witnessed the after-shocks of the oil crisis of 1973 and its 
consequences including in particular the decline of prices of agriculture commodities in the 
world market and the worsening of terms of trade for African countries. The 1980s 
witnessed a general world recession and growing food crisis and economic decline in 
Africa. In the 1990s, food and economic crisis in Africa worsened. A striking similarity 
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in the problems that they find to explain the food problems in Kenya is pertinent and proves 
that little has changed structurally in the country's food production and supply policies 
since the 1960s. 
IMPACT OF POLITICS ON FOOD PRODUCTION IN 
POST-INDEPENDENCE KENYA 
Although difficult to measure in the author's point of view, the impact of politics on 
food production in Kenya after independence can be summarized on two aspects: political 
institutions and allocation of state resources. 
On political institutions, the Kenyan state has been since independence a one-party state 
under the heavy command of the presidency. Therefore, such an institutional arrangement 
does not offer freedom of participation through political parties. Political parties are 
essential to agglomerate the interests of citizens on a broad basis and to provide channels 
through which those interests can be voiced. This thesis finds that only institution of broad 
participation during Kenyatta's era was the Harambee policies of self-help and the policies 
of Kenyanization. The lack of institutions of participation makes difficult for peasant food 
producers to express their needs in the agenda of national economic development. In 
addition, the lack of such institutions does not offer check-and-balance to the political elites 
who misallocate state resources into private pockets, ethnic favoritism and corruption. 
On the allocation of state resources, the current political culture in Kenya is prone to a 
waste of state resources into private pockets, flawed projects based on ethnic bias, and 
huge military expenditures to support the undemocratic regime. For example, Dirk Berg-
Schlosser and Rainer Siegler ( 1990) suggest that after independence, tribal politics favored 
the Kikuyu elite to appropriate almost 40% of the land that the Kenyan government bought 
back from the settlers in Kenyatta's land policy. Had institutions of participation been in 
place. this decision may have considered selling the land to the needy people rather than to 
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the elites. The remainder parcels of land were redistributed to small holders and families. 
However, as Kemp (1983) suggests the fragmentation of land into small lots created a 
problem of returns to scale. The output for each lot is small and does not offer a possibility 
to diversify food crop production for each small holder. As a result, the overall food 
production for small holders is low. 
Arap Moi's regime has continued to favor his ethnic group the Kalenjin for control of 
state resources. Loyal ethnic group members have been placed at key positions in the 
military, police, finance departments and civil service. Increased military expenditures 
during Moi's regime (see TABLE XXX in APPENDIX A) has taken away considerable 
amount of resources which otherwise could have been dedicated to boost food production. 
This table shows that military expenditures (weapons purchases) took an average 9.1 
percent share of total government expenditures in the 1980s. 
The Kenya government is not particular for huge military expenditures. Even 
democratic nations such as the United States and socialist/communist states such as the 
former Soviet Union and China have spent as much proportion of their budget on the 
military. However, for developed as well as centralized economies, military industry 
provides jobs and stimulates the economy while in the case of Kenya weapons purchases 
steal away scarce resources from needy (or ignored) sectors such as food production. 
Furthermore, TABLE XXX does not show any government expenditure specifically 
dedicated to food production enhancement. Expenditure entries classified under agriculture 
are subsidies to cash crop farmers and cash crop economy rather than food production. 
Food production has naturally been a private activity since the beginning of humanity. 
It is understandable that the Kenya government has left this activity to the private sector, 
therefore, has not shown much interest in it. However, functions of government are 
regulative, allocative, distributive, and to stimulate the economy. Since the food 
production affects the livelihood of citizen populations and political constituency of the 
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state, it affects not only the welfare of Kenyans, but the economy and the politics of the 
nation. Food security at national scale is a known legitimate concern and should be one for 
any modern state whether in times of abundance or in times of shortages. Food security 
for citizens falls in the realm of allocative, distributive, developmentalist, and regulatory 
policies which are the main functions of the modem state. 
On allocative policies, the government should provide appropriate resources to food 
production so that this sector can be sustained and capable of securing self-help in food at 
national scale. On redistributive policy arena, the government must make sure that the poor 
and those in marginal areas have enough food as basic need. The government can achieve 
this end by stimulating the private sector to make food distribution more homogeneous 
(providing subsidies and infrastructures). The government in Kenya and many African 
countries has provided subsidies and food security mostly to middle class populations in 
the cities. The governments have insisted on subsidizing imported foodstuffs in the cities 
as a favors to maintain their constituency base in the cities. 
On developmentalist policies, it will be demonstrated in length in CHAPTER IV --
based on economic development theories that, boosting the food production sector is a very 
important step in economic development of a nation. 
On regulative policies, the government must make sure that the prices of food are 
affordable to the majority of the population, particularly the lower class in the city and 
people in marginal areas where food availability is limited. It has been shown in this 
chapter that the Kenya government has done a poor job in regulating food prices. This 
thesis contends that the failure to regulate food prices is a normal result of the lack of a 
government policy regarding the food production sector of the economy. The food 
production sector has not been formally included as a legitimate sector of the national 
economies of sub-Saharan countries. Rather, it has been left entirely to the private sector to 
deal with. However, in cases where economies are not developed and agriculture 
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mechanization not existent, the private sector is incapable of keeping the food production 
sector afloat to match demand. 
In the next chapter, the present research tries to justify the needs for economic and 
development policies that emphasize food production in LDCs of sub-Saharan Africa 
including Kenya. Arguments to support the case are drawn from Development Economics 
theory. Dependency theory, and the experience of agriculture-rich countries such as the 
United States of America. Also, key issues pertinent to the African food crisis (for which 
the new strategies presented in this thesis try to provide solutions) will be exposed and 
further developed in CHAPTER V. 
CHAPTER IV 
A CASE FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICIES THAT CAPITALIZE 
ON BOOSTlNG UP DOMESTIC FOOD PRODUCTION 
lN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
The previous two chapters focused on an investigation of Kenya's political economy 
from colonial to contemporary time. The goal was to search for the causes of current food 
problems that may be rooted in the characteristics Kenya's colonial economy and economic 
policies. The findings reveal that Kenya, as many countries in the sub-Sahara region, 
inherited an export commodity (cash crop and raw material) economy characterized by a 
notorious neglect of the food production sector in national economic development policy. 
Particularly, it was put in evidence that more emphasis has been put on export cash crops 
solely at the expense of food crops. In the case of Kenya, this characteristic was already 
present in the policies of the colonial government moreover the 1954 Swynnerton Plan 
reforms. 
The present chapter is a short investigation of the African food crisis in the 1990s 
starting from far signals in the 1970s. Some statistics have been already exposed in 
Chapter I. This chapter focuses more on the roots of the African food crisis. In this 
section the impact of colonial economic and agriculture policies on the current situation is 
put in evidence. Policy recommendations of Western advisers are questioned and potential 
beneficiaries of the statusquo hypothesized. The chapter continues with an assessment of 
the role of a sustained food production sector in national development from a classical 
Development Economics perspective. Next, a shift of emphasis from cash crops to food 
crops is discussed as a viable policy to mitigate the food crisis in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA'S FOOD CRISIS: 1970s-1990s 
In the 1980s and 1990s sub-Saharan Africa has been crippled by many problems: poor 
economies controlled by the state and relying mostly on primary commodity exports, 
deteriorating terms of trade in the world market, dependency on developed economies, lack 
of technological capability and capital to develop the manufacturing sector, debt burden, 
rampant poverty, climatic severity and food crisis, epidemics, and political instability. 
Added to these problems is the sharp population increase (4% per year on average), the 
first in the world (Berg and Whitaker 1986). I The 1970 FAO report (Christensen et al. 
1981) already showed that 67 million people, about one fourth of the continent's 
population lacked adequate food supply. In 1975, the proportion rose to 60% of the 
population. The consequence is the rise of the food import bill. The conclusion reached by 
the report is that (Christensen et al. 1981): 
"Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region in the world where per capita food production 
declined over the past two decades ... In 1978, per capita food production in Angola, 
Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Upper Volta was 
less than 90 per cent of the 1961-65 average ... Declining per capita food production 
coupled with chronically inadequate calorie intake means there is little margin for human 
error or natural disaster. Drought, political turmoil, or errors in policy can produce major 
food crises which threaten many with starvation. Famines in the Sahel and East Africa 
over the past decade make this too obvious." 
The report (see Appendix B: Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 6) shows not only an 
increasing population growth in Africa, the first of the world in the 1990' s projection, but 
also shows that Africa's yield for staple crops is lagging far behind those of Latin America 
and Asia. Furthermore, the index of food production in Africa is less than the average 
I S~e also Figure 3 and Figure 4 in Appendix B. 
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compared to those of Latin America and Asia, and has been sharply declining since 1970. 
It is not surprising that already in 1978, the volume of grain imports in the continent started 
to increase drastically because of the insufficiency of food production (see Figure 4). The 
same Figure 4 shows that the cost of imports of food by sub-Saharan Africa has sky-
rocketed, especially starting from 1972. Combining with the chronic imbalance of the 
terms of trade food imports increased Africa's debt burden in the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s. Furthermore, the statistics of the UN (UN Statistical Yearbook 1985/1986) 
confirm the same trends: sharp decline in food production, increase in food imports, 
chronic imbalance of the terms of trade, high population grO\Hh rate. 
Reasons for food shortages. It is important to try to assess the major reasons behind food 
shortages in Africa. Seven major reasons can help to explain the decline of food 
production in sub-Saharan Africa. The first reason is the low output productivity of 
traditional (compared to modern) methods and technology to meet the demands of a fast 
growing population. As Hanley's analysis indicated (Figure 4)~ the rate of growth of the 
African population is very high compared to other continents. UN projections show an 
annual population increase of 2.5% per year in the 1970s (Christensen et al. 1981) to 4 % 
per year in the 1980s (Rotberg 1983, ix). 
T . .\BLE XXV, TABLE XXVI, and TABLE XXVII clearly show that Africa has 
consistently lagged behind the other two areas in mechanization and the use of fertilizers 
(TABLE XXV). While these aspects have increased almost twofold for the other regions 
bet\veen 1978 and 1991, they increased only slightly for Africa. The lax of increase of the 
output and yield results in poor growth of productivity and aggregate food production, for 
example, the poor yield for cereals shown on the tables. Therefore, food shortages seem 
inevitable because agriculture mechanization and scientific methods are very limited. 
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TABLEXXV 
MODERN INPUT USE, AFRICA, ASIA, AND SOUTH AMERICA, 1977 
Area Irrigated land as Tractors per Fertilizers used per Cereals yield in Kg/HA 
a percentage of 10,000 hectares hectare 
total arable land 
Africa 1.8% 7 4.4 Kg 924 
Asia 28.0% 45 45.4 Kg 1804 
South 6.1% 57 38.8 Kg 1653 
America 
~ FAO, Production Yearbook, and Fertilizer Yearbook, 1978 
TABLEXXVI 
MODERN INPUT USE, AFRICA, ASIA, AND SOUTH AMERICA, 1986 
Area Irrigated land as Tractors per Fertilizers used per Cereals yield in Kg/HA 
a percentage of 10,000 hectares hectare 
total arable land 
Africa 6.83% 18 - 1175 
Asia 33.66% 202 - 2100 
South 8.81% 64 - 1978 
America 
Source: FAO, Production Yearbook, and Fertilizer Yearbook, 1988 
Another problem is posed by urbanization on the demand side. Although the level of 
urbanization in Africa is still small compared to other continents, its growth is too high to 
provide the means to feed, employ, and house the populations in the inadequate urban 
centers. Furthermore, the low income growth exacerbates the food problem, because the 
unemployed populations lack sufficient income to afford the expensive foodstuffs. Also in 
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urban areas, as the report suggests, there is a prevalence on the consumption of imported 
food such as bread (wheat products), farina, rice, cheap meat and caned food. 
TABLEXXVII 
MODERN INPUT USE, AFRICA, ASIA, AND SOUTH AMERICA, 1991 
Area Irrigated land as Tractors per Fertilizers used per Cereals yield in Kg/HA 
a percentage of 10,000 hectares hectare 
total arable land 
Africa 6.98% 19 - 1251 
Asia 36.42% 203.7 - 2840 
South 8.91% 64.7 - 2152 
America 
Source: FAO, Production Yearbook, and Fertilizer Yearbook, 1992 
Part of the low productivity of sub-Saharan agriculture is due to the lack of improved 
and modem methods of farming which increase the yield as well. As Christensen et al. 
report suggests, agriculture in sub-Africa is mostly extensive on expanded areas, and most 
of the subsistence food production takes place in the rural areas. A comparison of the 
number of tractors and the percentage of use of fertilizers in food production (see TABLE 
XXV) shows very limited input resources for Africa compared to Asia and Latin America. 
In most cases, African food production agriculture has remained subsistence and 
traditional. Another aspect of the problem is the environment itself. Compared to 
temperate regions, soils in sub-Saharan Africa are very fragile to erosion that removes all 
the top soils. In addition, the African farmer lacks improved methods such as irrigation to 
reduce adverse effects of the weather conditions such as droughts. Therefore, as Hanley's 
analysis suggests the drought problem is one of the major causes of food shortages in the 
Hom of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia) and recently in South East Africa (Mozambique). 
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The policies and priorities of governments that neglect food production to the 
production of cash crops for exports (Raikes 1991; Shapouri et al. 1981; Maletnlema 1991) 
are equally responsible for low productivity of food. This pattern of economic policy, as 
argued in the next section of this chapter, is the legacy of colonial economies. The patterns 
of economies, inherited from colonization are responsible for the neglect of food 
production for local self-sufficiency. Civil wars in many African countries (Ethiopia, 
Sudan. Somalia, Mozambique) also cause hunger and malnutrition because large numbers 
of peasants are often displaced the areas where they used to produce food for their 
subsistence to a long journey of hunger that results in the death of many, especially the 
children and the elderly. 
Other causes have been found linked to poor marketing and distribution of foodstuffs 
between regions in sub-Saharan countries. 
Consequences of food shortages. The consequences of food shortages in Africa are many. 
First, malnutrition is the most- striking. The US Agricultural Economic Report 
(Christensen et al. 1981) suggests that in 1975, 60% of the total African population was 
malnourished. The UN FAQ statistics (UN Statistical Yearbook 1988) show that the 
amount of calories consumed by Africans is less than that of any other continents. Rotberg 
(Rotberg 1983) suggests the same idea at the introduction of his book: 
·'Millions of Africans today are severely malnourished, and many more perhaps 100 
million or more, would eat better if they could. In Africa there is a widespread caloric 
deprivation, seasonal and perennial hunger, and-climatic perturbations aside-little 
likelihood that the feeding disabilities of African life will soon be alleviated." 
Severe malnutrition results in deaths of children at the young age. The second major 
problem associated with food shortage is famine and the increase in the number of deaths 
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from starvation. The region of the Horn of Africa, mainly Somalia and Ethiopia, and 
currently South east Africa has suffered a tremendous food shortage in the 1980s (UNHCR 
1991) causing deaths of thousands. 
Another consequence of food shortages is the increase in food imports. As the Figure 
4 suggests, the quantity and price of imported food have increased over time. With terms 
of trade sharply deteriorating, the price of imported of food is going high compared to local 
income and buying power of the many. This situation exacerbates the already significant 
burden that these countries, mostly non-oil exporters, face with the import of petroleum. 
Although food aid has increased it cannot meet the needs of the growing population. What 
follows is a limitation put on domestic savings and domestic investment. 
The buying power of the populations, especially in urban areas, is small because the 
bulk of their income is spent on food that is very expensive. They do not have enough 
money left f\)r other priorities such as health care, and education of children. The burden 
falls on the governments to subsidize such sectors through social programs. For example, 
the government has to subsidize food prices (imported foods) in the urban areas to appease 
the middle class. Therefore, it can be understood that the prospect of developing any 
industrialization is far away because of the lack of domestic capital. The basic Harrod-
Damar growth formula g=slk proves that growth recorded in some of those countries is 
contradictory to the reality of their economies because their domestic savings are almost 
insignificant. 2 
2 In the Harrod-Domar equation, h represents the rate of domestic capital ands represents the rate of 
savings. This model shows growth without development of many African countries where some amount of 
savings may be recorded, yet net domestic capital accumulation is almost non-existent. A foreseeable 
consequence of this is a cycle of poverty manifested by the fact that all the money received or saved goes to 
pay for the expenses, and there is no development of internal capital. The lack of strong internal capital 
market or its non-existence creates the second type of economic dependency of sub-Saharan countries on 
developed economies, that is, capital dependency which adds to technological and trade dependency. 
Senegal. Amin accuses, was forced in the early days of French colonization in that country to specialize in 
groundnut economy that does not match the real needs of the people of Senegal. Rather, it provided ground 
nut to the French consumers. 
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The neglect of food production for local consumption is not to be blamed on 
governments solely. In the next section, it is argued that the economies of the former 
colonies of Africa have been set up by colonial powers to be mostly producers of primary 
commodity products and cash crops for the metropolises. Therefore, the continued 
structure as cash crop and raw material producers encouraged by capitalist institutions 
(GATT, IMF, World Bank) has led to the neglect of food production. 
UNDERSTANDING THE ROOTS OF THE AFRICAN FOOD CRISIS 
The patterns of economies known to most sub-Saharan Africa today still bear 
characteristics of their colonial period. That is, they are mostly resource oriented 
economies which produce raw materials and agricultural commodity crops for developed 
economies. Going in this sense some authors of Dependency Theory such as Samir Amin 
(Amin 1973) 3 have accused current economies of the region of fostering neo-colonialism 
rather than independence that they claim. Expanding on the issue of food production, 
studies of the colonial history of countries, for example, Kenya (Berman 1990), Nigeria, 
Cameroon, and Ghana (Amin 1973), suggest a chronic neglect of the food production 
sector in national development policies of these countries. More emphasis has been put on 
developing infrastructures, education, large scale bureaucracies, and to some extent an 
unstained import substitution industrialization. Therefore, it calls for a careful investigation 
of the colonial setting of economies in the region to find the deeply anchored policy failures 
that contribute to current neglect of food production. At first, colonial agriculture policies 
need to be inYestigated. Second, policy advice of Western experts to LDCs of the region 
needs to be questioned due to their insistence that these countries to produce more cash 
3 For example. Amin ( 1973) suggests that the economies of West Africa have been mostly plantation 
economies for exports of cash crops or resources of raw materials. 
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crop for needed foreign exchange to supply national accounts and to pay their debt and to 
earn more. Third, it is interesting to investigate who would benefit from food dependency 
of African nations with the current statusquo. 
Colonial Agriculture Policy: Cash Crops for Export versus Food Crops for Local 
Consumption. The colonial agricultural system of most sub-Saharan African countries, 
such as Nigeria, Kenya, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Kenya concentrated on producing cash 
crops for the consumption of metropolises (Amin 1973; Berman 1990; Davidson 1989).4 
Therefore, the economic structure inherited by these economies from colonization has been 
mainly of producing cash crops, raw materials, and other primary commodities. Added to 
4 In settler colonies, such as Kenya, Rhodesia, South Africa or Algeria, natives were either forbidden to 
grow cash crops for themselves or they were often forced by a system of police or taxation to labour for 
white settler farms. They were forced to produce cash crops to the benefit of the settlers at the expense of 
food crops that sustained their own needs (Berman 1990). Even the Swynnerton land, agriculture and labour 
reforms which gave African farmers right to own cash crop farms accentuated the decline of food production 
to the benefit of cash crop production for exports. In non-settler colonies, for example, in West Africa 
(British and French), the situation of the African farmers was different. Right from the beginning of 
colonial rule they were allowed to grow cash crop on their own for export (cocoa, groundnuts, palm kernels, 
cotton, and coffee) (Davidson 1989). However, the prices were fixed by foreign companies which, in order 
to maximize their profits, made the differential between metropolitan resale prices and purchase prices to the 
African peasants as big as possible. The profits often went back to the metropolis instead of developing 
colonized countries. The other two consequences as Davidson suggests were (1) indebtedness of successful 
African farmers because their revenues could not cover the cost of production, and (2) in the long term cash 
crop took over food crop security and food shortages started to rise (Davidson 1989, 18-19). 
"Another consequence was long-term. The more that farmers turned to export crops, the 
less food could they grow for local use. Because of this, local food shortages began to be 
felt as early as the 1930s. For the same reason, such food shortages would afterwards 
become much worse. Continuing on the same lines, even though independent, many 
African states today have to import expensive foreign food because their farmers do not 
grow enough food at home. Here was another way in which the colonial systems set a 
pattern of export that was bad for the majority of people. " 
This observation of Davidson is very important for this thesis because it justifies the claim that the food 
crisis that many sub-Saharan African countries face today has a lot to do with the pattern of economies and 
particularly the cash crop economy. The latter stole away the emphasis by traditional peasant farmer on 
food crop production for their own subsistence to the benefit of cash crop production for export to serve the 
needs of the colonial metropolises. In addition, post independence African states have relied on import of 
foodstuffs from the former metropolises, often more expensive for the common citizen's ability to pay. 
The long term consequence accused by this thesis is food dependency on developed nations of the North 
which adds to technological and capital dependency. 
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the economic weakness of these countries compared to countries of the northern 
hemisphere, little change has been achieved to transform these economies into exporters of 
manufactured goods even finished products derived from cash crops. Furthermore, the 
heavy concentration on cash' crops has resulted in the neglect of food production for self-
sufficiency (Raikes 1991; Shapouri et al. 1981; Maletnlema 1991). 
Robert I. Rotberg ( 1983) in his introduction accuses the African countries of inheriting 
an urban based strategy of development that neglects the rural areas to the benefit of urban 
areas. He writes (Rotberg 1983): 
"Never the less the nations of Africa, particularly the ones with which this book is 
primarily concerned - Zambia, Malawi, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda- have, since they 
achieved independence, systematically favored their urban over their rural sectors and, by 
design or neglect, undermined the productivity of what were their remarkable successful 
subsistence (as well as cash) growers of food." 
Rotberg also accuses the lack of infrastructures to supply the rural areas with fertilizers, 
money, and incentives. Vail (Rotberg 1983) shows that in Malawi, for example, the white 
farmers dominated the agricultural sector with large scale cash crop plantation-agriculture at 
the expense of food production for Africans. They forced the indigenous people to work in 
those farms, and they did not encourage sufficient food production. Rather cotton growing, 
coffee~ tobacco, and tea were favored over food production. Ian. R. G. Spencer (Rotberg 
1983) goes further to show in the case of Kenya that colonial administration favored the 
needs of white farmers at the expense of pastoral production of the natives that they viewed 
and qualified as primitive. The consequence is that the self-sufficiency and the orientation 
towards food production have been replaced entirely by cash crop production. 
According to the US Foreign Agricultural Economic Report, the colonial experience is 
heavily responsible for the current setup of African economies. The colonial economies 
insisted on dualistic structure with a modern sector and a traditional one. The latter 
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produced raw materials and staple food for the metropolises. Internally, the rural areas 
were set to produce food for the urban areas. The major consequences were that food 
production became merely subsistence activity. The report indicates (Rotberg 1983): 
"While there were major regional differences, several common themes emerged. African 
food production became a primarily subsistence activity, even in areas where substantial 
trade in foodstuffs existed before colonialism. Second, male participation in the off-farm 
work force in cash crop cultivation frequently makes women more responsible for food 
production. Third, the lack of colonial interest in African food production meant little 
sustained research on food production, and hence, a relatively poor understanding of 
African production processes. Recommendations for change were frequently 
counterproductive. Research on export crops was more extensive, and generally more 
productive. In almost all, African countries of the region are producers of cash crops." 
Kemp (1983) discusses the example of Kenya which has remained a primary producer 
of cash crops: coffee and tea mostly. Cash crops have played an important role in the 
economies of both Ivory Coast and Nigeria since 1960 (Amara and Founou-Tchuigoua 
1990). These are cocoa, palm kernels, palm oil, cotton, groundnuts, rubber and sugar in 
both countries; coffee, bananas and pineapples in Ivory Coast only. These two examples 
show the heavy reliance of these countries on cash crops. 5 Cameroon is another example 
of an essentially cash crop exporter: cocoa, coffee, tea. Most of these countries have 
conserved this pattern of production and almost no diversification of their exports. 
Goran Hyden addressing the issue of Agriculture finds that the modes of production in 
sub-Saharan Africa have remained traditional; he writes (Berg and Whitaker 1986, 54): 
Bernard Founou-Tchuigoua (Amara and Founou-Tchuigoua 1990): Cash crop production in 1982 as 
percentage of total world production. The following are excerpts of leading position statistics: 
- cocoa: Irnry Coast, 25%; Nigeria, 8%; Cameroon, 6.75%. 
- palm kernels: Nigeria leading with 15.71 % of total world production. 
- cotton: Nigeria, 27%; Ivory Coast 27%; 
- groundnuts: Nigeria is the largest African producer; 
- coffee. bananas, pineapples: Ivory Coast is the leading African producer. 
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"While African framers today are engaged in commodity production, usually for world 
markets, their systems and modes of production, usually remain pre-capitalist in nature, 
characterized by low productivity levels per unit of land. Unlike capitalist production 
units, activities are not differentiated according to a strategy of specialized production, nor 
is labor specialized; hence money wages are still a marginal phenomenon in Africa's rural 
economies." 
He finds that compared with Asia African agriculture cultivation remains extensive in 
general rather than intensive. In Africa, more people tend to be involved in food 
production at the family level because of extensive land and lack of mechanization. In the 
US, on contrary, because of mechanization and high yield crops, only 5% of the 
population are involved in agriculture production. Another reason he finds is that the 
African rural farmer enjoys a high degree of autonomy. Therefore, he may be less sensible 
to government policies. Goran Hyden concludes (Berg and Whitaker 1986): 
"To the independent peasant producer, the state is structurally superfluous and most public 
policy actions aimed at improving agriculture are viewed as having little or no value 
beyond any possible immediate gains to the producer himself." 
Hyden suggests that African governments are inadequately placed to influence agricultural 
development than governments in Asia or Latin America. 
The consequences as discussed in the earlier section are many. First, agriculture has 
remained at the subsistence level. Second, the productivity of agriculture has not been 
enough to meet the demands of a highly growing population. Third, poverty and 
malnutrition have increased because of the high cost of food compared to income. The 
import of foodstuffs subsequently has added to the worsened balance of payments to 
become a serious impediment of economic development. 
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In response to the magnitude of economic crisis in sub-Saharan Africa (debt crisis, 
underdevelopment, lack of capital) comprehensive solutions of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes of the IMF, the World Bank, 6 and Western advisers have insisted upon 
African economies producing more export goods (cash crops and raw materials). In their 
view more production of cash crop is the best way these countries can earn more revenues 
by specializing in what they produce best. Cash crop sales would earn foreign exchange 
and help them reduce their debt. It can be concluded based on this rationality that the 
prescriptions do not help with food production for basic needs of the populations. The 
countries embarked either in commodity exports or in expensive ISi at the neglect of the 
food production sector. This aspect will be the main point of the discussion in the next 
section. 
Causes related to current economic/development policies of African countries after 
independence. Although generalization of the causes of the food crisis to the region of sub-
Saharan Africa is not sound, some common characteristics or causes can be drawn for 
various countries that have been mentioned in some studies from which this thesis borrows 
(Shapouri et al. 1986; Raikes 1991; World Resources 1990-91). Raikes (1991) has 
raised key reasons for food problems in sub-Saharan Africa: ( 1) government neglect of the 
food production sector, (2) the bad marketing and distribution systems aggravated by 
government control and the lack of infrastructures (better roads and storage facilities), (3) 
the backwardness of technology which makes the food production agriculture too 
dependent on the weather and on human labor input alone, ( 4) the influence of aid policies 
of developed economies on the food production sector in the region, ( 5) the inequality of 
6 See Berg Report and Bruntland Commission Report. 
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access by women to decision making and resources needed for agriculture, and finally ( 6) 
the political and economic conditions of the countries in the region. 
Livernash (World Resources 90-91) has highlighted the food crisis in Africa by 
identifying Africa in the 1990s as the only region in the developing world with declining 
per capita food production since the 1970s (although the overall food production has 
increased) and the most reliant on imported foods from developed countries. Some reasons 
such as the following can help explain food shortages. First, population growth is very 
high and combines with slow economic growth. Second, serious environmental 
degradation and lack of arable land in certain areas are caused by demand for fuel wood, 
and livestock grazing. These practices, added to forest burning as a cultivation method, 
depriYe the soil from vegetation cover. As a consequence, erosion of the top soil is worse 
and in many cases the soil looses its natural ingredients. Hence, land scarcity presents a 
serious challenge for the African farmers in the need to increase productivity in a uniquely 
inhospitable environment in many cases. 7 Added to environmental hardship, rainfall in 
some areas is sporadic (in arid or semi-arid areas) or heavy (in tropical and equatorial 
areas). In any case the heavy rain contributes to serious soil erosion because of the lack of 
vegetation cover. This host of conditions shows that African peasant farmer's agriculture 
is greatly dependent on the weather and the environment. Traditionally, African farmers 
have practiced shift cultivation to adapt to the environment. Shift cultivation can sustain 
agriculture indefinitely even in arid areas. However, the fast population growth makes it 
almost impossible now to fully use this ancient technique. 
The third reason according to Livernash, which explains the food shortages, is the 
policy environment in the region. Agricultural policies undertaken by governments have 
been mostly counterproductive. 8 Such policies are the imposition of controls on the 
One fifth of the continent is a desert and 10 per cent of the soil is too sandy for cultivation. 
s 
' i World Resources 1990-91, 91) Most governments have, for example: 
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marketing and distribution, inefficient state-owned food processing plants and plantations, 
the pricing policy of the government to favor consumers has left no incentives for peasants 
to sell through official channels, overvalued exchange rates, and neglect of rural 
infrastructures where the food is produced. In addition, unequal access of women to 
credits and resources (land titles and security tenure) needed for food production while they 
are responsible for 70% of the staple food produced domestically. In some parts of the 
region they are responsible for 60-90% of the food production labor force. 
For Kenya, five major problems of food production agriculture were identified in this 
thesis (Berman 1990; Raikes 1991; Shapouri et al. 1986): (1) very high population 
growth. (2) the scarcity of arable land, (3) the technological backwardness and the lack of 
good road infrastructures, ( 4) the inefficient marketing and distribution system for 
foodstuffs aggravated by government control, and (5) the unequal access of women to 
capital and other input resources for agricultural production. These problems added to the 
chronic neglect of the food production that the country inherited from the colonial setting of 
its political economy which emphasized cash crop production. 
Davidson (1989) has gone further than Raikes and Livermash to suggest structural 
causes in the post W.W.11 world economy as the root of African food crisis. The structure 
of the world economy between the core and the periphery made that former colonies were 
caught up in producing cash crops for the former metropolises. This fact created 
dependency of the peasants on the cash crop economy from which they could not switch 
•Imposed controls on the marketing of key crops, often banned private trade, and frequently set up 
state-owned food-processing enterprises that were often costly, inefficient, and slowed agricultural 
developement; 
•Set producer prices so low, in order to keep consumer prices low to satisfy rapidly growing urban 
populations, that there was litle incentive for farmers to market through official channels (27); 
•Allowed overvalued exchange rates, resulting in cheaper imported foods than local products, so 
that urban populations developed a taste for imported wheat and rice, neither of which is well 
suited to local growing conditions (28); and 
•Neglected rural roads and rural infrastructure, in general, and the developement of rural and 
secondary towns. 
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dramatically to go back to sustainable inward-oriented economies. What followed was a 
gradual decline of the food production sector. 
Naturally many governments resorted to the easy solution of importing foodstuffs from 
outside Africa often at higher prices. 9 What followed was a clash between rural areas and 
cities. While the rural areas expected to make more income from the sale of foodstuffs in 
the cities at higher prices, the cities on the other hand wanted cheap foodstuffs. The cities 
9 Davidson suggests that African nations came to independence with a host of problems: the deepening 
crisis caused by colonialism, rural poverty, rapid growth of urbanization with rural exodus, internal division 
with the increase of tribal competition for control of the state resources and power. On the economic 
grounds. the new governments had to assume responsibility of their own economies in a short term: 
working, earning, spending, managing the national wealth. These governments emerged with weak 
capability to plan their own economies which has been a serious problem which still goes on today. 
The economic legacy of colonial period had two consequences on Africa. First, it continually drained 
Africa of wealth produced by African labour, land and natural resources. The situation continued in post 
colonial period with the adverse terms of trade for many African countries. The second consequence was 
that African countries joined a world trade and exchange organized by rich countries of the North, mostly 
former colonial powers, which control the wealth transfer from Africa. The wealth transfer from Africa 
operates in three ways according to Davidson. First, through exchange of raw materials against 
manufactured goods from the North. Second, through the fixing by the North of export-import prices 
which is a cause of adverse terms of trade for the South. Third, through debt-interest paid on loans, massive 
amounts of capital fly from Africa to the North. A visible consequence of debt-interest on loans has been 
the plunging of many African countries in a debt cycle because they cannot even afford to pay the interests 
in full. 
To come back to the issue of food production which is the focus of this thesis, Davidson suggests that 
by 1960s large rural populations in many African countries had become dependent on cash crop growing for 
their liYing. As an example, in Ghana farmers depended on cocoa for their livelihood and the government 
drew a large part of its revenues from cocoa exports. The issue is that with such a heavy reliance on cash 
crop economies. a cut off back to food production would have meant choking the economy and removing 
the source of income for the peasants already involved deeply in cash crop production. Davidson suggests 
that it was desirable for governments to cut slowly on cash crop production back to food crop production in 
order to reduce ( l) the size of wealth transfer, and (2) in order to provide more labour and land to food crop 
production which were taken away for cash crop production. 
These arguments are sound because, African countries have found themselves in a dependency trap on 
cash crop production where they have to produce more to keep receiving foreign exchange; yet the prices are 
set by .:ountries of the North which provides them less revenues to match the input cost of production. 
With more production of cash crops in the world economy and less growing demand, their prices go down, 
therefore, the revenues from export as well. The countries are forced to borrow in order to pay the peasant 
producers and in order to fulfill their needs for buying manufactured products, services, and development 
needs. The situation is pretty similar to what happened to the western farmers with the increased 
mechanization of agriculture and the expansion of agribusiness industry (Raikes, 1991 ). On the output end 
the income elasticity of agriculture is low compared to manufacturing and the demand does not grow much. 
The fanner receives less revenues from sales of products. However, on the input end the farmer must buy 
fertilizers and machinery to increase the output in the hope to have more revenues. What happens is that 
the hored increase in revenues for the farmer does not happen. Instead the farmer is caught up in debt in 
order to keep himself in business. A perfect consequence of this is the disenchantment from the agriculture 
sector. 
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naturally won because of their political power moreover because of the competition from 
imported cheap foodstuffs from abroad. It followed a general disincentive of peasants to 
produce more food in the rural areas. This situation in turn forced many governments to 
resort to more food imports to fill the gap. A long term consequence is food dependency 
on the North. 
However, regardless of (1) the increase in food dependency and the heavy 
indebtedness of African countries, (2) the fast growing population in the area (the food 
needs of which cannot be sustained with continued food imports), and (3) the sharp decline 
in the world price of many cash crops, Wes tern policy advisers have seemed to encourage 
more cash crop production and more import of foodstuffs from abroad because of the 
forced "open door" policies on African countries needy of loans from IMF, World Bank, 
and bilateral donors. 
Western Policy Advisers: capital intensive and export-led agriculture versus food 
production for internal markets. Facing the food shortage problem in Africa and mostly the 
gro\ving African debt the World Bank, the IMF and their advisers have imposed or 
suggested development strategies to restructure sub-Saharan economies. Most of these 
strategies have insisted on liberalizing domestic economies and promoting the export 
sector. However, the programs imposed on African countries have often led to detrimental 
conditions such as the sharp cuts in the social services that these governments used to 
perform (education and health). Other cuts have been suggested to remove subsidies on 
agriculture. This section examines the reaction and solutions of Western advisers to the 
food crisis in Africa. Berg suggests that the IMF and the World Bank programs encourage 
cash crop exports rather than food production; he writes (Berg and Whitaker 1986, 219): 
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"The controversy surrounding export versus food crop production is based on the 
contention of the World Bank and other international organizations that Africa should 
specialize in export crop in which it enjoys comparati\'e advantage, and because its 
agricultural labor productivity is generally substantially higher in export than in food 
production. Also the specialization on food imports will even change the consumption 
component in these countries from tuber plants, millet and others to rice, wheat and 
corn." 
Berg recognizes that the increase in food crop production will help in the long run to 
increase the amount of domestic savings, therefore, the needed foreign exchange to finance 
other essential imports (e.g., petroleum) that cannot be produced domestically. He 
suggests, therefore, a mixed strategy with equal emphasis ·on food production. This thesis 
sides with Berg in supporting that food production for local consumption will boost 
domestic savings, therefore, provide more capital for domestic investment and spare the 
earned foreign exchange from exports. It can be understood~ based on the important 
contribution of the agribusiness industry to domestic GDP and local economies of 
developed countries such as the United States that, boosting food production will not only 
contribute to healthier domestic market. but it will help for development of the agribusiness 
industry with related industries. Also not negligible is that, with increase supply of food, 
the prices will fall to allow people to spend for other necessities including paying taxes to 
the state. However, the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in Africa have penalized 
for years the sector of the population on which food production rests strongly, peasants 
and women. 
Christina Gladwin ( 1991) discusses the consequences or significance of Structural 
Adjustment for women farmers in Africa. According to her the adjustment packages 
include: deYaluation of national currencies (accused of being overvalued), increases in 
artificially low food prices and interest rates, a closer alignment of domestic prices with 
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world prices, an emphasis on tradable/exportable and the gradual withdrawal of restrictions 
on competition from abroad (trade liberalization), privatization policies (of "parastatals" or 
large-scale government monopolies), a decrease in government spending, wage and hiring 
freezes, reductions in employment in the public sector or the minimum wage, the removal 
of food and input subsidies, and across-the-board reductions in budget deficits as ways to 
invigorate stagnating economies. 
Many of these prescriptions embody contradictions that are worthwhile addressing. 
Starting with increases in low food prices, the case study of Kenya (Kennedy 1987; 
Kennedy 1989; SRI CIS 1991) has proved that the price of food is very high, almost 50% 
of total income of the average household in the cities. Increasing food prices further makes 
food non-affordable when considered that poverty in Africa is becoming rampant (World 
Debt Tables 1989-90). On interest rates of loans, increasing the rates will do no good to 
the countries that are already locked in a debt cycle where they cannot even afford to pay 
interests alone (World Debt Tables 1989-90). 10 The withdrawal of restrictions on 
competition from abroad is unidirectional. Developed countries, particularly America 
wants open door to their goods. However, manufactured products, semi-finite products, 
and competitive agricultural products from the South find erected barriers that do not allow 
them to enter the markets in the North. Full withdrawal of restrictions or protection of 
domestic industries will surely kill them. In the case of food imports, full removal of 
restrictions \\·ill do nothing but push African countries to become dependent on food from 
developed countries. Such dependency in the long run may choke their development for 
good. 
10 
The World Debt Tables (World Debt Tables 1989-90) show from private sources that the sub-
Saharan Africa region came in 1989 with an outstanding debt of$ 140 billion fur total EDT and $40 
billion. a principal debt service of $8 billion/year on average with interests of $4 billion/year in average, a 
debt ser.-ice ratio (INT/XGS)of 25% in average per year between 1979 and 1989,and a EDT/GNP ratio of 
almost 120 in 1989. 
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Privatization of state-owned companies and services and reduction in state-supplied 
employment are all sound strategies to increase efficiency and operation. However, state 
involvement in the economy in LDCs of Africa can be compared to the Keynesian 
prescriptions and applications in the United States during the Great Depression and after 
W.W.II, Kennedy's government research and Johnson's Great Society programs of the 
1960s. The reason is that, the level of development there makes that wage earning is not 
high enough. Therefore, the state must provide services and some goods (such as 
electricity, water, health, education, and employment) that many cannot afford on their 
own, or which cannot otherwise be offered by private companies and individuals in a way 
to secure social justice. In addition privatization of parastatal services may be sound if the 
new owners are nationals. If ownership is foreign instead, there is a risk of a collision of 
the mission versus the market; market rationality may be used to justify the deprivation of 
needed basic goods and services to millions. Removal of food subsidies is even more a 
crooked prescription because in the United States the government heavily subsidizes 
farmers, and in EEC 80% of the budget is allocated to the CAP policy to protect and 
nurture their agricultural sector. 
Gladwin's arguments against SAPs converge to the allegation that they have failed to 
stimulate growth or recovery in sub-Saharan Africa. Claims are that SAPs are more 
macroeconomic rather than microeconomic in the sense that they do not benefit the rural 
producers of food who are mostly the African women. They have failed to eliminate the 
urban bias and redistribution of income -- they have worsened agricultural production and 
incomes instead. The author accuses the SAPs to be gender-biased because the modern 
yield-increasing inputs are used only by men in the cash crop agriculture. The women who 
produce food do not see any of that. Gladwin accuses also the unequal access of women to 
land, credit and fertilizer, labor, and in many societies the right to grow cash crops at all. 
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Given the SAPs' greater emphasis on cash crops for exports, men may appropriate 
more inputs than women who produce food, rendering the food production difficult. 
Therefore, the author foresees a food crisis for Africa. Another reason she finds to explain 
the food crisis that if food production remains in the non-monetarized sector or without 
incentives at all, price incentives designed to increase supply will have no significant effect. 
The solution then is that the SAPs must also encourage food production by women to serve 
the rural and urban areas. 
Johnston O'Brien (Gladwin 1991) finds that higher food production is critical to 
increasing the backward and forward linkages to the manufacturing sector, i.e., achieving 
structural transformation in the future. Women are hit by cutbacks proposed by SAPs in 
health care and education. Women are not only producers but also consumers of products 
and education. Cuts in health and education make it hard for them to pay for school of the 
children and afford health care. In many households, the mothers are the ones who feed 
the family and provide school fees for children, especially in urban areas when the fathers 
do not have a job. 
A Good example of boosting the food production sector is demonstrated in Guyer's 
case study of Nigeria (Gladwin 1991). The Nigerian policy has banned import of food 
and has forced the Yoruba women to produce more food because the prices were hiked. 
This has encouraged some women to start entrepreneur ship in food crops. Guyer 
suggests that "If price incentives are to be the solution to Africa's food crisis, and women 
farmers produce most of the food but cannot provide a supply response to increased price 
incentives, then more African food crises are in store for the 1990s." Therefore, she sees 
that structural adjustment does not guarantee structural transformation of these economies. 
In sum, the SAPs, because of the removal of subsidies on education and health, 
increase poverty especially in rural areas. The increasing cost of health care and the 
remoYal of subsidy on education and health care is a serious burden on the income of those 
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peasants. The money that they can have on food production or cash crop is spent for health 
and education of children. Therefore, there is not enough money saved for more 
improvement of production, for example, buying small agricultural machines such as chain 
saws and other tools to reduce human labor. Added to the debt, the SAPs encourage 
African countries to open themselves to unrestricted imports -- these include food, for 
example. The example of Nigeria has shown that cutting imports of food, although it has a 
painful effect in the short run can boost production of food domestically. The import of 
food helps MDC agricultural producers and makes the African farmer dependent on food 
imports from outside. New strategies to mitigate the food crisis should discourage food 
imports to the maximum. The best solution for Africa facing a possible wide scale food 
crisis seems to orient development strategies to boost food production for domestic 
consumption. Such strategies require not only a reconsideration of government food 
policies, but some level of technological improvement, and improvement in agricultural 
methods as well. 
Food Dependency of African Countries: Whose Benefits in the Long Run? It can be 
suggested based on Raikes' assessment of international trade policies in the agriculture 
sector of US. EEC CAP, and other agriculture-rich countries of the OECD that, the African 
food crisis in the long run makes returns for many or help them fulfill their policies. The 
remark holds on two points. 
First, agriculture-rich countries, particularly the US (with PL 480 programs) and the 
EEC (with CAP) solve their agriculture production surplus by dumping cheap foodstuffs 
and cereals in the world market destined for LDCs in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and 
former Communist countries. Therefore, a dependent sub-Saharan Africa on food would 
provide a market for agriculture-rich countries to satisfy their farmers by buying the surplus 
and selling it abroad. This issue is facilitated for the EEC by the Lorne Convention 
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agreements between the EEC member countries and former colonies in Africa and the 
Caribbean. For the US, the PL 480 has widely helped Egypt (the largest African recipient) 
cope with its food shortages starting with the Sadat administration in the early 1970s. A 
consequence of this flood of cheap foodstuffs in the world market breeds dependency of 
LDCs on food imports as a palliative for their food problems. A long term effect is the 
destmction of the food production capacity of these countries and their ability to feed 
themselves. 
Possible beneficiaries of food dependency on agriculture-rich countries are not limited 
to fam1ers of the North. Political and business merchant elites in the South rip the 
exclusivity of benefits from imports of cheap foodstuffs that they resell to local populations 
often at higher prices. The other fact is that cheap foodstuffs help political leaders satisfy 
the demands of urban middle classes that otherwise would rebel against the government in 
the ad\·ent of food shortages or high food prices. The case for a sustained food production 
base as an important component of national economic development strongly holds for 
African countries to avert food dependency on the North as another vicious trap that would 
add to the structural, technological and financial dependency that they are already plunged 
m. 
SOLUTIONS PROPOSED TO ADDRESS THE FOOD CRISIS 
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
Government strategies. Various strategies have been used to palliate to the food gap in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The strategy most widely adopted by many governments has been to 
increase commercial imports and food aid from developed economies to cover their 
domestic food deficiency. A major consequence of this "easy way" solution has been the 
indebtedness and the dependence of these economies on food aid and commercial food 
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imports. With the growing economic decline in the region, the price of food is too high 
and food becomes non-affordable by many in the urban areas. 
Another strategy has been to boost domestic production of cereals by adopting the 
cultivation of higher yield crops. These crops have boosted production output in many 
cases, for example, the hybrid maize in Kenya since the 1950s. However, hybrid species 
require a jood amount of fertilizers to catch. Furthermore, they are more vulnerable to 
tropical insects and parasites. Hence, they require the extensive use of insecticides. Since 
fertilizers and insecticides are often imported from developed economies, the cultivation of 
certain hybrid species of crops may add to the debt burden of the countries to some extent. 
A plausible solution, yet not sustainable for the indebted economies has been to boost 
production by increasing mechanization in the food production agriculture. The solution 
has implied the adoption by governments and private entrepreneurs of capital intensive 
agriculture: mechanization and large scale irrigation schemes to improve production output. 
The shortcomings of this attempt are: ( 1) the lack of capital of the impoverished and 
indebted countries which translates their inability to purchase new equipment, and (2) the 
non-sustainability of the methods to the physical environment. Also the reluctance of 
donors to put more money into inefficient projects is to be considered. Even in the case 
when they have been awarded credit for these expensive projects, the countries have been 
left seriously indebted. In addition, the serious imbalance of the terms of trade renders 
heavy machinery practically non-affordable by most private producers in the region. 
A solution imbedded with government control has sought to increase the output by 
organizing peasant farmers' production into cooperative units of production. In both cases 
(cash crop production and food crop production) this effort has failed to produce expected 
results for two major reasons (Shapouri et al. 1986; Raikes 1991). First, it is widely 
recognized that cooperatives lack enough skilled people of their own to improve existing 
methods, or to create new ones to increase the yields and quality of the products. Second, 
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cooperatives are very much drawn back by government control, regulations and 
centralization of the bureaucratic machinery. In some cases cooperatives have not been any 
object of improvement rather a drawback. Third, peasants resent cooperatives after many 
failures of these to satisfy· their needs. It can be suggested that peasants consider 
"government-engineered" cooperatives as tools of exploitation by government officials. 
Such has been the case of failed cooperatives in Kenya in the late 1970's. 11 
Resentment of peasants to new food production methods of food production is to be 
considered as well based on the fact that, peasants who live off the land they own tend be 
conservative on their methods of producing food carried from generation to generation. 12 
Therefore, they may distrust agricultural experts sent by the government. Also, peasants 
tend to be independent and resist centralized government policies including taxes that they 
consider as a tool of government control and exploitation. It can be understood that new 
food production policies that do not involve peasants in their conception may face the same 
resistance faced in tax collection. One can suggest, therefore, that leaving peasants with the 
opportunity to organize their own production may seem an attractive solution to avoid 
resistance. CHAPTER V makes a strong recommendation that the government in sub-
Saharan countries should change its role from centralized controller to a regulatory agent 
that will help people organize and funnel their energies towards achieving the ends that they 
seek. Many MDCs, while they accuse the leadership in sub-Saharan African countries for 
11 Shapouri et al. (Shapouri et al. 1986) suggest that many peasant maize cooperatives organized under 
state control failed in Kenya because they put a debt burden on the peasant producers. The peasants had to 
repay the loans that they had taken to purchase new agricultural equipment and chemicals. They had 
expected to repay with the returns of crop sales. However, the glut of food in the market in the late 1970s 
without judicious pricing policies from the state brought the prices very low and very less returns to the 
peasants. They had no money to pay back the loans. Therefore, not only they lost motivation in food 
production, but also developed resentment toward state-organized cooperatives. 
1~ 
- See Gunnar Myrdal 
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their flawed policies, have mostly predicated curbing population growth and improving 
technology as solutions for solving the food problem in the region. 
Donor countries in the MDC bloc and multilateral organizations. Donor countries and 
organizations in the developed bloc have pointed the finger at two major causes of the food 
gap in sub-Sahara Africa that offset the slow food production growth to make the balance 
(World Resources 1990-91). The most important one is the fast population growth overall 
as well as urban population. They have, therefore, predicated limiting population growth 
as a long term strategy. After drawing from scenarios, 13 the study shows that with current 
population growth of 3.5% there will be food shortages in the year 2020 unless population 
growth is reduced below 2.75%. Therefore, the World Bank stresses that curbing 
population growth and maintaining a 4% growth in food production is the best strategy to 
avert the food shortages coming ahead. However, this solution does not seem to sell in 
many countries where birth control is not culturally accepted by the populations or there 
exists no government population control strategies in place. 
The second cause of food shortages is accused on the technological backwardness of 
the countries in the region, which hinders their ability to increase food production output 
through mechanized agriculture and more efficient agricultural techniques. Added to this 
aspect is the total lack of research or limited agricultural research in many countries. 
Although agricultural research centers have yielded impressive results (example case of 
hybrid species of maize in Kenya, research on cassava in Nigeria, and other), they have 
1.~ (World Resources 1990-91, 92). "If present trends continue (case 1)--population grows 3.5 per cent a 
year and food production 2 percent--the food gap (the amount required to provide 110 percent of the 
recommended intake of calories for the entire population (37)) would grow from 10 million metric tons in 
1990 to 245 million metric tons 30 years later, in 2020. Even if population growth remains the same and 
food production grows 4 percent annually, the food gap would be 110 million metric tons by 2020 (case 2). 
Only if population growth declines to 2.75 percent and food production grows 4 percent annually (case 3) 
will the food gap stabilize and fall to 5 million metric tons by 2020." 
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been slow to develop new methods and technology due to government neglect and poor 
management. To provide an immediate relief to the crisis, agriculture rich or donor 
countries in the developed world have fallen back on giving more food aid and allocating 
more loans as a short term so1ution to keep the countries afloat on their food crisis. Some 
countries have used food aid and food export policies to the Third World as means of doing 
away with their production surpluses or achieving protectionistic goals for their agricultural 
sector. Such are the cases of the United States with the PL 480 food aid programs, 14 and 
the EEC agricultural protection policies through the CAP. 15 
The overall danger of these policies is that they create dependency of sub-Saharan 
African countries on food aid and food imports. Therefore, these countries are left with 
fewer incentives to develop their own food production sectors. With the high population 
growth (particularly in the cities) and the indebtedness of most of these countries, the 
solution of "being fed" from outside help is not sustainable in the long run. It would be 
beneficial in the long term even for the agriculture rich economies to give more incentives to 
14 The US has used PL 480 as a political leverage tool fur its Cold War purposes and foreign policy 
objectiYes. Egypt has been for decades the biggest recipient of PL 480 and other food aid from the US in 
Africa. It can be suggested that the US has used this policy towards Egypt to obtain from this country the 
capacity to draw a coalition of Arab states less hostile to Israel and favorable to exploitation of oil from the 
Middle East (Gaddis 1982). 
See also Dieudonne Mayi. (1993). Understanding the Motives and Implications of US Foreign Policy 
towards Egypt ( 1945-1981 ): Nasser and Sadat Administrations. Term paper for PS 507: "New World Order 
and US Foreign Policy"; Professor Mel Gurtov; Department of Political Science, Portland State University; 
March 1993. 
In this paper the author held the argument that US apparent "predilection" towards Egypt shown during 
the Sadat Administration had nothing to do with good will, Carter's universalism, or his spiritual match 
with Sadat as some have suggested. The policy was specifically aimed at ( 1) coopting Egypt on the side of 
the US to mitigate the growing Arab nationalism favorable to the Soviet Union, which started with Nasser, 
(2) to use Egypt as a conduite to form a coalition of Arab states less hostile to Israel a protege of the US in 
the Middle East, (3) to bring the Egypt-Israeli conflict to an end, which had proven the capacity to 
distabilize the Middle East, a strategic economic area for the United States and the West because of its oil. 
The United States used the carrot of (1) food aid with the PL 480 programs, (2) loans, (3) grants, and (4) 
large military aid in order to draw Sadat into an unconditional surrender of Egypt as the US leading ally in 
the Arab world. 
15 The EEC has used their Common Agricultural Policy to protect their agriculture from competitors 
such as the US, Australia and Canada. They have used the Lome Convention arrangements which allow 
them to dump their agricultural surpluses in LDCs, particularly former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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sub-Saharan African countries to enhance their domestic food production. This suggestion 
holds considering the fact that even in the MDCs, diminishing returns of agriculture due to 
overuse of soils do not necessarily indicate that they will be able to feed the millions in 
most sub-Saharan African 'countries. In addition from the view point of classical 
Development Economics theory discussed in the next section, development of the food 
production sector has been justified by many authors as key to any sound economic 
development, particularly for LDCs. 
Other strategy of donor countries and multilateral organizations has sought to increase 
and expand the scope of development assistance programs in agriculture. However, in 
many cases these programs have not fared well as indicated by the failure rate of 33-50 
percent for Africa compared with 5 per cent for Asia. 16 The current research finds that 
reasons behind this failure are not only linked with government embezzlement of project 
money, but also to the way projects are defined by officials (as well state officials than 
World Bank or donor requirements). Many projects are not suited to the cultural 
characteristics of the recipient populations and often do not match the environment. In 
addition, the projects as opposed to Asia are not granted to private entrepreneurship, which 
bounds them to inefficiency and low economic turnout eventually ending in failure. It has 
been recognized comparatively by the study (World Resources 1990-91) that projects 
awarded to NGOs or private individual entrepreneurs have often fared better. 
Some prospects of solutions that many studies in developed economies have found for 
African countries to get out of the hole revolve around six macroeconomic reforms that call 
16 (World Resources 1990-91, 91). In 1985, the World Bank reviewed the short-term results of more 
than 1.000 of the projects it had funded. The failure rate in Africa was the worst of any region, and its 
agricultural failure rate was the worst of any sector. The failure rate for Asia's agriculture projects was 5 
percent: by comparison, it was 33 percent in West Africa and 50 percent in East Africa. The worst sector 
within Africa's agriculture was livestock projects, which averaged a shocking-2 percent economic return. 
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for increased spending on food production agriculture 17 increase the role of the private 
sector in agricultural economies, strengthen research and management, improve rural 
infrastructures, develop environmental protection plans, improve the role of women and 
give them more access to resources, land reform. 
For solutions that add a feasible policy aspect to intellectual or non-sustainable 
recommendations. Many of the solutions investigated in this section have either produced 
palliative remedy to the food gap or they have failed to prescribe ways of implementing the 
recommendations. Therefore, some have remained merely an intellectual exercise. For 
example, some of these solutions stress empowering women. Yet they do not specifically 
draw a policy recommendation on how to do it. Others call for drawing men into food 
production to help women, yet they do not provide any hint of how to provide incentives to 
men directed at attracting the latter to food production. In CHAPTER V, this thesis 
provides not only conceptual solutions to increase food production, but it also answers the 
question on "how" these recommendations can be implemented practically. 
17 
(World Resources 1990-91, 93). What must be done to prevent the suffering that may lie ahead for 
Africa? A recent study listed six key agricultural needs: 
• Reform agricultural economies to increase the role of the private sector, provide for the fre~ 
marketing of agricultural products, allow prices to reflect supply and demand, promote private 
investment in production, agricultural processing, and farm input supplies, and encourage easier 
access to credit in rural areas; 
• Strengthen agricultural research management at the national level and boost international research 
efforts; 
• Develop and maintain rural infrastructure; 
• Develop environmental protection plans for each country to address soil erosion, deforestation, 
and watershed management issues; 
•Strengthen programs to assist women as farmers and traders, and foster women's farm, credit, and 
marketing groups; and 
• Provide legal and administrative mechanisms to facilitate land tenure ( 46). 
SUSTAINED FOOD PRODUCTION BASE AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: THE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING 
THE FOOD PRODUCTION SECTOR 
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The issue of food production is part of the larger issue of agriculture development and 
cannot, therefore, be divorced from economic development for any given country. 
However, food production seems to draw particular attention because of its basic needs 
aspect for human life. The objective in this section is to give legitimacy to the need of 
developing or securing the food production sector on Development Economics grounds. 
Development Economics theory and food production. Development Economics has the 
main goal of enabling a better understanding of Third World Economies to provide means 
and strategies for their improvement and by that way the lives of those people in those 
areas. There are four main leading theories of economic development regrouped in four 
approaches (Todaro 1983): (1) the linear stages of growth model, (2) theories and patterns 
of structural change model, (3) the international dependence revolutio11 model, and (4) the 
neoclassical. free market counter-revolution model. Another model less popular in the 
literature is the New View of economic development of the 1970s which was heavily 
influenced by the push by Third World countries for a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO). The :\IEO requests from developed economies of the North to facilitate more 
redistribution of wealth among developed and less developed countries by improving the 
terms of trade. eliminating protectionism of developed nations to competing products from 
the South, and transfer of wealth and technology to the South (Gilpin 1987). The New 
View of economic development also emphasizes on policies of basic needs for Third World 
countries. 
The linear stages model that was predominant in the 1950s and 1960s sees the process 
of economic development as linear and progressive through stages. According to W.W. 
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Rostow ( 1990) each developed country or economy has gone through five main stages of 
development to reach modernization: ( 1) the traditional society characterized by agriculture 
as the sole source of economic activity, (2) the pre-conditions for take-off into self-
sustained growth, (3) take-off, (4) the drive to maturity, and (5) the age of the high mass 
consumption. The precondition for take-off is enough accumulation capital to support an 
industrial investment. The drive to maturity is characterized by high level of industrial 
activity. The age of high consumption is the postindustrial society. 
The model of structural change focuses on the mechanism by which underdeveloped 
economies transform their economies from totally agricultural-based and rural subsistence 
economies to more urban, industrially diverse manufacturing and service economies. 
The international-dependency model emphasizes the division of the world into core 
industrialized and periphery producer of raw materials (Theotonio Dos Santos of the 
International Dependence School. 18 This view supports that underdevelopment is created 
by the relationship of exploitation by the core. Advocates of this model call not only for 
delinking of the periphery from the core, but also for a lessening of income inequalities 
within countries of the periphery. 
The neo-classical counter revolution model of the 1980s calls for privatization of public 
corporations in developed economies and calls for dismantling of public ownership, 
planning, and regulation of economic activities in developing countries. Gunnar Myrdal, 19 
18 ECLA school. See also Raul Prebish (Rostow 1990) and Samir Amin (1976; 1985). Samir calls 
for a delinking from the core by adoption of inward looking development strategies which fully utilize the 
massi Ye support of the people as a whole and serve their needs, rather than strategies that are outward 
oriented. Prebish suggested similar strategies earlier that Latin American countries can develop only if they 
acquire their own industrialization. Therefore, delinking from the core means for Prebish having import 
substitution industrialization. Either view does not suggest a complete cutoff. However, Samir's view is 
more appealing because it also calls for elimination of inequalities within each country. Prebish's view 
does not necessarily eliminate income inequalities because the ISI products as it has been criticized serve the 
needs of the internal bourgeoisie rather than the masses. Therefore, it is just a transport of the problem 
from core-periphery to periphery-periphery, i.e., between the elite bourgeoisie and the lower classes of 
proletariat and peasant class within developing nations. 
19 See (Rostow 1990). 
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one of the prominent advocates of this view supports the point that what thwarts 
development of Third World countries is that governments have control of everything from 
politics to economics. They do not leave any chance for political democratization and free 
market opportunities that are capital to economic and political development according to the 
Modernization School. 
These four models address each a different problem. However, the aspect of food 
production can be found in each of the models. Starting with the linear stages model, the 
pre-conditions for take-off suggested by Rostow' s model, for example, require that the 
price of food be reduced by proper output production of the agricultural sector. With 
cheaper foodstuffs workers in the growing industry can save money to buy manufactured 
products and services that will continue the economic growth towards maturity. Without 
adequate food supply at cheap price, this model seems to indicate that the transition from all 
agricultural to manufacturing or service economy is problematic. This is to some extent 
true when a closed economy is considered. The argument does not hold strongly in the 
case of open economies in a free world market 20 because it could be more advantageous to 
import cheap foods from abroad rather than developing a large scale food production at 
home. In addition, the example of the NI Cs has proved that industrialization is possible 
without necessarily passing the linear stages of the Rostow model. The NICs benefited 
heavy infusion of capital and foreign investment through MNCs and loans from the 
American government for Cold War containment (Gaddis 1982). However, it can be 
assumed that the price of food in those countries was not that high compared to incomes. 
The structural change model shows the characteristic of many African countries that are 
still predominantly agricultural. It reveals as well the problems that they face to transform 
their economies from agriculture and resource-based into diversified economies 
:n See W.H. Nicholls (Eicher and Witt 1964). 
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(manufacturing and services). Also, subsistence agriculture can no longer feed the fast 
growing population in Africa, therefore, a food gap exists. This model sees the transfer of 
labor from the subsistence-overpopulated rural sector to the urbanized industrial sector. 
The problem with this recommendation is that industry has not picked up to absorb this 
excess of labour. 
The international-dependence model calls for self-help in order to break the core-
periphery exploitative bond. Therefore, it would suggest enough output from agriculture to 
satisfy the basic needs of the populations in food. In the case of food needs for Africa it 
would suggest boosting food production to avoid the current food dependency of sub-
Saharan African countries on developed economies. This model is very attractive for the 
thesis supported in the present research. 
The neo-classical free market model calls for a change of government policies, from 
centralization to deregulation to allow more entrepreneurship. This would apply to 
government liberalization of controls over food production and distribution in LDCs, and 
encouraging private enterprise and entrepreneurship in the food production sector. Private 
entrepreneurship and competition are vital for improving output of food production and the 
quality of marketing and distribution systems. This aspect complements the international-
dependence view in a sense for policy making to succeed in African countries it must 
involve the people, not the elites only as is done in most cases. 
The New View of economic development of the 1970s stresses reduction or 
elimination of poverty, inequality and unemployment, redistribution of growth between 
MDCs and LDCs on the one hand and within LDCs on the other. This implies in the case 
of basic needs, elimination of hunger and providing enough food base for everyone. It 
appears then that, for this objective to be fulfilled with the fast growing population in sub-
Saharan Africa, it is important to boost food production. Sustainable development 
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strategies must dominate new development policies, so that basic needs can be achieved by 
the many. 
Taken from either angle, the linear stage models, the modernization approach, the neo-
classical Marxist approach, or the New View, self-help in food production is stressed for 
any sustainable development of a given developing country. 21 On the basis of this 
theoretical background the present research supports that food production for self-help is a 
necessity in the sub-Saharan economies. In addition the situation of the 1980s with 
significant indebtedness, fast population growth, growing climatic hardships, and 
deterioration of economies with unemployment, it is imperative to concentrate on policies 
that promote basic needs and self-help. Therefore, increasing food production to meet the 
demands of the populations is a necessity to cut on food aid and indebtedness from 
commercial food imports. 
The conclusion that comes up is that the agriculture sector in sub-Saharan African 
countries must produce enough food to meet the demands of the growing population and 
growing transition to pre-industrial or industrial phase. Supporters of comparative 
advantage in international trade and economics have widely demonstrated that a well-
developed food production sector at the national level is no longer a strong prerequisite for 
industrial development. However, it still holds that food must be made cheap so that 
people can spend more money on industrial products and services. A way of making food 
cheap is to increase the output production of the food sector. In addition, borrowing from 
the NIEO on the basic needs policies and sustainable development in the Third World, it is 
justified to say that the moral duty of the state should include making sure that the 
populations have the basic needs, of which food security ranks first. Traditionally the 
primary moral duty of the state has been to provide security of its citizenry from external 
21 See Eicher. Witt. and Nicholls (Eicher and Witt 1964). 
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threats. 22 However, it is often taken in power politics theory from Western prospective 
that security from military threat or foreign invasion is the most important duty of the state 
(Russett and Starr 1989). In a capitalist system, the economic security tends to be less 
emphasized and its responsibility left to the 'invisible hand' of the free market conducted by 
the private sector. However, with the failure of the market to provide economic and basic 
needs security to the majority of people in African LDCs, it is justified to support the 
argument that governments must put more emphasis on providing security of basic needs 
for their populations. Therefore, the issue of food security must be seriously addressed 
especially in LDCs where significant development of capital and industry has not brought 
wealth overall to raise the standards of living of the populations. In addition in most LDCs 
that are still at the agricultural or pre-industrial stages, there is a need to make the transition 
to industrialization that require a good food supply basis that is sustainable and available. 
Importance of agriculture in economic development. The importance of agriculture in 
economic development has been stressed by other theorists of Development Economics. 
Colin Clark (Rostow 1990) studied comparative study of agriculture of many developing 
regions as early as 1935. He attacks the view often considered in MDCs that the declining 
proportion of the agriculture work force caused by the rise in per capita income justifies the 
positioning of agriculture as the least priority in modern economic development. His 
positive view implies that improvements in agriculture productivity are necessary 
conditions for industrial development. Clark's position with regard to this issue can be 
read in the following excerpt (Rostow 1990, 388): 
"Both international comparisons and time series indicated that a rising proportion of the 
labor force in non-farm occupations was only possible if agricultural productivity not 
2 ~ G. L. Scott and C. Carr, Are States Moral Agents? Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 12, No. l, 
Spring 1986. 
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only rose, but rose at an increasing pace .... The only exceptions were when a developing 
country could produce what we JabeJed "food substitutes"-mineral or forest products, or 
occasionally manufactures, which could be exported to world markets-and would bring 
in food imports which could partially substitute for the productivity of the country's own 
agriculture .... You cannot employ an industrial population if you cannot feed them. In 
addition, economic development necessitates an increasing volume of imports (though 
many planners seem to have neglected this issue). These have to be paid for, and in most 
developing countries (apart from the exceptions mentioned above) the only possible 
exports are agricultural products." 
Clark's position is sound because most MDCs in their economic advice to LDCs tend to 
bypass the food production sector which played an important role in their own transition 
from agriculture to industrial economies. 
Another pioneer of Development Economics theory is Arthur Lewis (Rostow 1990) 
known for his two major concepts in economic development: the "anatomy of growth with 
unlimited supply of labor," and "the fundamental role of increased agricultural productivity 
in the process of industrialization." He too recognizes the critical position that agriculture 
plays in the process of industrialization. 
Other views of economic development in the Development Economics literature insist 
on modernization 23 or import substitution industrialization 24 as prerequisites to economic 
development of LDCs. 
23 Gunnar Myrdal's view (Rostow 1990) insists on the process of modernization viewed from the 
political angle. i.e., the process of democratization. Modernization is viewed as the performance of a whole 
society and whole people, not merely its economy. He blames underdevelopment in LDCs as caused by 
government control of the economies and corruption from politics. Liberalization , democratization, and 
free market are a must for economic development. Myrdal's view, however, makes no mention of the 
agriculture dewlopment in the process of economic development. 
24 
Raul Prebish's view in the 1950s insisted on industrialization as key to achieve economic 
development taking the case of Latin America (Rostow 1990). His view is a critique of outward-oriented 
development which does not permit full development of those countries. Therefore, they must look inward 
and develop their own industrialization. He suggests development by implementation of import 
substitution industrialization. 
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Carl Eicher and Lawrence Witt ( 1964) recognize an important role for development of 
food production base in economic development. Although they recognized the popularity 
of Rostow's linear stages model of economic development, they suggest that countries 
have particularities in their development patterns that do not call for a replication of 
development as Rostow's model seems to suggest. Most economic historians agree that no 
country in experience has fully developed without a rise in agriculture productivity 
preceding or accompanying industrial development. Today a more general view accepts 
that development need not necessarily be launched by either agriculture or industrial sector 
alone. Rather, each economy contains both components. The neo-Marxists and Amin 
particularly (Amin 1990) suggested that development is not linear. Rather it can be 
understood as a circular process centered on basic needs. Therefore, it can start and 
expand from any basic need to reach the other sectors. 
Expanding on the place of agriculture in economic development, W. H. Nicholls 
(Eicher and Witt 1964) acknowledges that a large number of literature in history, theory, 
-and economic development policy recognizes the dominant place of agriculture in the 
economic development of developing countries. Development requires that a vast number 
of people from the rural sector migrate to the cities. Therefore, substantial industrialization 
"My diagnosis of the situation of the countries of Latin America was constructed on the 
basis of my criticism of the pattern of outward-oriented development, which I considered 
to be incapable of permitting the full development of those countries. My proposed 
development policy was oriented toward the establishment of a new pattern of 
development which would make it possible to overcome the limitations of the previous 
pattern. This new form of development would have industrialization as its main 
objective. In reality, my policy proposal sought to provide theoretical justification for 
the industrialization policy which was already being followed (especially by the large 
countries of Latin America), to encourage the others to follow it too, and to provide all of 
them with an orderly strategy for carrying this out." 
So-.:ialism is then necessary to ensure 'social use' of the surplus. Economic liberalism is also necessary 
insofar as indi\·idual decisions to produce and consume should be left to the market. Prebish makes no 
mention of food production as a significant development strategy. His view has been criticized because the 
ISis try to duplicate lucrative goods from developed economies to satisfy the domestic elite bourgeoisie. 
Therefore, they do not address the real needs of the lower sectors of the society. In addition the IS Is have 
failed to find sustainable markets within the Latin American countries themselves. 
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is needed to absorb this population for non-agricultural production. Investigating the 
relationship between agriculture development and industrial development Nicholls has 
found that agriculture progress is fundamentally a prerequisite for industrial development as 
is the case in a closed economy. In closed economies, the linear models suggest that the 
prerequisite of industrial development is the achievement of the rate of increase in 
agricultural productivity that exceeds the concurrent rate in the rate of demand for food. 
Therefore, the rising agricultural productivity supports and sustains industrial development 
in two important ways. First, it permits release of labour force from agriculture to industry 
while meeting the food needs. Second, it raises agricultural incomes, therefore, increasing 
the rural purchasing power needed to purchase industrial goods and rural savings that may 
then be mobilized to finance industrial development. It enables agriculture to produce 
foods at prices that are profitable for industry workers to buy and save to buy industrial 
products. 
For open economies the rationale is not the same. Agriculture development is no longer 
a prerequisite for industrial development. With revenues from trade a nation can purchase 
food from outside at cheaper prices than produced inside. However, rising productivity in 
the food sector is desirable for two reasons. First, it may help save scarce foreign 
exchange needed for financing imports of industrial capital. Second, it contributes to the 
integration of the dualistic (plantation-peasant) agricultural economy, the existence of which 
often restricts the rate and spread of economic progress such as is the case in sub-Saharan 
Africa. This remark seems well suited to sub-Saharan African countries for many reasons. 
First, 60 to 80% of the population in many countries of the region live off the land in rural 
areas. Second, these countries do not have enough domestic savings. Therefore, savings 
on food bills can help meet this ends. Third, many countries in Africa have not yet 
developed significant industrial sector to absorb labor surplus from agriculture. 
Furthermore, if agriculture productivity is high the nation may enjoy food surpluses to 
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export and savings of foodstuffs for adverse fluctuations in production years. In the first 
case African countries which have enough foodstuffs to export can do so to other countries 
of the region with less favorable climate. Such trade policies can help the problematic 
economic integration in Africa. 
Industrialization contributes also to agricultural development. As an economy 
undergoes industrial-urban development, it accelerates the rate of agricultural progress in 
many important ways. First, industrialization increases the demand of wage-goods, of 
which food is initially the most important. Therefore, it opens markets for foodstuffs and 
specialization in cash crops, development of agriculture processing industries, and the 
integration of rural and urban economies. Second, industrialization provides the 
agricultural workers with a range of goods -- particularly equipment -- to improve 
productivity. This problem is a setback in the capacity of sub-Saharan African countries to 
increase the productivity of their agricultural sector. Industrial-urban development also 
creates an intellectual environment, which is more educated and has more skills for capital 
formation and technical innovation. 
In sum, although it is hard to realize both at the same time, agriculture development and 
industrial development go hand in hand for many LDCs. Nicholls concludes that 
agriculture development is a key for underdeveloped economies to embark on the path to 
development (Eicher and Witt 1964, 16): 
"Admittedly, there is probably no underdeveloped country which can at any stage afford to 
concentrate all of its investment on either agriculture or industrial development. 
However, in my opinion, not until it has succeeded in achieving and sustaining a reliable 
food surplus (or in at least reducing the food deficit to a magnitude which expanding non-
food exports might realistically be expected to cover in the near term) does a shift of 
emphasis to large-scale transfer of farm population into non-farm employment and to 
labor-saving devices in agriculture begin to make sense." 
AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT: WESTERN COUNTRIES' 
EXPERIENCE VERSUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
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Wes tern Agricultural experi~nce. Often when they prescribe solutions and strategies to 
developing countries for their economic development, experts and decision makers in 
developed economies (the Group of Seven) advise LDCs "to follow their example." What 
this means is that Western development and modernization approaches (linear model 
theories) often predicate to LDCs that they must follow the same path that the today 
industrialized nations followed to move from agriculture and resource-based to 
manufacturing and service economies. 
In the case of food production, for example, most industrial nations and other advanced 
economies have been characterized by a strong food production sector. This sector 
produces enough food to meet domestic demand and enough for commercial, relief, and aid 
exports to hunger stricken countries as well as those facing food gap in the Third World 
and the Communist bloc. It is interesting to remark that these countries which were mostly 
agricultural at the on-set of their development (the United States, Canada, and Australia in 
the New World), France, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, Australia (Eicher and Witt 1964) 
are the most exporters of grain in the world market in the 1990s. European nations of the 
EEC through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provide cheap grain to the Third 
World and seriously compete in this market with Canada, the United States, Japan, and 
Australia. Also, because of a strong food production sector, the price of food in those 
countries especially the USA, Australia, Canada and the EEC is cheap compared to other 
individual living expenses. Compared to most LDCs in Africa where food expenses for the 
average urban family is sometimes more than 50 percent of the total household budget, the 
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food budget in advanced industrial economies cited is a minimal fraction of the total 
household budget (see TABLE XXVIII).25 
The low cost of food compared to manufactured products and services and its low 
income elasticity compared fo these two categories is predicated in Rostow's linear stage 
theories (Todaro 1983; Rostow 1990) as a characteristic of a successful transition from 
agriculture economy to manufacturing and service economy. Therefore, this model 
suggests that increasing the food production sector output is a prerequisite for any 
developing country to sustain a growing industrial sector in the take-off stage of economic 
development. Two reasons are advanced to support this view. First, with increased food 
production, food becomes cheap so that the workers in industry and other sectors can save 
money to spend on purchasing manufactured products and services to run the economy. 
The second reason is that, with a developed food production sector, especially 
enhanced with technology and high output/yield agricultural methods to match the demand 
of the faster growing population, there is a progressive migration of the labor force from 
farms to serve the manufacturing and service sectors of the economy. 
For LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa eager to solve their food crisis and to develop at the 
same time, it would make more sense to engage in a policy lesson-drawing based on the 
example of the industrial countries that have successfully maintained a strong food 
production sector. A brief historical examination of the evolution of the agricultural sector 
in the developed economies cited above, particularly Europe and the United States, deems 
fruitful. 
Raikes ( 1991) has well laid out the historical evolution of agriculture in Europe and the 
economic dynamics that have contributed to strengthening the food production sector in 
those economies to the proportions that are known today. 
25 Income elasticity of agriculture sector in the United States is lowest (0.2 per cent) compared to the 
other sectors of the economy (manufacturing and services) (Todaro, 1983). In addition, the American family 
spends on average 13 percent of household budget on food (see TABLE XXVIII). 
Year 
Category 
IBT ($) 
IAT (%) 
HSize 
AvWkF ($) 
AvYrF($) 
TABLE XXVIII 
AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD FOOD BUDGET AS A 
PERCENT AGE OF TOT AL INCOME ( 1986-88) 
1986 1987 
A u R A u R A 
25,383 26,053 21,336 26,966 27,795 21,963 27,941 
91 90 91 92 92 93 92 
2.55 2.52 2.74 2.56 2.53 2.74 2.56 
23.35 23.92 20.04 24.78 25.21 22.43 25.24 
3,096.2 3,134.4 2,855.2 3,298.7 3316.6 3195.8 3359.9 
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1988 
u R 
28,929 21,894 
92 93 
2.55 2.65 
25.68 22.65 
3405.1 3121.1 
Fexp/I 13.4% 13.36% 14.70% 12.29% 12.97% 15.64% 13.07% 12.79% 15.32% 
Source: Extracted from David M. Smallwood, Noel Blisard, James R. Blaylock. (1991). Food 
Spending in 
American households, 1980-88. Rockwillve, MD: U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Economic 
Research Service. 
Legend: ( l) Household category A (All), U(Urban), R(Rural); 
(2) IBT (Average yearly income before taxes), IAT(Income after taxes); 
(3) HSize (Household size), AvWkF (Average food expenditures per week and per person excluding 
alcoholic beverages), AvYrF(Average yearly expenditure on food calculated as 52*AvWkF), Fexp/I 
(proportion of food budget as a percentage of earned income per year, the average of which in this table 
is 13.35%). 
In a simplified analysis, he has carefully described and discussed the transformations that 
the agricultural sector in Europe and in the USA has undergone for centuries. The 
development of Western agriculture occurred in a three-stage model from the 'agricultural 
revolution' and revolutions of Europe over 200 years to the present. The change in the 
structure of western agriculture has been bound by the development of capitalism and 
dominated by the development of industrial capitalism. The three stages are: farm-level 
integration, subordination to industrial capital, integration and modernization. 
Starting with the first stage, 'agricultural revolution' in Europe happened with the 
break-up of feudalism and the shift to capitalist forms of land tenure. In terms of farm 
organization this was followed with three kinds of changes. First was the integration of 
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crop and livestock production. Second was the introduction of crop rotation and fodder-
crops. Fodder was used to feed livestock which in turn produced manure to fertilize the 
soil, therefore, increase crop yield. Another aspect was the introduction of animal power in 
agriculture with horse traction as the first step in mechanization of agriculture, moreover the 
use of improved drainage. Release of feudal land to capitalist tenure caused exodus of 
impoverished peasants to cities while improved machinery and animal labour substituted 
farm labour. This marked the beginning of industrial revolution and urbanization by 
expansion of food surplus and the creation of a class of landless peasants who formed a 
working class in the cities. A major result of this transformation was the extinction of the 
peasantry and its replacement by farm units with wage-labour similar to capitalist firms. 26 
The second stage of agricultural development in Europe happened in the mid-nineteen 
century with increasing political and economic dominance of industrial capital. As the 
Rostow model suggests, the take-off stage for industrialization requires to keep food prices 
low as means of keeping wages low. Along with this transformation came the 
development of cereal production and transport routes to the 'new world.' This period was 
marked by increased impoverishment of peasants and the net cut of venture capital to family 
farming. With the movement of capital away from agriculture came the birth of 
agribusiness by the turn of the 20th century with the appearance of tractors manufactured 
by industry. Organic fertilizers were being replaced by chemical fertilizers. The 
development and massive production of livestock and dairy products were initiated. Also 
agricultural research institutions started to be created in the USA and Europe. All these 
26 
Marx and other observers saw the organization of agriculture in farm units as similar to capitalist 
firms. Without a take-off of industry in the cities to aborb the landless, a societal breakdown and violent 
revolutions may have hindered the industrial revolution. This remark is very crucial for LDCs in Africa 
\\·here 60 to socc of the population is rural. Without any industrialization to aborb the landless peasants, a 
dispossession of peasants of their land could be catastrophic. 
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developments caused the swelling of towns and urban centers while rural areas became 
progressively depopulated. 
The third stage in Western agricultural development was the integration and 
modernization of agriculture.which occurred in two stages according to Raikes. First was 
the acceleration of non-agricultural inputs and scientific techniques to increase the output of 
production in the 19th century. These were encouraged by private capital as well as state 
capital with government concern about stabilization of dispossessed peasants. Equally 
important was the effects of income increase with the booming industrialization. 27 A more 
important consequence in this stage was the full extension and development of the 
agribusiness and agri-state institutions (agricultural firms, banks, credit institutions), state-
supported policies for agriculture, marketing boards, etc. 
A consequence for the farmers came from the income elasticity of agriculture compared 
to industry or tertiary sector. As income levels rose and supply of food increased, only a 
small fraction of household income was spent on food, which caused a lowering of 
farmers' returns. Many small farmers were driven out of business or had to aggregate to 
form bigger producer companies because they could not afford to pay the cost of 
agricultural inputs. As the trend went on, the population of people involved in agriculture 
declined sharply to the 5% areas. It can be understood that farmers' production became 
bound by the agribusiness forces: on the input side by agricultural input companies and on 
the output side by consumer prices. However, strong state subsidies of agriculture in the 
27 
The Engel's Law has two political and economic manifestations. The first is that as the incomes 
rise, the amount of household budget spent on food declines sharply which gives an incentive to buy more 
expensive foods (fresh vegetables and livestock products), especially for the middle class. The second 
consequence is that political stability is less threatened because of food prices. As income rises the urban 
population are less affected by food price increases, then unrest that originates from high food prices or food 
shortages -- a political threat for many governments in LDCs -- is averted. 
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USA and in the EEC have helped the farmers dump their surpluses in the Third World. 
Governments have also allocated credits and subsidies to farmers in business. 
Some issues are related to the structural change of agriculture: increased cost and 
purchase of agricultural inputs, replacement of human energy by fossil fuel, predominance 
of research and bioengineering, increase specialization in agriculture production. First the 
use of inputs (machinery, fuel, fertilizers, pesticides, seeds and others) has made modern 
agriculture in Western countries, particularly the United States, a capital intensive market 
activity. Mechanization and the use of fertilizers have dramatically increased production 
and yield per hectare. However, the consequences have already been noted by 
environmentalists as of the mid-1970s: poisoning of rivers and underground waters, 
destruction of soil texture by chemical fertilizers, and poisoning of consumers through 
contamination of foodstuffs from pesticides. The sharp reduction of the population of 
agricultural producers to a very small fraction of relatively large producers forces 
governments to provide subsidies to keep this sector in business to secure the food base in 
their economies. The USA and Europe are notorious -for farm subsidies to protect their 
agricultural sectors from competition and from other adverse effects related to production. 
For example, the EEC spends almost 80% of its budget on costs related to protect its 
agricultural sector within the framework of CAP. 
Another characteristic rising within highly advanced agricultural systems is the 
increased precision and system-dependence suggested by Raikes. Timing between 
production, supply, and deliveries must be met as well as standardized industrial 
procedures to keep the requirements of quality, quantity, and timing machine energy with 
fossil fuel. 
Examination of the Western agriculture development experience may provide some 
elements from which new strategies can build in order to develop the food production 
sector in sub-Saharan African countries. The list includes ( 1) reorganization of farm 
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production units, (2) bell-drawing on adverse effects of mechanization and the use of 
chemical fertilizers on the environment, (3) the advantages of increasing production to 
reduce the cost of food, (4) impact of Western model of agricultural development on the 
impoverishment and subsequent drastic shrinking of the peasantry, and (5) importance of 
research and private capital as well as state investment on the success of the agricultural 
sector. All those aspects will be taken into consideration in the search for new strategies to 
mitigate the African food crisis in the 1990s. 
Developing countries' experience: case of sub-Saharan Africa. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
commonly agreed upon trends and problems in LDCs (African, Asian and Latin American 
countries) have been identified by researchers of the World Bank, WHO, and IMF, for 
example, to provide a broad characterization of LDCs as opposed to their MDC 
counterparts. Todaro has drawn general characteristics of LDCs (including sub-Saharan 
African countries) which reveal the many problems that these countries face in the struggle 
for development. First, living standards are very low compared to the North, which is 
manifested by rampant poverty in certain areas as a result of low or absence of incomes, 
inadequate housing, poor health systems, limited education, high infant mortality, and low 
life and work expectancy. 
The second set of characteristics is found in the low levels of productivity with the lack 
of skilled labor, lack of management skills, lack of good physical health and the absence of 
well-established institutional framework to promote entrepreneurship and productivity. 
The third characteristic is the high rates of population growth (up to 3 to 4% growth per 
annum) and dependency burdens for large families. Particularly in the cities, it is common 
in large families that few work to support the others. Poverty is exacerbated with high and 
rising levels of unemployment or underemployment, and significant dependence on 
agricultural production and primary product exports (cash crops and raw materials). In 
164 
most of these countries 65% of the population are rural and lives on the land. Agriculture 
contributes 20% of GNP versus 3% only for developed nations. All this host of factors 
leads to LDCs dependence on wealthy nations of the North, and their vulnerability in 
international relations because of the big political and economic power gap between the rich 
and poor nations. 
One characteristic that can be added to this list is the growing inability of these countries 
to provide adequate food supply to their fast growing populations. Therefore, hunger and 
malnutrition crisis are growing in the African region. Poor health conditions combine with 
malnutrition to sharply reduce the level of individual work productivity. Because it's 
neglect leads to low calorie intake -- poor health -- hunger -- malnutrition -- low 
productivity -- and death by starvation in the worst case, food production is a major issue 
that should be taken seriously into consideration in the formulation of development policies 
of LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa. 
FOR POLICIES TO BOOST FOOD PRODUCTION IN SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA: INWARD LOOKING SOLUTIONS AND STRATEGIES 
The severe food shortage in Africa needs to be answered with feasible and inward-
looking solutions designed to boost food production in order to avoid a wide scale hunger 
in the continent by 20th century's end. The solutions that this research proposes can be 
grouped in three categories: ( 1) shift of emphasis of national economic policies from cash 
crop production alone to include food production, (2) curtailing imports of foodstuffs and 
cereals from agriculture-rich nations, and (3) technological improvement and 
research/development in high yield cultivation techniques and plant species. First, a change 
in agricultural policies by the governments should emphasize giving incentives for food 
production, integrating the peasant in the formulation and execution of policies, mixing the 
production of cash crops and food crops at the same time. The second solution is to reduce 
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the imports of foodstuffs and grain from outside in order to force production of food 
domestically. Third, an improvement in technology and high yield farming techniques is 
necessary. The result of boosting the food production sector will help build a strong 
domestic market as Berg suggests, therefore, a possible increase in domestic savings and 
investment. 
Bernard Founou-Tchuigoua (Amara and Founou-Tchuigoua 1990) has proposed 
similar strategies as those suggested by this thesis when he finds that agriculture in Africa 
(to avoid wide spread famine) must undergo three series of transformations: (1) its 
functions, (2) its techniques, and (3) the ways in which accumulation is controlled. 28 For 
the transformation of its functions, he suggests that agriculture must undergo 
transformation from mainly cash crop producing to fulfilling the primary task of producing 
enough foodstuffs for local consumption. This solution does not, however, call for a 
suppression of cash crop production which is an important source of national revenues 
from exports. Rather, he calls for a mixed solution that keeps foreign exchange receipts 
and at the same time fills the stomachs at home without creating a financial burden on 
households or a serious limitation of their access to decent food supply. On techniques, 
Tchuigoua suggests that African agriculture must become technologically oriented -- not 
necessarily heavy mechanization or dependency on the use of input chemicals, but one that 
makes benefit of the existing labor force and the characteristics of the African natural 
environment and soils. On the last point he insists on putting the farmer in control. 
.::s Founou-Tchuigoua's strategies and those proposed in the present research are similar. However, he 
does not seem to provide an answer of how to make the transfer from cash crop dominated economies to 
those which attach importance to food production as well. My strategies provide a model of how policy 
makers can improve the value-added of food production activity, and make it beneficial and attractive to the 
food production sector of the population particularly the peasant farmer. Also, in the last point, he 
suggests to put the farmer in control, which he does not specify explicitly. My model of rural economic 
reorganization around the food production sector answers this question. Founou-Tchuigoua does not either 
seem to address the crucial problem of imported cheap foodstuffs from agriculture-rich countries which 
impedes on the seriousness of local policies to achieve self-help in food production from internal bases 
rather than just filling the food gap from food imports. 
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The first solution to boost food production is to change government policies towards 
encouraging food production as Christina Gladwin's critique of the SAPs suggests. A 
change in policies of the governments is necessary. They must encourage small farmers 
and give women enough resources and incentives to produce food. This can be 
accomplished by supporting women equally with land titles, credits, farm equipment and 
other agricultural inputs. Men need to be given more incentives to get involved in the food 
production business to supplement women with the needed work force. SAPs on the other 
hand must encourage food production by giving or allowing governments to give subsidies 
to women for food production and being more flexible on the hidden "open door" policy 
often linked with loans. Another solution is to encourage small scale agricultural 
entrepreneurship as Berg suggests. 
Clearly, as Founou-Tchuigoua suggests, there must be a shift from solely subsidy of 
cash crops towards production of food. This will help the objective of producing enough 
food for local consumption, yet keeping up with the production of cash crop to provide the 
needed foreign exchange revenues. By mobilizing mral farmers to food production as 
equally as to cash crops, they will be able to supply the cities with foodstuffs in a more 
sustainable way. A good production of food domestically will lower the price of food. 
Therefore, it will not only reduce the possibility of hunger, but also increase the buying 
power~ and provide new jobs. Another issue related to policies is to integrate the African 
peasant more into government strategies of food production. As Goran Hyden (Todaro 
1983) suggested the African peasant as opposed to the Latin American or Asian peasant is 
almost autonomous. Therefore, reforms of the government towards food production may 
not mean much for them since they are the peasants in general are reluctant to adopt new 
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methods. 29 Berg suggests to put the African farmer in control, i.e., to make him aware of 
the process and provide him with incentives for food production. 
Some level of land reform is necessary, because certain areas of the countries, are very 
densely populated and others are not. However, in Africa ethnicity is often high. Also 
ethnic groups are usually concentrated on the same contiguous piece of land. Therefore, a 
land reform may bring political turmoil among the different ethnic groups. This thesis 
strongly suggests that land reform should respect ethnic boundaries in the rural areas within 
each country. 
Todaro ( 1983) calls for development of rural economies and decentralization of national 
economies of LDCs. Urban economies in LDCs underdevelop and exploit rural areas 
(Amin 1976~ Amin 1990). He suggests that in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, there is a 
sharp increase in population and poverty in the rural areas where almost 70% of the 
population are concentrated. Therefore, rural economic development must be given 
priority, and national economic decentralization is needed. Todaro concludes that "if 
development is to take place and become self-sustaining it will have to start in the rural 
areas in general and the agricultural sector in particular. For LDCs Todaro recommends an 
economic development strategy that is centered on developing agriculture and providing 
employment (Todaro 1983, 291): 
··An agriculture- and employment-based strategy of economic development requires at a 
minimum three basic complementary elements: (1) accelerated output growth through 
technological, institutional, and price incentive changes designed to raise the productivity 
of small farmers; (2) rising domestic demand of agricultural output derived from an 
employment-oriented urban development strategy; and (3) diversified, nonagricultural 
29 
Also Barbara Warton on "Risk, Uncertainty, and the subsistence farmer" in Struggle for Economic 
Development (Todaro 1983). 
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labor-intensive rural development activities that directly and indirectly support and are 
supported by the farming community." 
Yet the means to achieve, decentralization need to be found. There is a need for policy 
makers to create business infrastructures in rural areas or to attract businesses to those 
areas. The present research demonstrates in CHAPTER V that reorganizing rural 
communities around food production and the agribusiness sector is one way of retaining 
people in the rural areas and achieving at the same time rural economic development and 
national economic decentralization. 
30 
The second solution suggested by the present research is to restrict imports of cereals, 
meat, and other foodstuffs that can be otherwise produced locally. The benefit of this 
solution is to force people to produce more food. However, such a strategy is directly 
opposite to the prescriptions of the SAPs and the current GATT agreements of the Uruguay 
Round which impose full trade liberalization (with opening of the borders) on member 
states, particularly those of the Third World. The SAPs' prescriptions encourage the 
opening of LDC economies to investments and imports. The solution to continue 
importing everything from tractors to bread when the debt problem is getting out of hand is 
not sound. Curtailing imports will force domestic savings and most of all force people to 
find solutions from within. As long as people can buy rice, bread and other imported 
30 A parallel can be drawn between the neglected rural economies of Africa and the declining economies 
of rural counties in Oregon hit in the 1990s by the impact of habitat preservation of the spotted owl, the 
salmon, and other endangered species (Strathman et al. 1991; Haynes 1991; Haynes 1993). These 
economies have lost their sources of revenues from timber sales and fishing. Sound economic policies in 
Oregon are trying to attract businesses such as recycling and high tech to those areas. Other strategy aims 
at reducing timber exports and adding value to the scarce timber harvested by producing finished wood 
products in Oregon and selling them to other state and countries as suggested by Catherine M. Mater (Mater 
1990). This will have the impact of creating new jobs in those hard hit areas. The parallel is the same for 
rural areas in Africa. For decades they have relied on cash crop activity as a source f income or mining of 
raw materials. In the 1990s, the decline of world prices of commodity cash crops and the discovery of 
synthetic materials and minerals to replace natural minerals has caused the decline of revenues for the people 
living in rural areas. However, food production is an activity that these people are involved in for their own 
subsistence. More value can be added to this activity by appropriate economic policies which would render 
food production business more lucrative and attractive. 
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cheap foodstuffs, they do not have incentives to produce food for themselves. Those who 
suffer the most from the situation are the poor, and the unemployed who cannot buy at all 
with current poverty levels. May be some quotas on food imports need to be imposed in 
order to satisfy MDC food exporters and trade policy makers. 
Technological improvement, although it requires more capital and skills, must be 
geared towards producing tools that are used and adapted to the means, income and 
environment of the peasants. The present strategies strongly recommend that non-
motorized agricultural equipment such as the ones that were used in MDCs at the beginning 
of the century and up to the 1940s be adapted to help the African peasant farmer. Such 
tools will replace the rudimentary hoe, machete, and ax which are the basic tools of the 
African peasant farmer. These 'dinosaur' tools require a lot of physical effort from the 
worker than the new tools envisioned. In developing such a small scale technology, it will 
be possible to launch a basis for small scale industrialization around the needs of 
agriculture. Another aspect of technological improvement includes solving the problem of 
food preservation. The lack of food preservation expertise is directly Tesponsible for part 
of the low output of agriculture. More research must be conducted to devise methods of 
storing and preserving local staples including tuber plants, fruits and varieties of 
vegetables. Canning techniques used at the household level in MDCs moreover in India 
can help because conventional preservation by electric refrigeration is very costly for the 
already poor populations. Other methods should include rural irrigation techniques such as 
water retention reservoirs (see Figure 24 in APPENDIX B) to provide water for crops and 
li\·estock during prolonged dry seasons. These reservoirs can also be used for fish and 
water products farming. 
Robert H. Bates and Lofchie ( 1980) propose to encourage inter-African agricultural 
trade as it existed before colonization. This thesis sides with their solution that countries 
with surpluses should trade food with their neighbors who don't. However, this solution 
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comes only in the long term, after food security has been re-established from domestic 
production. The reason is that most of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa are experiencing 
serious food problems or are about to face such an experience. Therefore, there is not 
enough supply even to meet domestic demand for many countries. 
The strategies proposed in this research converge practically towards the same points as 
those of Todaro and Founou-Tchuigoua. However, the approach taken in this thesis 
differs a bit from theirs in a sense that it suggests "how to do it" rather than just raising the 
question about "what ought to be done." The solutions that discussed are feasible. 
However, some of these solutions may not be implemented in the short run. The climatic 
factor is still a key issue in Sahel regions where severe droughts make harvests uncertain. 
Other limitations are the high population growth that needs to be curbed in order for the 
food supply to catch up with the population increase. This may take time because it 
requires educating the populations to practice birth control. Acquiring a high output 
technology (mechanization) is not feasible for these countries which are for the most 
heavily indebted. Instead, the abundant labour force can be tapped to substitute high output 
technology. This approach offers solutions better suited solution for the realities of these 
. 1 I countnes. -
In the next chapter, a conceptual model of strategies is presented to expand on the three 
solutions proposed for food production development in this chapter: (1) a shift from sole 
emphasis on cash crop to food crops as well, (2) curtailing food imports from agriculture-
rich economies outside the African region, (3) technological improvement and research 
development in the food production sector. 
-1
1 This remark draws from the trends that the costs of the means of productions are diametrically 
opposed between MDCs and LDCs. While capital is more available and cheaper in the North, labor is 
comparatively more expensive. In the MDCs of the South it is the opposite. 
CHAPTER V 
A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF NEW STRATEGIES 1 TO IMPROVE 
FOOD PRODUCTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
In CHAPTER II and CHAPTER III evidence was presented that current or prospective 
food crisis in Kenya can be linked to the colonial setting of its economy as a resource 
economy (agriculture and raw materials). This may seem obvious considering that 
developed economies started with agriculture and raw material production sectors before 
they diversified into manufacturing and services (Rostow 1990; Todaro 1983; Eicher and 
Witt 1964 ). However, for Kenya and many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
transition from resource economy to manufacturing or service economy doesn't seem to be 
near. In addition, a concern of this thesis is that a very important parameter of economic 
development -- food production -- has been given scant attention by governments. 2 In the 
case of Kenya it was shown that (1) government neglect, (2) inefficient capital and 
technological investment, (3) policies notably the marketing, distribution and pricing of 
food crops are responsible for the food gap facing the country. Another parameter which 
equally contributes to the food crisis is the fast population growth. 
1 Most of the conceptual strategies exposed in this thesis are drawn from my personal experience 
growing up in Cameroon, my native country in West Africa. For future work in food production 
development in sub-Saharan Africa, the strategies presented in this thesis will be backed up with statistical 
data analysis based on field surveys and second hand data. 
2 Discussion in CHAPTER IV justified the importance of developing the food production sector in 
economic development of a country, based on Development Economics theories and the experience of 
de\'eloped economies. 
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The present chapter builds from problems of the food production sector in Kenya to 
develop a conceptual model of food production strategies that try to provide an answer to 
the food crisis in Kenya and sub-Saharan countries facing similar problems. It made more 
sense in this thesis to develop a conceptual model rather than to propose a full policy 
recommendation for two reasons. The first reason is that a policy recommendation on food 
production, supply, marketing and distribution, requires quantitative data analysis based on 
research and surveys on the field. The second reason is that strategies sought in this study 
are aimed at answering similar problems in other countries of sub-Saharan Africa. 3 It 
should not be understood, however, that this study is trying to generalize strategies for the 
region, which is not realistic because economic, political, social, and environmental 
realities of these countries differ (Raikes 1991 ). Furthermore, the strategies narrow down 
to address specific problems within the food production sector. 
The model proposed aims at being realistic in a sense that the conceptual solutions 
proposed are sought having in mind that they be feasible and sustainable in their 
implementation without much dependence on aid from developed economies. In the first 
part of the chapter, a brief discussion of important issues involving food production is 
conducted. Next, the strategies are exposed in detail and discussed. The chapter concludes 
with an assessment of the limitations of these strategies. 
ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE IN FOOD PRODUCTION 
There are a certain number of critical factors which affect the output and efficiency of a 
food production sector (Raikes 1991; Shapouri et al. 1986): production and supply (in 
quantity and quality), availability, distribution, marketing, and pricing policies. Strategies 
·' It was cO\·ered in the previous chapters that other countries in sub-Saharan Africa inherited cash crop 
and raw material economies from the colonial period and have remained so. These countries, most of which 
are facing a food crisis in the 1990s (see Hanley) suffer similar problems as Kenya, particularly government 
neglect of the food production sector in economic development policy. 
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proposed in this thesis try to incorporate these considerations. However, pricing policy is 
not covered because it enters more in the realm of microeconomics and macroeconomics 
theory which are not the object of this thesis. 
Production. Food production involves the methods and practices used to produce the 
foodstuffs. The inputs to the production process include human labour, capital resources 
(equipment and money), and land. Production is estimated in the quantity of foodstuff 
extracted per unit area of cultivated land in case of cereals and staple foods (FAQ norms). 
For meat production, it is the number of heads killed for the market at any given time (day, 
month, or year). Estimation of the quantity produced is a real issue in LDCs economies 
where peasant production dominates local markets or where marketing and distribution are 
not well organized. Numbers presented to FAQ by some countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
do not always reflect what is produced even in the case of large government plantations. 
Therefore, statistics produced by the FAQ are sometimes misleading as Raikes has argued. 
For human resource input, production implies the proportion or segment of the 
population (composition and numbers) involved in food production. The studies covered 
in this thesis have indicated that in many LDCs of sub-Saharan Africa, women are 
responsible for 80% of the food produced domestically and constitute 70% of the work 
force in food production. In general, however, the segment of the population involved in 
agriculture has remained high (70-90%) which makes these economies mostly agricultural. 
Therefore, new food production strategies must take into account the impact on the vast 
population involved in agriculture. For example, mechanization of agriculture without a 
rise of the manufacturing sector to absorb excess of labour will deprive many of income 
revenues and a base for personal food. The studies observed as well that in most countries 
of the region, the bulk of local food staples are produced in the rural areas by peasants. 
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Therefore, it makes sense to develop rural infrastructures and rural economies if the food 
production sector is to be improved. 
The percentage of population involved in food production agriculture reflects also the 
level of economic development of a country. It has been suggested by some economic 
development studies (Todaro 1983; Kemp 1983; Rostow 1990; Eicher and Witt 1964) that 
as a country goes from agricultural to industrial stage, smaller and smaller portion of the 
population is involved in agricultural activity including food production. For example, in 
the US only 5% of the population produces enough food for the whole population and for 
exports. This reflects the level of technological advancement which has increased the 
output of agriculture without requiring a large proportion of workforce involved. In the 
case of many LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa, mechanization and industrialization have not 
picked up yet. Therefore, new strategies must take advantage of the abundant labour to 
offset the lack of mechanization. 
Food supply. Food supply refers to the various kinds of food and quantities made 
available for the market to meet the demand of the populations. Supply also reflects the 
more important factor of nutritional quality of food to provide the necessary level of calorie 
intake required for the population. In some cases in Africa, the food is supplied but the 
nutritional quality is very low which leads to malnutrition as another sign of food crisis. 
This fact is shown in sub-Saharan Africa's low record (89%) on daily calorie intake level 
required by WHO (see footnote 6 in CHAPTER I). For example, Kennedy Eileen's 
studies (Kennedy 1987; Kennedy 1989) have shown that, Kenyan families working in the 
sugarcane industry had enough money to purchase food and they did. However, the 
children were malnourished. 
Food availability. This term has been well defined by Shapouri et al. and differs from food 
supply in the sense that availability reflects ( 1) buying power of an individual consumer or 
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household to purchase the food supplied in the market, or (2) the food that is actually 
available in the market and ready to be purchased. In the first case availability can be 
understood as affordability of the food supplied. For a family, having the food in the store 
but non affordable to them is almost equivalent to the case of another family in an area 
where the food is not supplied at all. In the second sense, differently from food availability 
food supply reflects potential food in the market. However, it has happened in some cases 
that a lot of food was supplied to the market but because of bad infrastructures or bad 
distribution systems, its availability for certain areas was poor as in the case of marginal 
areas in Kenya. Therefore, the overall food supply quantities do not reflect the availability 
of food to the individual families. Extending on this explanation it can be implied that food 
availability reflects not only the marketing and distribution systems, but also the pricing 
policies. 
Distribution. The distribution system consists actually of the network of producers, and 
retailers who bring foodstuff product from production sites (farm) to the retailer store or the 
local market. Distribution networks include also the various techniques used for storage, 
conservation, and transportation infrastructures. A good distribution system enhances 
supply in quantity and variety. 
In the case of African countries, Kenya as an example, the studies covered in this thesis 
have suggested that the distribution system is very poor because of poor rural road 
infrastructures. Even worse, the number of storage facilities is very small. Therefore, 
excess surplus of cereal or foodstuffs could not be stored for times of poor harvest and 
shortages due to consumption bumps. A better distribution system could have helped 
marginal areas benefit from the surplus produced in more fertile areas. However, in the 
case of Kenya and in other African countries, the lack of road infrastructures leads to 
sh011ages and hunger in some areas while others have plenty of foodstuffs to waste. 
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The issue of preservation of foodstuffs is crucial for storage and quality. Many native 
food staples in the region such as cassava, plantain, tuber plants, fruits, and other 
vegetables have not been preserved successfully at low cost due to humidity, high cost of 
energy, lack of technological skill and research to overcome unfavorable climatic 
conditions. It follows that the year long supply of certain foodstuffs is not possible or is 
very costly in electric bills. For example, it is not foreign to have lots of fruits during a 
season, and none for the rest of the year. 
The distribution system also reflects the level of decentralization of economic activity. 
In many sub-Saharan African countries, the distribution of foodstuffs is not homogenous. 
In developed economies (such as the United States, Canada, EEC countries, Japan, and 
Australia) on contrary the distribution of foodstuffs is more homogeneous. In LDCs it 
tends to be from rural areas to cities for staple crops and reverse for certain kinds of meat, 
fish, and imported food products. The distribution system provides the critical input for 
the marketing system. 
Marketing. The marketing system represents all the organizational apparatus that controls 
the leYels of production in quantity and quality. It also overseas the distribution, storage 
and commercialization of foodstuffs. A good marketing system is the crucial nerve for 
self-help in food production. The marketing system also sets out production policies and 
policy objectives through boards and deals with import/export of foodstuffs. A marketing 
system should try to match supply to demand and control the prices. 
Both Shapouri et al. and Raikes have accused the poor marketing system and marketing 
policies in Kenya as responsible for most of Kenya's inability to close its food gap from 
internal solutions. Particularly, it was seen that too much state control has discouraged 
producers or prospective investors in the food production sector. Free enterprise is 
hindered by state control which often involves inefficiency and corruption. As suggested 
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in CHAPTER IV, state-organized cooperatives of peasant producers have miserably failed 
in some cases both in the food and cash crop sectors. Closely related to marketing and 
influencing it are the pricing policies. 
Pricin ~. Pricing policies are another key issue in food production in the sense that low 
prices for foodstuffs discourage producers while high prices hinder food availability for the 
populations and cause inflation. In addition, a lousy pricing policy which disfavors 
producers encourages smuggling to the black market, especially in systems such as 
developing nations where regulation of market activities is almost impossible at the micro-
level. 
In the case of Kenya, for example, it was shown that the government has often reduced 
and held constant the prices of foodstuffs in order to increase the buying power of urban 
populations. However, government control has produced disincentives for producers 
(farmers particularly) to sell through state boards. The result is a growing black market 
network where producers smuggle products such as corn to sell them at higher prices in 
marginal areas and neighboring countries. 
Also a good pricing policy must respond to the supply-demand mechanism, moreover 
to market fluctuations as suggested by Raikes. It has not been the case for Kenya as 
Shapouri et al. suggest where prices are overly constant and do not reflect the supply of 
foodstuffs in the market. In some cases prices have been manipulated by the government 
to appease the middle class populations in cities at the expense of rural producers. 
A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR IMPROVEMENT OF 
FOOD PRODUCTION IN SUB-SAHARA AFRICA 
The model tries to answer major problems of food production for which feasible and 
sustainable solutions can be found within African countries themselves. Such questions 
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are (1) boosting production of local staples and foodstuffs 4, (2) improving the marketing, 
distribution and storage of foodstuffs. Although both aspects involve government policy, 
question (1) needs more government action in the following ways: a shift in policy from 
cash crop towards food production, curbing food imports, providing incentives to increase 
production, a shift of the government's role from inefficient producer to regulator and 
catalyzer of private entrepeneurship, and development of rural economies, reorganization of 
rural communities, encouraging technological development with the exploration of 
entrepreneurial techniques (at the grassroots levels), and the role of vocational/engineering 
skills of graduates to produce new agricultural tools. 
Also the solutions proposed are sought to accommodate the nature of the economies of 
most countries of the region where 80% of the population make a living on agriculture. 
Therefore, the new solutions depart from a sharp transformation from agriculture to 
industry (as was the case for developed economies in their growth stage) to recommend a 
mixed system of agribusiness and industry so that the rural economies and peasants can be 
accommodated. A sharp transformation from agriculture to industry would otherwise 
shrink the size of the food production sector while industry has not picked up significantly 
to swallow the agricultural labour. 
Production: a shift of government policies from total emphasis on cash crops for exports to 
food crops. Although food production has been almost always a private enterprise (except 
in closed economies) it is however, the.role of the government to frame food production 
policy at the national scale. Unfortunately, it seems that in most African nations 
4 
Raikes observed in his study that in most African countries south of the Sahara (at the exception of 
hunger stricken countries like Somalia, Mozambique, and heavy importers of cereals such as Egypt) local 
local foodstuffs (in the exclusion of dairy products) are responsible for 50% of the diet composition in the 
cities and almost 80% in the rural areas. Therefore, the model presented in this thesis emphasizes on 
increasing production of staple crops grown locally. 
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referenced, food production policy is either non-existent or solely left to the private sector 
(peasants and small producers). It seems that governments are primarily preoccupied about 
securing food for urban populations in order to avert political crises that would originate 
from food shortages in the_ cities. Therefore, this thesis places government policy 
orientation as the backbone on which new strategies must find firm root. The issues 
addressed in this section are: putting food production as a priority in economic and 
development policy, curtailing food imports, empowering women, creating incentives to 
draw men into food production, technological improvement and the role of education, 
reorganizing rural economies around food production and agribusiness when favorable, 
regional trade of foodstuffs within sub-Saharan Africa. 
Putting food production as a priority in economic and development policy 
A key issue involves the role of the government as catalyzer of economic activity 
particularly to reorganize food production at the national level. This thesis does not intend 
to deny that in some countries food production policies have been undertaken by the 
government as indicated by the food production aspect of the Green Revolution. In 
Cameroon, for example, the Green Revolution policies of the government encouraged food 
production at scale. Yet, distribution and pricing were not well orchestrated always. The 
current widespread food crisis in sub-Saharan Africa leads to hypothesize that such policies 
were not mature or of lasting reach. It seems, based on the foreign advisers' emphasis on 
cash crops that, many govem_ments of the region tend to consider food production as a 
given rather than the product of carefully designed policies. This thesis calls for including 
food production policies, marketing, and distribution in the national agendas of economic 
development. Governments must catalyze private entrepreneurship to produce food 
domestically for self.,.sufficiency rather than relying on food imports to cover food gaps. 
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Encouraging food production requires the curtailing of commercial food imports from 
developed economies. 
Creating and strengthening institutions to help participation in decision making 
It was covered in the analysis in CHAPTER III that since independence power has 
resided strongly in the hands of the presidency in Kenya's a one party state (Berg-
Schlosser and Siegler 1990). Besides the Kenyatta's Harambe (se1f-he1p) programs of 
rural development in schools, health care facilities, sanitation, and water supplies, politics 
have not allowed wide citizen participation outside the agenda dominated by the president 
and his political elite. Considering Lisk's ( 1985) argument that popular participation is 
needed in the planning for basic needs, this thesis calls for the Kenyan government to 
create more institutions that allow participation in the decision making process. Such 
' institutions would include a multiparty system and a Congress of the People to aggregate 
the interests of the citizens and to provide channels where these interests can be voiced 
without political intimidation and too much elite control. In the food production sector, 
these institutions would allow rural farmers to voice their needs for subsidies, loans, and 
help with infrastructures needed for food production. Also institutions of participation will 
reduce the predominance of tribal politics which thwart resource allocation to benefit certain 
areas or members of particular ethnic groups to the detriment of the majority of Kenyans. 
A Congress of the People will also provide a powerful tool to prevent further waste of 
scarce national resources spent to purchase weapons to protect the undemocratic regime. 
Curtailing food imports 
Food imports are of two kinds as suggested in CHAPTER IV: food aid (relief 
emergencies and sharp food gaps), and commercial imports. At the exception of 
emergency food imports to cover shortages due to weather conditions, governments must 
sharply reduce food imports to force the populations to find solutions from inside. 
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Importing greater quantities of foods from outside, as is increasingly the case for many 
countries, offsets the claims of Western policy advisers that is cheaper to import cheap 
grain than to produce it locally. Two reasons can help support this view. First, increased 
food imports in the long run create irreversible food dependency of these countries on 
developed economies. The danger is that developed economies will not be able to sustain 
such production with current population growth in LDCs and diminishing returns of 
agricultural mechanization. Hence, the concern on world population growth based on the 
scarcity of food is greater in the 1990's. Second, the buying power of the consumer in 
sub-Saharan African countries has been reduced so much that they can no longer afford 
even imported cheap cereals and other foodstuffs because of currency devaluation in the 
market. For example, in Cameroon and Gabon (Central Africa), the price of a kilogram of 
rice in the 1980s was roughly 300CFA ($1.00). With 100 percent devaluation of the CFA 
currency in 1994 (in exchange value), the same kilogram of rice would now cost 600FCA 
which represents on average 0.2% of the average annual income in the case of Cameroon. 5 
Therefore, even imported cheap food has become prohibitive for populations. This 
conclusion may seem exaggerate because it does not consider government subsidies 
moreo\·er that the bulk of the population with yearly income around the GNP value leave in 
rnral areas where they cultivate their own land. However, it should be recognized that even 
in the cities, the decline of economic conditions and the layoffs combined with currency 
devaluation have seriously reduced the buying power of the average citizen. 
Import of meat is even more expensive in quantity and quality because of preservation 
costs associated. Therefore, meat production must be increased and production of dairy 
products be accelerated domestically to meet the demand. Curtailing imports of foodstuffs 
5 
The GNP in Cameroon was $966 in 1987 (see TABLE III) and is widely recognized to have dropped 
as a general tendency in sub-Saharan Africa (at the exception of some countries such as Ghana, Mali, and 
Nigeria). Therefore, a kilogram of rice worth $2.00 alone represents 0.2% of the annual income of the 
average citizen at the 1987 GNP level! This shows that even imported cheap foodstuffs are not affordable 
without heavy government subsidy. 
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must be carried to protect domestic food production. However, this strategy will meet 
resistance from GA TT trade policies which force "open door" on LDCs. 
The tradeoffs of curtailing food imports do not seem encouraging in the short term, but 
this thesis supports that in th~ long run benefits will offset short term hardships associated 
with this policy. The shift of emphasis from cash crop to food crop production may cause 
a decline in the production of cash crops, which will affect the foreign exchange revenues 
of these countries. In any case there is not much to lose anymore since the prices of these 
commodities (at the exception of coffee and tea) have dropped dramatically in the 
international market since the late 1970s. In addition, restriction on imports of foodstuffs 
from EEC, US, Japan, Australia, Taiwan and China will face resistance because of 
stmctural settings such as GATT, IMF conditionalities for loans, and Lome Convention 
arrangements. This thesis recommends that the "bitter pill" be taken so that in the long run 
African countries can be self-sufficient in food production and avert food dependency on 
developed economies at a wide scale. 
Curtailing imports of cheap foodstuffs must be carefully orchestrated with increasing 
domestic production to achieve significant and long lasting results. A prerequisite seems to 
reorganize production, which involves organizing inputs for best efficiency. In this case it 
calls for empowering women as the major segment of the food production workforce, and 
drawing in men as supplementary component. 
Empmi ·ering women and encouraging entrepreneurship in food production 
The studies covered in this thesis (Raikes 1991; Shapouri et al. 1986; FAQ 1986/87) 
have suggested that women are almost entirely responsible for food in the households. 
They were found responsible for almost 80% of the local staples produced domestically 
and made up more than 70% of the workforce in food production. 
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Since women have always sustained food production in Africa, the model calls for 
giving more means to women so that they can lead food production policy and its 
implementation. Clearly, governments can improve on food production by giving more 
leadership responsibilities tQ women in this sector. Along with leadership women need 
access to loans and other resources needed for food production. To make food production 
more market oriented and competitive, a careful blend of incentives and productivity 
enhancement strategies need to be applied. What this means is that incentives must be 
given to entrepreneurship of small agribusiness firms and industries in the food production 
sector. 
Empowering women can be achieved with development of the agribusiness industry as 
will be expanded later in this chapter. This industry will create service jobs for 
unemployed women and housewives. 
Incentives for men to join food production 
Production of foodstuffs by women alone cannot be sustained to match a growing 
population because they have other energy-consuming task of bearing and raising children, 
and household work. To improve on food production quantities, it seems justified that 
men join women in this activity. Raikes has suggested that most of the staple food is 
produced in the rural areas by women while men concentrate almost entirely on cash crops. 
In tropical areas particularly, men provided women with physical labor to clear the land for 
cultivation. But as men became increasingly drawn in the lucrative cash crop production, 
women in most cases were left alone to produce food. 
What is needed is to devise incentives to draw men into food production. This implies 
shifting emphasis away from cash crop production by giving value to food production. If 
the food production activity is found "rewarding" enough it can be hoped that men will join 
m. Objecti,·e conditions in the 1990s with the decline of economic conditions, 
unemployment in the cities, and sharp decline of the price of cocoa, for example, have 
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drawn some men in Cameroon to engage in the production of foodstuffs (such as plantain) 
which they can sell for income revenues. From one case, this example proves that 
unfavorable conditions gave men incentives to revert partially from cash crop to produce 
foodstuffs for money. Drawing from this example, this thesis concludes that policies that 
would provide incentives for men to enter a lucrative food production activity would be 
beneficial to help women. Further in this chapter a point is made that development of a 
lucrative food production and agribusiness industry can draw men into food production 
when coupled with enough incentives and the curtailing of the imports of cheap foodstuffs. 
However, it should be carefully stated that the incentives should be measured so that 
they will not withdraw men completely from cash crop production. What is targeted is the 
vast population of unemployed in the cities and those in rural areas who are suffering from 
the decline of cash crop prices. Therefore, a balance between cash crop production and 
food crop production priorities must be created. 
Technological improvement and the role of education 
It was argued in what preceded that reorganizing the labour input of food production 
sector can help increase the output, particularly that the labour is abundant and cheap. 
HoweYer, technology as another input can yield even a better result 6 in a sense that 
technological improvement reduce human labor input and can help make agriculture be less 
dependent on weather conditions. Physical human labour input can be lessened in 
agriculture with the introduction of mechanization to increase the output per hectare of 
production. However, capital intensive mechanization is very expensive and depletes the 
6 
In addition increasing one input of the production function of food production can yield diminishing 
returns. The production function of food production as any production activity can be generalized as 0 = 
f(I,Z) where I represents the inputs and Z are other factors such as infrastructures and other market 
characteristics. The common inputs are labor (L), capital (K) and land (L). Increasing one input can 
increase overall production. However, too much increase in one input alone can yield diminishing returns 
in the long run. In the case of human labor input, increasing the size of the labor force may cause 
management problems which will offset the benefits. 
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soil in the long run. Another aspect of improvement in agriculture technology involves 
research to determine higher yield species and to devise irrigation schemes. 
In this model two categories of solutions are proposed to help reduce physical labour: 
the use of animal power anc;l the design of light non-motorized tools. In areas such as 
Sahelian regions where the Tse Tse fly is less present, animal power can be used. Even in 
humid equatorial areas this thesis suggests that animal power be equally used in rural areas. 
Peasants should, therefore, be encouraged to take advantage of animal power for traction 
(to lessen requirements on human energy) and manure for fertilizer. Light tools such as 
plows can be pulled by horses or cows to save human labor in tilling the earth. Horses and 
donkeys can be used to transport produce to market centers. 
The task of producing new tools rests on technical education and that is why education 
enters into play to provide peasant producers with new mechanical tools which are 
improved compared to the traditional hoe, ax, or machete. The criteria for these tools is 
that they must be made affordable to the average peasant or small scale producer. 
Therefore, their design must be such that they do not require energy bills nor a considerable 
initial capital investment. Usually, the motorized or non-motorized tools (chain saws, light 
tractors, motorized pumps, and other tools used in agriculture) are non-affordable to 
peasants because of the low exchange ratios of their currencies compared to those of 
manufacturers in MDCs and NICs. Therefore, it can be understood why poor peasants are 
confined to using traditional tools such as the machete, the ax, and the hoe. The new 
strategies call for educational policy that encourages technical students to design and 
manufacture new tools. Outmoded tools that were used in the Western agriculture at the 
beginning of the century and which provided the basis for mechanization of agriculture in 
the West, can be copied with appropriate copyright agreements. The patents of such tools 
are cheap and the designs are available in libraries all over the developed world. 
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The implementation of such a policy orientation in technical education will open the 
door to small scale entrepreneurship in agriculture tool technology. What will be needed is 
to help young entrepreneurs with necessary loans to help sustain small scale manufacturing 
of agriculture tools. A technology of small scale to help the agricultural sector obeys the 
requirements of the linear stage model prescribed by Rostow, i.e., it will help mechanize 
agriculture progressively and help increase production to provide a basis for the industrial 
sector to takeoff. Also, for the case of the US many researchers and policy surveys have 
demonstrated that productivity of agriculture was very high before W.W.II based on 
limited mechanization and the use of natural fertilizers (Raikes 1991; Eicher and Witt 
1964 ). Modern techniques although they yield a bigger production capacity are capital 
intensive, destroy the soil, and pollute ground waters. In the case of African countries they 
are even not affordable at all. This observation calls for a policy in the agricultural sector 
which puts requirements and demands on young engineering graduates to find technical 
solutions, domestically-originated and feasible to help food production. 
Similar efforts must be unde11aken in food preservation and conservation with local 
methods rather than always relying on capital intensive technology and methods. This 
strategy discourages capital intensive technology and methods used by many governments 
who either own large plantations (Cameroon, Ivory Coast) or embark in projects of scale 
(the Bura irrigation project in Kenya.) 
Another crucial problem facing food production agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa is its 
vulnerability to weather conditions as a sign of very limited irrigation (see CHAPTER III 
and CHAPTER IV). In many areas of marginal land such as in Kenya and in the Sahel 
countries, heavy but short rain falls usually occur during the small rainy season (2 to 3 
months). This water can be retained in natural reservoirs (see Figure 24 in Appendix B) in 
each village to serve in time of dry season for irrigation of crops and livestock water 
supply. This reservoir can help also for fish farming and other animals such as alligators 
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and crocodiles to supply protein. One problem with these reservoirs would come from 
evaporation due to sunshine three quarters of the year. However, it could be a little relief 
compared to nothing at all. 
Reorgani :ing rural economies around food production and agribusiness 
Earlier in this section, the thesis called for government incentives to draw men into food 
production, particularly in tropical/equatorial areas and in the cases where they are only 
busy with cash crop production. Such incentives may come from developing an 
agribusiness industry of scale. This sector will be responsible for producing and marketing 
various foodstuffs to substitute imports. Food processing plants will employ people in the 
cities and in rural areas for production and services. In addition, when proper incentives 
are opened in rural areas with the reorganization of rural communities and development of 
rural economic infrastructure as will be covered later in this chapter, people who are 
unemployed and in misery in the cities may find more attractive to return back to the land. 
The phenom~non of reverse migration from crowded cities to rural areas has been 
observed at a small scale in some African countries (Cameroon, for example) where people 
who ha\·e lost their jobs in the cities and have objectively no way to support their families, 
or are retired. yet have a piece of land in the rural areas go back to live there. Revenues that 
they get from food production and sales in the cities allow them to continue supporting their 
school-age children living with relatives in the big cities. A dilemma comes, however, 
from the possibility that a massive return to rural areas could cause land disputes and 
require a full scale land reform. 
This thesis suggests that land reform (if required) be done in respect of ethnic setting in 
the rural areas to avoid political problems and disputes between ethnic groups. In many 
African countries, land occupation has traditionally corresponded with ethnic boundaries 
which still exist today as in the case of Kenya, Cameroon, Nigeria and other. In the rural 
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areas, land reform can be done within people of the same ethnicity in order to avoid ethnic 
crises. This proposition seems contradictory to advocates of full land reform. However, 
this thesis supports that "bounded" land reform as opposed to full scale one is a better 
solution because it would face less resistance from peasants, particularly those it will 
dispossess. Land reform has been easier in countries without high ethnic diversity such as 
Europe, Japan or communist countries under repressive regimes. It is not the same for 
Africa, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa where ethnicity is high. It would be a big 
mistake to carry out a full scale land reform without creating a serious discontent from the 
different ethnic groups that are majority in various areas touched by the policy. 
Regional trade of foodstuffs within sub-Saharan Africa 
One question which comes to mind is that if the strategies suggested in this thesis find a 
"fertile soil," there will be an overproduction of foodstuffs for less demand in some 
countries particularly in tropical Africa (Central, West and Central-East) where the climate 
is more favorable to agriculture, and population growth is lesser. 
If considered the population growth and the exponential demand for foodstuffs 
associated, it can be contended that food glut in the domestic markets will not materialize 
any time soon. Furthermore, there exist considerable food differential in many countries 
(Kenya, Cameroon, Nigeria, for example) between agriculture-rich areas and marginal 
areas. With a better distribution system as will be covered later in this chapter, marginal 
areas will benefit from the surplus of agriculture-rich areas. 
On international level within the region of sub-Saharan Africa, the thesis suggests that 
policy makers must engage in a policy of "food for economic integration" in a sense that 
agriculture-rich countries in the region can formally trade foodstuffs with their neighbors 
who have less favorable ecological conditions. Such courses of action were undertaken in 
the past but were not successfully institutionalized in the long run due to political 
differences, smuggling, and lack of organization. Such is the case of Kenya's exports of 
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food crops (maize, millet and sorghum) to Uganda and Tanzania in the late 1960s within 
the EAC (East African Community) arrangements (Heyer et al. 1976) Another case was 
Cameroon exports of foodstuffs to Gabon within the UDEAC (Customs Union Area in 
Central Africa) arrangements. The trade unfortunately came to an end in the late 1970s 
after a mistreatment of Cameroon immigrants in Gabon spoiled political relations between 
the two countries. 
In all of these cases, the trends have not reached long lasting term and have even 
disappeared due to political differences among these countries, lack of organization, too 
much government control, and most of all the drastic decline in food production. 
Therefore, an increase in food production within many countries could help economic 
integration and hunger relief in the region. 
The distribution and storage of foodstuffs. Closely associated with production is the 
distribution of foodstuffs. The distribution system is the nerve of the marketing system for 
foodstuffs produced domestically as _was suggested earlier. It was covered in the study of 
Kenya that the distribution sector was responsible for food shortages and famine in 
marginal areas. While agriculture-rich areas and urban centers of the country had plenty of 
food to waste. marginal areas were running severe shortages. Another case can be 
obserYed with the lack of distribution capability and storage of various fruits in 
tropical/equatorial countries in Central Africa (Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon). In 
Cameroon, for example, due to a lack of better distribution infrastructures between the 
agriculture-rich South and the arid North, people in the North undergo food shortages 
when there is enough food produced in the South. 7 In addition, the storage of foodstuffs 
is underdeveloped. Furthermore, knowledge in preservation of foodstuffs is missing. For 
7 See also 1 Boyer and Davis 1990). 
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example, there is an overproduction of fruits and vegetables during the season, but they are 
wasted. These products could be preserved for year round consumption and for 
distribution to marginal areas. Keeping fruits available year round using conventional 
refrigeration is prohibitive in. electricity bills because other preservation methods have not 
been devised or canning techniques are not wide spread yet. Two aspects are of critical 
importance to the distribution of foodstuffs in the market. The first one is the road 
infrastructure and the second one is the storage infrastructure. 
Storage 
The storage of staple crops and cereals is an issue in sub-Saharan Africa. In tropical 
areas of Central and West Africa, humidity inhibits storing fresh food crops and vegetables 
for a long time. In other areas, storage of cereals faces insects and limited availability of 
storage facilities of scale. 
It was covered in the case of Kenya that famines experienced in the early 1980s (due to 
unfavorable weather conditions and disincentives to production) followed a period of good 
harvest in the late 1970s. The government did not have enough storage to hold the surplus 
of previous years. MDCs (US, Western European countries, Australia, and Japan) have 
well-developed storage systems to help meet the demand in case of low harvest and 
consumption bumps. The government in sub-Saharan Africa should encourage private 
entrepreneurs to build food storage units. The government itself should maintain storage 
units for surplus purchased from producers. With multiplication of storage facilities and 
their decentralization to different urban and rural centers managed by private firms, 
availability of foodstuffs is hoped to increase in the markets. 
The preservation of non-cereal food staples has traditionally been prohibitive in tropical 
areas because of humidity and the vulnerability of these staples to heat. In general with 
good preservation, yams, cocoyams and taro roots can last up to three months. Cassava, 
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plantain, and tropical fruits (mangoes, papayas, pineapples, guavas, different oranges) 
usually lasts a couple of days or up to a week. Here the present model proposes a very 
simple solution to the preservation problem for tuber crops such as cassava, plantain, taro 
root, yams, cocoyams, potatqes, and sweet potatoes. Fresh products (the excess or unsold 
stock) must be quickly transformed into farina and stored in that form. For example, 
cassava tubers are pealed, crushed, ground, fermented and then dried. After, they will be 
ground again into cassava flour and stored or put in bags ready for food stores and local 
markets. Under this form cassava can last years. The other crops can be processed the 
same way and stored. The only tradeoff is that consumers be willing to accept these new 
forms of consuming tuber plants. 
Like tuber plants the fruits are very perishable in humid and hot areas. Usually, it is 
very common to experience an excess of production of these fruits during the season and 
their spoiling and waste while they are absent in needed areas moreover absent the rest of 
the year. Tropical fruits can be transformed into jams to offset the import of expensive 
varieties of these. commodities from developed economies. These fruits can be processed at 
the household level into jams and sold in local markets. In addition preservation 
techniques, for example, canning can help provide these fruits year long. 
Small agribusiness industries with very light equipment can transform these fruits into 
jams, or save them in cans as it is done in India and other Asian countries. Caning 
techniques were also widely practiced at the household level in the USA and Europe before 
the explosion of the agribusiness industry. Transportation infrastructure plays a crucial 
role in the distribution system to carry foodstuffs in a timely and safe manner from 
production sites to consumer markets. 
Road i1~frastructures 
The discussion in this section calls for more efficiency in the organization of the 
distribution sYstem. A key aspect of this question is the creation and maintenance of 
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transportation infrastructure to bring foodstuffs from production sites to the marketing 
centers. Transportation infrastructure includes land, air, and water. Usually water is the 
cheapest, followed by land transportation. In this thesis recommendations concentrate 
more on land transportation because it is the most widely used. In addition, within land 
transportation, recommendations narrow down on road transportation not neglecting the 
fact that transportation by railway is cheaper than transportation by truck. However, in 
many cases the railway network is not widespread in rural areas where the food is 
produced. 
Addressing road infrastructure, particularly in rural areas, the new solutions call for 
selective maintenance to save funds and provide more efficiency. Governments in many 
African countries have spent tremendous amount of their revenues from exports 8 or loan 
money to build big roads linking cities and also road nerves connecting rural towns and 
localities to main roads. Heavy rainfalls, erosion, lack of knowledge, and most of all lack 
of capital and equipment to maintain those roads make them almost unusable after a short 
while. 
Drawing from the example of Cameroon which is very familiar to the author and should 
not be generalized, the government has concentrated attention on big road axes linking big 
cities and medium size cities neglecting arteries from which food produced in the rural areas 
transit. In this model the thesis proposes a strategy that will use less funds yet provide 
significant help to peasants to sell their products. It will also help to distribute foodstuffs in 
. al 1 . 9 margm · ocat1ons. 
The basis for discussion is a conceptual classification of roads which can be found 
similar in many LDCs of sub-Saharan Africa (see TABLE XXIX ). These roads can be 
s FN example, Nigeria and Ivory Coast have considerably invested in road infrastructure. 
9 _-\_nimal traction should also be encouraged as it is used extensively in Asia, Latin America and 
Northern Nigeria to transport foodstuffs to areas inaccessible by road locations. 
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classified into three main categories based on the administrative structure found in former 
French or British colonies in the region: 10 (1) primary road axes linking big cities or urban 
centers and crossing the rural areas, (2) secondary roads from main road axis to city centers 
at the province or division level, and (3) tertiary roads which link rural villages, 
subdivision and district centers to primary road axes or secondary roads. 
It has been the author's observation in Cameroon that tertiary roads are critical and 
often hinder peasants ability to transport their crops to the distribution centers in bigger 
cities. Heavy rain fall, soil erosion, flooding, or frequent tree falls are critical elements 
which discontinue distribution to and from remote rural areas. 
Therefore, the new strategies call for selective maintenance of these roads to provide 
more efficient distribution system and to save funds allocated to road maintenance. 
Governments should concentrate more capital on full scale maintenance of primary arteries 
because they are nerves of communication by land between major cities and urban centers. 
However, for the point of view of peasants, the government should engage in efficient 
maintenance by attacking the problem areas on the road rather than rebuild~ng tertiary roads 
from scratch as done sometimes. This depletes capital and turns it away from necessitated 
investment. This thesis concentrates on sub-division and tertiary roads which are the real 
problem. Problem areas on secondary and tertiary roads are hill tops, bridges, swamps, 
10 Cameroon and Kenya were respectively colonized by France and Great Britain as the major colonial 
forces in Africa after W.W.II. We have found, however, a striking resemblance in the administrative 
partitioning of these countries into provinces or divisions, subdivisions, districts and villages. In any of 
the cases, colonial policy placed big colonial cities such as Nairobi in Kenya, Douala and Yaounde in 
Cameroon as the nexi of economic and political activity of the colony. Consequently, all transportation 
infrastructure converged toward those centers, some of which were often located at the coast with access to 
the sea. This structure has not changed much in the former colonies. It is not surprising to note that the 
structure of the transportation infrastructure usually is driven to these big city centers than otherwise. 
A parallel drawn from transportation infrastructure in traditional urban patterns still found in some 
cities in Europe and North America, can also provide an explanation to the one-center structure of the 
transportation systems in former colonies. The most common traditional urban pattern of communication 
infrastructure is the once-center structure. In this structure, the city center is the hub where all traffic, 
economic and political activity converge. However, because of congestion and the need for decentralization 
or urbanization. this model is increasingly giving place to a more decentralized, multi-center urban structure 
in the C nited States. 
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and fallen trees. Government maintenance of rural roads should emphasize on these 
aspects. 11 ( 1) repair damaged bridges, (2) provide asphalt on hills -- they are the most 
problematic for vehicles, (3) remove fallen trees. Maintenance of portions of rural roads 
that are not hills, bridges or problem areas like swamps should be left to the responsibility 
of villagers themselves. 
Technology wise heavy trucks and lorries are the most responsible for road damages in 
rural areas (bridges and hills). This thesis recommends that only light trucks be allowed to 
transport product from villages to Division centers. All-wheel drive trucks will be able to 
make it easily from villages to centers as many private individuals currently do. This aspect 
will be expanded more in the reorganization of rural communities and the marketing system 
for food crops. The villages will supply their products to their Village collection point. 
The collection point will deliver to the Division city and from there products can be sent to 
big cities by train or car by food distributors. Selective maintenance can help the 
government save a lot of money that otherwise would be wasted as has been in some cases. 
Distribution of foodstuffs from production to consumer table 
A layered distribution system is proposed (see Figure 25 in Appendix B) where the 
producers (peasants) are kept in rural areas and only licensed distributors can have access 
to city markets. A layered organization of the distribution system for foodstuffs (staples 
and meat) matches the layered organization of the abstracted road system which matches 
administrative organization in provinces, subdivisions, districts, and villages. 
At the upper level, i.e., big cities, 12 only licensed distribution companies are allowed 
to retail foodstuffs from producers (rural peasants, small producers, and big producers) to 
11 It is our experience in Cameroon that the government tried at each time to remodel these roads from 
scratch and could never succeed because of limited funds. In the end the projects were often abandoned. 
12 In this kind of administrative organization, big city centers usually fall within administrative 
provinces and are "capitol" cities for these provinces. Each province is made up of sub-divisions which 
comprise districts. Districts comprise individual villages. 
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retail stores, and food processing plants. Storage units must be built in big cities by these 
companies to store the product before distribution to small retailers. Also the government 
must build storage facilities for surplus production. 
At the provincial or division level smaller provincial city centers will have storage 
facilities as well. At this level distribution companies will store the produce obtained from 
rural producers before shipping it to larger cities. 
Category 
Primary roads 
(big axes) 
Secondary roads 
Tertiary roads 
TABLEXXIX 
A CONCEPTUAL CATEGORIZATION OF ROADS IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
Origin Destination 
Big city <-----------------------> Big city 
(Smaller) Provincial city <---------> Big city 
(Smaller) Provincial city <---------> (Smaller) Provincial city 
(Smaller) Provincial city <---------> District/subdivision town 
District/subdivision town <---------> District/subdivision town 
District/subdivision town <---------> Primary road 
Rural Village <---------> Rural Village 
Rural Village <---------> Secondary road 
Rural Village <---------> District/subdivision town 
Rural Village <---------> Primary road 
Rural Village <---------> (Smaller) Provincial city 
Rural Village <---------> Big city 
Peasants and producers are not allowed to distribute food in the city at this level. The task 
is left to licensed distributors only. 
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At the subdivision or district level, peasants can distribute their produce to local retailers 
directly or to licensed companies. However, at this level, peasants and small scale 
producers can distribute (sell) their produce directly in the local markets. 
Distribution of food from.production sites to marginal areas will be uniquely carried by 
licensed distribution companies. These companies will supply the produce to those areas at 
the big city nodes, the smaller provincial city centers, or subdivision nodes. However, it is 
preferable that the hierarchy of distribution be kept because it will help distributors gain 
more time and efficiency by shortening the trip that individual truckers have to cover. 
The distribution of foodstuffs within big city centers or provincial city centers and 
subdivision of foodstuffs will be covered extensively in the following section. Also, the 
benefits and tradeoffs of this organization of distribution will be discussed together with the 
marketing system. 
The marketing of foodstuffs. In the case study of Kenya it was shown that the marketing 
of foodstuffs was significantly responsible for the incapacity of the country to meet its food 
demands. In the current solutions, it is suggested that the marketing of foodstuffs be 
completely left to private entrepreneurship. The government must intervene only to set 
standards and prices in collaboration with producers, distributors and consumer 
representatives. Pricing policy because it involves more specific microeconomics and 
macroeconomics considerations will not be addressed in this thesis. However, it was 
suggested in CHAPTER IV that pricing policy must be balanced to provide incentives for 
producers to stay in the food production business and consumers to have food at 
reasonable prices compared to their income. 
The organization proposed for foodstuffs marketing (see Figure 26 in Appendix B) 
closely espouses the structure of the layered distribution system. The marketing system 
comprises three layers: ( 1) the producers (peasants, other small producers, and big 
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producers), (2) the licensed distribution companies, (3) the licensed retail companies, and 
( 4) food stores and small shops in urban centers. A general remark is that food marketing 
on scale in big cities and primary provincial city centers is carried by licensed marketing 
companies and shops only. , 
The peasant producer at the village (small town) level 
This model recommends the replacement of inefficient government-controlled 
cooperatives by small agriculture firms, the "peasant food production firms." Each village 
would have their state registered agricultural firm. Each peasant member of the firm sells 
food products through that firm and receives revenues according to his/her share of the 
input product as in any other capitalist enterprise. This means simply that the benefit share 
is proportional to individual investment in the firm. The concept of the "peasant food 
production firm" is different from a cooperative in a sense that it is nationally registered as a 
firm, and its members associate on the basis of proportionality of returns based on one's 
share of initial capital. Each villager member of the firm may subcontract his farm produce 
to the village firm. 
The authorized distribution company purchases foodstuff products from these firms for 
sales to city consumers or to agribusiness industries at the price fixed by the state. 
Villagers who are not members of the village firm can market their products directly to 
consumers at the district center market or sell it directly to retailers or distribution 
companies at prices fixed by the state. 
The village firm may be responsible for transporting the product from the village to the 
district or subdivision center where it is sold to distribution companies. In turn firm 
members will buy their provision of necessities from the stores at that location to furnish 
their small shops in the village. Transportation of food products from the village to district 
or subdivision centers must be done with light (4x4 preferred) trucks to avoid damaging 
198 
tertiary roads. The village firm can obtain a loan from the state or major banks to purchase 
a light truck for transport of their produce. The truck will of course be the property of the 
firm. The notion of private property needs to be stressed and enforced by law. 
The district or subdivision level 
Distribution and retail companies can have their stores to retail products at the district 
center. At this node they can have storage units for the produce ready for pick up and 
delivery to cities or other areas in the country. At this level, popular markets can be left to 
function because they do not cause significant congestion and garbage problems. The 
popular food market is necessary at this level to keep the psychology of the community 
which is stronger in rural areas and areas close to rural areas. Conversely, in big cities the 
purpose of the food market is no longer necessarily a medium of socialization, rather an 
impersonal resource collection base. They create congestion, non-hygienic handling of 
foodstuffs, and garbage problems. 
A regulation should impose that villages in a given radius outside the center of the 
district or subdivision only be allowed to sell their product though their "village firm" to the 
distribution companies or retailers at that district center. 
At the provincial city (or big city) level 
At this level only distribution and marketing companies or retail stores are licensed to 
sell foodstuffs. The distribution companies supply retail stores and shops with the produce 
from their distribution centers located in the city. At this level, the village firms within the 
vicinity of the city can be allowed to sell their product to licensed distribution companies 
only. Also~ popular food market will disappear progressively because distribution and 
marketing of foodstuffs is only carried trough licensed companies or stores. A big social 
consequence may arise from the demobilization of a cohort of women and small retailers 
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who make their living from these popular markets. It will be covered in the discussion of 
solutions how these retailers can stay in food retail business by organizing into small food 
retail enterprises. 
Development of rural economies: decentralization. Based on the transition from agriculture 
sector to manufacturing in industrial countries, it can be supported that the phenomenon of 
rural exodus toward city centers can be abstracted to three categories of reasons. First, 
people go to cities to find jobs in the manufacturing, service, or government sector to 
increase their income compared to what they make from the land. Second, people move to 
the cities because agricultural activity does not provide them anymore with the needed 
income and vital resources to sustain themselves. 13 Third, others go to cities for 
necessities such as better education and health, or to purchase commodities not available in 
rural areas, or just for the attraction of the "modern." 
In any case the phenomenon of rural exodus has deprived rural areas of needed labour 
force to produce food. Traditionally rural areas had enough manpower to help women 
produce food. The rural exodus to cities is partially responsible for the actual incapacity of 
rural areas to keep production levels that satisfy the demands of the fast growing population 
in urban centers. In current times, cities are full of unemployed people who are a 
dependency burden to their working relatives. With the wide economic recessions and 
heavy downfall in some countries, many people have been laid off after the closing of 
foreign or state-owned companies. 
If given more economic incentives in the rural areas through agriculture production and 
agribusiness industry, unemployed people in the cities could flee misery to come back to 
live a better quality of life in the rural areas. Such a move calls for a decentralization of 
economic acti,·ities to develop rural areas. This model tries to answer that question from 
u This applies also when they are landless, or cannot do squatting or labor for others in return for pay. 
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the viewpoint of food production. As mentioned earlier, the crucial issue lies in providing 
incentives to food producers, especially those incentives designed to empower women and 
to draw men from the declining cash crop activity (especially cocoa) into food production 
and agribusiness. These incentives can be obtained from decentralization and the 
reorganization of rural communities. 
At the lowest level, the rural village, the model addresses the reorganization of the 
peasant community around food production activity. The village should be organized to 
provide to the maximum self-reliance. The benefit of this strategy would be to provide 
basic needs to people living in the village. What this means is to give incentives to people 
to own a small shop in the village for household basic needs such as kerosene, salt, sugar, 
non-prescription and first aid medicine, agriculture tools, school material for children, etc. 
These necessities can be supplied by distribution companies on their way to collect food 
product. 
As food production is concerned associations such as the "yum" which have in the past 
boosted individual food production, are recommended. The "yum" (found in Cameroon) is 
a traditional association of villagers to provide workforce to members of this association on 
a rotation basis. The benefit of this association was to increase production of each 
individual producer (the cash crop farmer, or food crop producer) by providing enough 
labour for clearing the farm or tilling the earth to plant crop seeds. However, the increase 
in cash crop activity and the penetration of money economy destroyed these forms of self-
sustained associations which helped production and kept the village community tight 
together. This is predicted to happen because capitalist penetration destroys traditional 
forms of production and community associations to replace them with individual drive to 
k f
. 14 ma e more pro 1t. 
14 In a study of the impact of the money economy on social relations of the Mambwe tribe of 
Northern Rhodesia (current Zimbabwe), Williams Watson (1958) has found evidence that capitalist mode of 
production and the penetration of money economy had a serious impact on traditional bonds of native 
societies in the non-Western world. The Mambwe tribe before colonization. had land as their only resource 
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Also traditionally, each household in the village raised a small livestock (goats, sheep, 
cows, pigs, chicken, and other) for protein base. This provided a self-reliance on protein 
base. However, to the exception of sahelian areas where nomadic pastoralist still practice 
livestock farming, in general livestock self-sufficiency of the past has given way to 
increased hunting for wild meat or supply of meat and fish from city centers. Without 
significant source of monthly income, peasants in rural areas face a serious crisis of in 
protein supply. It is not foreign that children and adults lack enough protein to enrich their 
nutrition. Therefore, this model recommends that at the household level, each family have 
their own minimum livestock in addition to what they sell. 
Other sources of protein can be obtained from "meat product farming." In many 
African countries (as opposed to the Western and Asian countries), people have remained 
historically reliant on nature to provide them with resources and have not necessarily 
learned to rebuild nature (although they consumed natural products with restraint). 
Historically. with the small population and the lack of huge market demand, consumption 
of natural products such as fish, water animals (alligators, crocodiles), and wild meat was 
minimal, which gave nature time to reproduce. Now with commercial demand from urban 
centers. especially middle class need for delicacies of wild meat, many species such as 
antelopes, porcupines, wild pigs, monkeys, chimpanzees, gorillas, rhinoceri, etc., have 
been drawn to near extinction without any significant effort to reintroduce them in the 
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forests and savannas. 15 This thesis recommends that fish and water products be farmed in 
creeks and ponds in the village. For example, natural water retention ponds (such as 
proposed earlier in this chapter) and village creeks can be used to farm small river fish, 
shrimp, crabs, alligators and .crocodiles. All these products will provide more sources of 
protein to the villagers and help save wild animals from excessive hunting and trapping. 
Another significant organization is the political one. Traditionally each village had a 
chief and elders who solved disputes, and assumed leadership in the political structure of 
these communities. With modernization, a village chief recognized by government 
authorities of the district or the division has been responsible for tax collection, solving 
minor disputes, and reporting to higher authorities. However, in the food production or 
sometimes in cash crop production activity, villagers seem to resist the advice of "experts" 
sent by the government, especially in areas where they have accumulated centuries-long 
experience or field experience on their "own" environment. The result of this is not only 
the waste of government efforts by deploying agricultural aides, but sometimes 
misguidance of the villagers_. What is suggested here is to train a local person in the village 
to be the "expert" on new methods. This will make it easier for agriculture experts of the 
base (\\·ith no individual ownership) for living. With the market penetration, they faced a new mode of 
production: work and wage earning from the mining industry. As tribesmen moved to the money economy, 
the traditional solidarity among the people in the village disappeared progressively to give way for 
individual search for money. 
A parallel can be taken from this example to justify why traditional associations such as the "yum" in 
Cameroon disappeared with increased penetration of the money economy particularly cash crop economy in 
peasant societies. Jalousie which is frequent in traditional societies can be considered as an explanation to 
support the impact of market penetration on peasant societies. It can be considered that jalousie increased as 
some people earned more money than others on cash crop or food crop sales to cities. Therefore, others 
were no longer willing to give time to common activities were beneficial to each one. 
15 Only since the late 1980s when conservation movements around the developed world rang the bell 
on endangered species and the need for their preservation, have governments in LDCs embarked in an effort 
to save these endangered species. Such efforts have been notoriously successful in Kenya and Zimbabwe 
with the preservation of big mammals such as elephants, rhinoceri, big cats, chimpanzees and gorillas. 
HoweYer, not so much is done for smaller species such as monkeys, antelopes and other which are hunted 
extensively for meat. 
The three last categories (gorillas, chimpanzees, elephants, rhinoceri or big cats) were hunted by 
poachers for skins, body parts and ivory often on payroll by foreign smugglers. 
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Ministry of Agriculture to teach new methods. The rationale behind this approach is that 
historically and by experience more traditional societies rely on kinship relations and have 
proved to be more efficient than their modern counterparts in this respect. This kind of 
political organization is suita~le for the results sought in this thesis, i.e., a sustainable food 
production sector, a more robust development of rural economies, and a successful 
restructuring of rural communities to provide amenities for peasants to stay in rural areas. 
The layered distribution and marketing systems exposed offer a more efficient, fruitful, and 
less costly way for villagers to market their foodstuffs to urban consumers 
DISCUSSION OF THE BENEFITS AND TRADEOFFS OF 
THE NEW STRATEGIES 
The model presented in this thesis is a market economy model with only limited 
government intervention namely in shaping a national food production policy, catalyzing 
private entrepreneurship in food production, setting and enforcing prices, monitoring the 
respect of regulations such as (1) restrictions on the distribution and sale of foodstuffs to 
non licensed individuals or companies, and (2) enforcement of traffic limitations on rural 
roads. (3) sanctioning non-licensed food retailers in the city markets. 
The benefits of these strategies have been discussed. Overall, the new system will help 
the transformation from subsistence food production to an agribusiness food industry. 
Therefore, the new model can serve as a starting point for the transformation of these 
economies from purely agricultural to agribusiness, then to manufacturing sectors. It was 
seen that big distributor companies or producers (village firms, or large scale producers or 
licensed individual entrepreneurs) can build food processing plants in the secondary 
localities near the food production centers as done in the US. What results from this is an 
opening of new jobs in the rural areas to employ those who do not own land or are not 
employed in food production. The benefit of this is economic decentralization and 
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development of rural economies around what they produce best -- food. The current 
solutions embody some tradeoffs that are not necessarily beneficial or feasible in the short 
term. Each area of solution (production, distribution, marketing) is investigated in the 
following. 
Production. Food production indeed can be the node of a sustainable development as it has 
been in history for industrial countries. Development can be considered as a multifaceted 
endeavor which can take its starting point from any basic need (food, education, shelter, 
health) then develop in concentric circles each adding and expanding, including or opening 
new sectors as diversification of the economic activity increases with the needs 16. An 
example of this was the agricultural sector in the United States which, with the 
development of the agribusiness industry has brought a host of techniques, plants, 
manufacturing needs, and has helped the growth of other sectors such as the manufacturing 
sector and the biochemical industry (plastic industry, bottling and canning industries, 
irrigation industries, tractor and tools industries, and other.) It could be the same case for 
sub-Saharan African countries to focus their development on food as basic need. Other 
sectors could develop because of the needs of the food production sector. Then in 
concentric circles a sustainable development centered on basic needs can be attained which 
fits the environment, culture and economic capabilities of sub-Saharan countries. 
In a simplified abstraction, the layered distribution model and marketing presented in 
this thesis look much like the models in the US and other developed economies. However, 
16 See also (Amin 1990). In this sense the advice of Western policy advisers has been to specialize 
more efficiently in what they produce better -- cash crops. However, this thesis joins Amin to contend that 
such an advice creates outward oriented development and does not necessarily help people meet their basic 
needs. We support that any sound development for LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa should emphasize self-
reliance in food production. 
The success of this type of program needs wide popular support in order to defeat the economic forces 
which tend to keep the statusquo in favor of the internal bourgeoisie (political and economic elites) and 
external economic interests. 
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the model has mixed both the market economy and the peasant economy without drastically 
destroying the latter. With the development of agribusiness, many small producers will get 
out of the business. Peasants will be smoothly transformed to wage earner in the 
agribusiness or in the devel9ping manufacturing sector. Therefore, the transformation 
from agriculture to industry will happen progressively. 
This model is robust because it accommodates both rural and modern. It combines 
peasant economy with modern market economy, therefore, it may help decentralization of 
economic activity to rural areas. Politically, the model imposes no coercion on the 
peasantry and may reduce the black market because competition is open. Domestic 
economy can be improved based on the food sector provided imports of cereals are 
discouraged. 
The model presents no imposed painful and politically dangerous land reform which 
has failed in many countries in the Third World where ethnicity is high. In addition, the 
new strategies place government's role as regulator and catalyzer of private 
entrepreneurship rather than controller or producer. If this model is implemented and takes 
firm root, it may require a robust and diversified banking sector to provide loans to 
producers and distributors without negative intervention of the government. Finally, the 
model opens a way for services and new jobs in the agribusiness industry. In addition the 
expansion of the agribusiness industry and its needs in equipment and tools will trigger an 
improvement in domestic skills within the manufacturing sector. 
Distribution. The layered distribution system because it reduces long journeys saves 
money and products. In addition when combined with the layered marketing structure, it 
will tend to keep peasants within rural areas. An adverse effect is that it will need a lot of 
enforcement. therefore, state funds to institutionalize such a system. However, education 
of the peasants on the benefits of such a system may help gather support for the 
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implementation of such a system. Also, this model implies development or rural 
communities so that peasants can have amenities to stay in rural areas. Therefore, 
maintenance of hospitals, roads, and provision of other services such as credits and loans 
to these villagers through their agricultural firms can help keep them in rural areas where 
they are better off than frequently coming to cities. Also, marginal areas will be able to 
benefit from surplus of agriculture-rich areas. On the storage of foodstuffs, if new 
preservation techniques are carried at small scale, many fruits, vegetables, and meat will be 
preserved to provide more food for local markets. 
The overall benefit is that the whole distribution system is a sort of relay system on pick 
up delivery schedule. Therefore, a lot will be saved on transportation cost and time related 
to far-reaching vehicle trips. Distribution vehicles, at the exception of trains (which usually 
link big cities), will be confined to a given layer except when they transport food to 
marginal areas. Therefore, efficiency is added to the distribution system and bottlenecks 
can be easily removed. 
By confining bigger tonnage vehicles to primary and secondary roads only, rural roads 
will be protected from frequent damages caused by these vehicles. In addition, the layered 
distribution system imposes that transportation of foodstuffs is done in short distances 
(between two supply centers) rather than on very long distances (except distribution to 
marginal areas very far from agriculture-rich areas.) With this layered arrangement, 
efficiency in schedule and preservation of the product can be achieved. A problem may 
come from the enforcement of these regulations on tonnage and respect of distribution 
layers. Ho\\'ever, if the activity is made competitive, distribution companies will find 
necessary to enforce these regulations upon their workers. The reason is that with a tight 
licensing of distribution companies, it is easier to identify the violators. Also in a truly 
competitive system, other companies will reduce social cost by exposing the violators in 
order to preserve the good working state of the system on their benefit. 
~-
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Marketing. Many advantages can be gained from the marketing system exposed in this 
thesis. As the distribution system, a layered market system will be more efficient in 
meeting supply schedules in_ time and space. Also the producers have a better chance to 
gain better benefits from their produce with such an organization. The system is discussed 
from ( 1) the view point of the small producers (peasants), (2) distributors and retail 
companies, (3) the small market retailers in the cities, (4) urban consumers, (5) the cities 
and the system as a whole. 
17 The peasant producer 
The benefits to the peasant are many, three of which will be discussed here: benefits 
related to the "peasant food production firm", benefits of the layered distribution system, 
and benefits of the layered marketing system. 
The "peasant food production firm" protects the individual farmer from distributors 
who routinely purchase products at very low prices or rip off poor peasants who do not 
have the means to sell their products to the cities at more competitive prices. Therefore, 
through the firm the peasant would be assured of the return from his product. One could 
argue that this would not solve the problem because food distributors could take advantage 
of the villagers' lack of means to go to cities in order to rip them off. Although competition 
among food distributors would tend to reduce producer prices, it would favor the peasants 
because they can choose between many buyers. In addition, strictly state imposed and 
enforced price levels would prevent price drops below allowed limits as a result of 
competition among producers. 
17 
We haYe not covered big producers. However, it is implied that because of their large market share 
compared to small producers and resources at their disposal, these producers can be at the same time 
distributors of their produce provided they be licensed by the state. Big producers have latency to sell their 
product where\·er they like provided it be either to grocery stores or to licensed distribution companies. 
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Another difficulty is that some peasants in the village would initially tend to go alone to 
have more benefit by selling to the highest bidder of their choice, or to make fast money to 
respond to an immediate need. However, this one producer would lack bargaining power 
vis-a-vis of the more powerful buyer and will discover the disadvantage in the long run. 
To solve immediate financial issue, the "village firm" will have an account to provide small, 
yet controlled loans to each villager member of the firm. The village firm can also provide 
a health insurance to cover part of the medical bills of firm members and their family. This 
host of advantages will immediately discourage people who want to go on their own, 
without imposing control on them as the cooperatives did with disastrous results (lack of 
motivation and inefficiency). 
A question to answer is how to stop black marketing? Since the current system is not 
imposed to anyone and that there are many potential benefits to the participants, this will 
not cause any significant tendency towards black marketing. Organizationally speaking, 
villagers will organize their firm either on modern structures of a capitalist firm or on the 
lines of their traditional organizations. However, the market competition characteristic is 
kept. 
Another question is "how if villager wants to go to the city to sell his product at higher 
bid?'' Tight government regulations would forbid and sanction any villager from selling 
products directly in a popular market in the cities. They can only sell their product at the 
district or subdivision level to licensed distribution companies. Only the latter should be 
allowed to sell the product in the cities. 
Peasants will be left with less incentives to come to the cities to sell their products. With 
more basic need stuffs available to them in rural areas, they would be able to go to the cities 
only to visit their relatives, or for vacations, or medical needs and others. It will save them 
a lot. Traditionally peasants, especially women have often embarked in long journeys to 
cities on dangerous roads, on the back of trucks with crazy drivers. They often get ripped 
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off for transportation costs only come home with small leftover income from the sales. In 
addition, for those who do not have relatives in the city, it means cold nights outside in the 
local market with babies in their arms, under threat of theft, rape and murder, and non-
hygienic conditions in the dir~y local markets. With the retention of peasants assured in the 
rural areas, the latter will be able to invest their money to buy products in the local 
economies in the rural areas which will boost these economies. At this moment peasants 
have been going and spending all their money in the cities, depriving rural areas of capital 
accumulation. With the present model, peasants can save money and time wasted on long 
trips to urban centers. 
The strategies proposed require a popular education through the sort of "popular 
movement" suggested by Amin (1985). Mass education of the peasants about benefits of 
such a system can, better than a coercive dictatorship, help for the implementation of these 
policies. When the masses are educated enough on what these solutions can bring as a 
positiYe contribution to help satisfy their basic needs, they may join in easily. This remark 
calls for its opposite, i.e., if not enough "popular education" is carried out, these strategies 
may not find a fertile ground at all. 
Distribution and retailer companies 
The agribusiness companies responsible of buying the products from village companies 
or small town companies, could diversify their activities by opening stores in the rural areas 
for manufactured products and other necessities. On their way to pick up produce from 
production areas, they can transport these necessities to rural areas. A layered distribution 
system is more efficient because not only it will make the trip of the producer shorter, but it 
will also saYe the perishable products from sunshine. An overhead may come with the 
handling of products at "relay storage point." However, with better packaging there will be 
less problems. In general, electrification in many African countries has reached most rural 
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subdivisions and localities. 18 Therefore, storage houses air conditioning can be built there 
from which trucks can pick up the product to sell it in the cities. The big retailer or 
distribution company will just have to make the trip from big city to the Division or district 
center. They can also own credit banks to provide loans to village firms from which they 
subcontract foodstuff products. 
The small retailer in city markets 
It was suggested earlier that with the current system, spontaneous popular markets 
would progressively di~appear in the cities to give way to food stores, supermarkets, and 
shopping centers. However, the cost is that a host of small food retailers, particularly 
women would be put out of business, depriving them from the source of income to support 
their families. A solution to this problem is that those retailers who cannot afford selling in 
supermarkets can open their own stores in residential areas provided they obtain a license 
from the state. However, a better solution is that the women can organize as retailer firms 
or as shop owners to purchase and sell products. The firm will employ each member and 
hire other workers in the provision of services. The workers will be paid on hourly basis 
and based on the minimum wage imposed by the state. Revenues will be deposited in the 
fim1' s account at the end of the day or at the end of the week. 
Sale of foodstuffs in grocery stores is beneficial to consumers in a sense that it is more 
clean. occupies less space, and causes less congestion of the streets and garbage problems. 
In addition, popular markets usually close with the fall of day light while shops and 
grocery stores can be kept open on 24-hour basis to provide needed food to consumers. 
Also~ decentralized shopping centers around the city will help reduce congestion and 
transportation hassles to get to the few popular markets in the city. 
18 Even for countries with less electrification, what will change is that the route between production 
areas and the nearest "relay storage point" will be longer. The layered distribution system can still be 
maintained. 
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The disappearance of popular markets will also affect other ambulant merchants and 
small retailers. As for the food retailers, these vendors can associate to co-own shops or 
retailer enterprises. In general the popular food market is the one that drives the creation of 
popular markets. With its transformation into shopping centers or shops, the other vendors 
of necessities are expected to do the same. 
The urban consumer 
The consumer in the city benefits from variety, quality and supply schedules. In 
addition, the consumer will benefit better prices that can be controlled more closely by state 
regulations. As pointed earlier, one benefit of the transformation of popular food markets 
into grocery stores is that the food can be made available 24 hours a day in shops and food 
stores, clean, and competitive. Also, an increase in food production and organized 
competition will certainly bring prices of foodstuffs down to benefit urban consumers. 
They' 11 be able to save on income for other life investments. 
A question to address is that some city dwellers may find it cheaper to buy foodstuffs 
from farmers and peasants. It is normal, even in the US it is done so. However, the more 
the distance to the farms, the less the incentive for individuals to engage in such a practice 
because the cost of the trip in time and transportation may offset the benefits. 
The cities and the rural areas 
The system presented will benefit the cities by providing more foodstuffs (quantity, 
quality. and variety) in the market at a price affordable to consumers. In addition, if the 
strategies are successful, some level of de-congestion of the cities will follow with more 
people settling in the rural areas. With the transformation of popular food markets the city 
gains in cleanliness and a new type of infrastructures, food stores and shopping centers 
which are more controllable and may provide jobs to the unemployed in the service sectors. 
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The reorganization of food production in rural areas and the growth of the agribusiness 
industry proves on abstract that development of rural economies and decentralization are 
achievable with the food production sector of the economy. Furthermore, the strategies 
have suggested a way of reorganizing rural communities around food production which 
may give incentives to people to stay in these areas when their basic needs are at reach. 
The strategies have proved also that the long sought decentralization of economies in 
sub-Saharan Africa is possible with development of the food production sector, particularly 
the agribusiness industry. Some questions are yet to be answered which have not been 
discussed in length in this thesis: resistance of policy makers in developed economies, 
internal corruption, pricing policy for foodstuffs, regional integration with the trade of 
foodstuffs within the African continent. 
Unanswered questions. This model has called for a curtailing of food imports from 
developed economies. Yet in the short term a food gap may occur unless gradual curtailing 
is conducted. Also, the dilemma is that the economies vow to be market-oriented and at the 
same time this solution is nothing but government control of economic activity. However, 
it is legitimate in trade and economic policy for any country to protect its domestic industry 
from external products by applying judicious tariffs. All MDCs practice this policy for 
manufactured products and for agriculture products (CAP policy of the EEC, and US 
agriculture trade policy). It is legitimate to curtail imports of foodstuffs, but the decision 
makers must conduct it in a way that will not cause food gaps while the food production 
sector is picking up. 
In addition, it was covered in CHAPTER IV that imports of foodstuffs benefit the 
farmers of the North, politicians and businessmen in the South, but not so much the 
consumer or the country's self-help in food production. Therefore, curtailing of imports is 
likely to meet resistance from developed economies. It is here that Amin's "popular 
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movement" must come into play to preserve progressive governments in sub-Saharan 
Africa from external pressures. By gathering national consensus on such inward-oriented 
development strategies, negative external influence to maintain the statusquo may be 
contained. In this sense, democratic governance seems better placed to achieve such a 
goal. Decision making should no longer rest on the President alone or a corrupt political 
elite vulnerable to external pressures, but on a "Congress of the People" who will easily 
contain external forces, and mitigate corruption and other government bottlenecks. 
Another issue is government corruption that will have a negative effect on the 
enforcement of regulations and setting of prices. However, it is hoped that if the enterprise 
is private, that private forces will coerce government officials to lessen corruption. Also, 
with a "Congress of the People" and "popular education" on these strategies, corrupt 
government practices will be exposed and combated by the private sector. 
Also governments must play a key role in catalyzing private entrepreneurship in food 
production and limiting food imports. Governments must stop playing the role of "do-it-
all" controllers and bottlenecks and become regulators and catalyzers of economic activity 
particularly in the food production sector. A sure way to succeed in this effort will be to 
give leadership of this food program to women. They have done it so well for centuries, 
they \\·ill be willing to do it again. It will provide them with more power and more 
economic independence vis-a-vis of their husbands. Also, in the cities, the agribusiness 
will bring jobs to women and allow them to raise their kids and support their families by 
working in the food service sectors. 
The issue of subsidies to food producers and distributors has not been addressed in this 
thesis. It is implied in food production that the government must provide subsidies to 
producers to keep them in business and to cover losses due to bad harvests, a high cost of 
production inputs, capital machinery, and other expenses. As for pricing policy, this issue 
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is not in the scope of this thesis. Another area, the inter-regional trade of foodstuffs among 
African countries has been mentioned and suggested but not developed in detail. 
Nonetheless these prospective limitations, government leadership and popular 
education on these new strategies are a key for their success. The conceptual model of new 
food production strategies has provided a path which sub-Saharan African countries can 
follow to make a transition from agriculture to pre-manufacturing economies with solutions 
that do not originate from foreign advisers, but from inward-originated and inward-oriented 
solutions. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The food crisis in Africa in the 1990s is exacerbating. The present research has made 
evidence that the causes of the crisis are rooted in the economic policies of sub-Saharan 
African countries, inherited from colonial legacy. Such causes can be summarized in the 
fact that the economies of sub-Saharan Africa are mostly export enclaves of cash crops and 
raw materials to MDCs. Henceforth, facing the shortage in needed capital and foreign 
exchange, these countries and Western advisers have insisted on expmting more cash crops 
and raw materials. Other countries of the region have resorted to expensive ISi, but have 
lacked a domestic or regional market to sustain it. The consequences on the food 
production sector have been the decline in domestic production and the increase in food 
imports that add to the debt burden. Furthermore, harsh climatic conditions (prolonged 
droughts) add to the backwardness of agricultural technology and methods to cause poor 
output of food production and inability of the food production sector to catch up with the 
fast growing population. 
Kenya figured in the 1990s as a country facing severe food problems. The food 
production, although it was kept constant, faced fast population growth and unfavorable 
climate as two dilemmas which set back the ability of this sector to satisfy domestic demand 
for foodstuffs. As a consequence Kenya has been for more than a decade, a net importer 
of foodstuffs in the form of food aid and commercial imports. 
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An investigation of causes for Kenya's food gap reveals six major reasons: (1) 
Structure of Kenya's economy as agriculture and commodity exporter set up during the 
colonial period, (2) Government neglect of food production sector to emphasis on cash 
crops, (3) Flawed government policies (poor production methods and technology, 
marketing, distribution, pricing), (4) Population growth, (5) Natural ecology of Kenya, 
(6) Structural barriers set by international economic institutions which allow the Kenya 
Government to take the easy solution of food imports (GATT, CAP & US agriculture 
policies) rather than encouraging stronger domestic food production. 
A historical study of Kenya from the colonial period and subsequent governments after 
independence has attributed responsibility of politics to the food crisis. During the colonial 
period, the state favored the settler's cash crop economy and denied resources to Africans 
for both cash crop production and food crop production. Settlers agriculture provided the 
backbone for the agriculture economy. The confiscation of land to the benefit of settlers 
left Africans without means of food production. Colonization destroyed African food 
production with confiscations which aimed at forcing Africans to modern economy (for 
example, destocking of Kamba cattle). Even the land reform of the Swynnerton Plan 
favored cash crop production and gave larger lands to the African elites. The majority of 
the population got just small lots of land which couldn't produce much output. 
Until 194+, all the institutions of the colonial state were closed to Africans (Legislative 
Council, Central Government, Provincial Administration.) Africans were subjects and 
were denied participation in politics. Therefore, they did not have a voice to express their 
needs for food production. Discontent over land alienation and repression of African voice 
gave way to the Kikuyu-led Mau Mau rebellion in 1954. 
In modern Kenya, politics were found responsible as well for the food crisis 
particularly on resource allocation, governance, and political institutions. At the 
217 
independence, land bough back from the settlers was unevenly distributed to the elites and 
Jomo Kenyatta's Kikuyu group benefited the most. 
The structure of the Government since Kenyatta shows no participatory institutions, 
rather institutions that are directed by the President himself or the elite. Political institutions 
(Government, National Assembly, and Local Government) are mostly centralized. The 
political rule has been mostly authoritarian and has not allowed free citizen participation 
with agendas that divert away from the elite agenda. In other words, the agenda of national 
policies has been often set at the discretion of elites. As an illustration, Kenyatta embarked 
on Kenyanization of the economy, education, cash crop economy and attracting foreign 
investment (MNCs) as his own policy vision. The food production sector was not given 
enough attention. Furthermore, it can be argued that heavy investment in rural 
infrastructure, education, health and a large civil service during the Kenyatta era has taken 
away large amounts of scarce resources that could have benefited the food production 
sector. 
Arap Mai followed Kenyatta's footsteps. However, the crisis of governance and 
allocation of state resources worsened with his regime. Huge military spending, large 
police force for repression, and tribal politics favored his ethnic group and stole away more 
resources of the state. In addition, the political institutions have not changed in their 
authoritarian character and their domination by the President. During Arap Moi's regime, 
the Government has also been unsuccessful to curb population growth by stronger birth 
control policies. As a result, food supply has lagged far behind in matching population 
growth. 
Structural Adjustment Programmes imposed by the IMF and World Bank have further 
penalized food production by forcing the government to remove subsidy to rural farmers. 
Women particularly have been denied access to resources with this adjustment. This host 
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of reasons prove, in the Kenyan case, that the politics have significantly contributed to the 
crisis in the food production sector. 
A sound solution to the food crisis as recommended by the present research is to devise 
development strategies in sub-Saharan Africa to boost food production. To do so, there is 
a need for governments to give incentives to rural farmers and small scale producers to 
produce food. Women who produce 80% of the food consumed locally fall into this 
category. Particularly, incentives must be devised to draw a large segment of the 
unemployed population of men and cash crop farmers to food production activity. Such a 
goal can be achieved by rendering the food production business more lucrative with the 
development of a better marketing and distribution system and an agribusiness industry. 
This thesis has offered a conceptual model for production, marketing and distribution 
of foodstuffs. The model is robust in a sense that the solutions offered are simple, 
affordable and inward looking, that is, they require almost no reliance on outside help for 
their implementation. Also, the model presented provides a possible way to solve two 
other crucial problems in sub-Saharan Africa -- development of rural economies and their 
full integration with urban economies, and national economic decentralization, and regional 
economic integration through trade. 
Some level of improvement in technology and farming methods is necessary for an 
increase in the yield. Therefore, there is a need to provide the traditional farmers with some 
equipment adapted to their environment and means to alleviate human labor. Technical 
education should be tapped to invent new equipment that is adapted to the needs and the 
buying capacity of the rural peasants. 
For the implementation of the proposed strategies to work, it is vital that governments 
in sub-Saharan Africa curtail imports of cheap food from agriculture-rich countries. 
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Particularly they must discourage citizen reliance on imported cheap food and to force them 
by the same way to look inward for solutions to their food needs. 
As for the case of Kenya, there is a need for improvement in political governance to 
provide democratic political institutions that allow people to participate in the decision 
making process. In the case of food production, food farmers must be given a voice 
through democratic political institutions to express their need for resources to produce 
food. Particularly, women must be given more access to resources (loans, land, and 
equipment). These institutions will also be a check-and-balance for the government so that 
allocation of scarce national resources would go to the real needs of the people, rather than 
in private pockets of leaders, luxurious palaces, huge police and weapon purchases to 
protect the undemocratic regime. This thesis supports the establishment of a "Congress of 
the People" such as the American Congress as an institution well-indicated to achieve this 
end. The existing National Assembly in Kenya and other African countries (Cameroon, 
Gabon, Zaire as examples) fails to meet this objective because it works on the whim and 
word of the President. There is practically no balance to presidential power in decision 
making. 
Some problems remain to be solved. Those are, for example, food preservation 
identified as one of the causes of poor food production output in Africa. Another problem 
is the lack of research for high yield species that are more sustainable to the environment as 
opposed to those imported from laboratories of the North. This thesis has called for 
allocating more Research and Development in these areas so that the expected results can be 
met. 
If development strategies are well reformulated to give priority to food production for 
local needs and regional economic integration in the continent, the African food crisis could 
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be overcome by the beginning of the next century. Side benefits for such a policy move are 
many. First, an increase in domestic savings may happen from cutting imports of 
expensive foodstuffs from abroad. Second, progressive regional economic integration in 
Africa can occur based on trade of foodstuffs between agriculture-rich countries and less 
advantaged countries. Third, it is possible to create a solid foundation on which a 
sustained small scale industrialization that is nationally owned can grow from. The 
beginning of such industrialization could be agriculture-based to satisfy the needs of food 
production and the agribusiness industry. 
Future work in continuation of this research will focus on drawing a full policy 
recommendation applied to one specific country in the region. Conceptual strategies 
proposed in this thesis will be backed up with quantitative data analysis and surveys on the 
field. 
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1980s 
Debt 
TABLE V 
KENYA, 1980s: EXTERNAL DEBT IN MILLION US DOLLARS 
(PULBIC AND PUBLICLY GUARANTEED LONG-TERM) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
2197.9 2311.0 2423.7 2419.8 2467.3 2800.5 3537.3 4280.9 4083.9 
Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1974, 1989. 
TABLE VI 
KENYA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY KIND 
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
Industrial activity 
228 
1989 
4001.4 
Year GDP Agriculture Total Manufac- Cons- Wholesale Transport Other 
(million pounds) turing truction and retail 
trade 
1964 355.0 38 12 10 4 9 7 23 
1970 575.3 31 13 11 5 10 7 25 
1972 715.5 31 14 12 5 9 7 26 
1973 805.7 30 15 13 5 10 6 25 
Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1974. 
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TABLE VII 
SELF-SUFFICIENCY RATIOS 1 
Countr~ I '1966-68 I I 1981-83 
Ratio 
Ethiopia 0.95 0.90 
Kenya 1.23 .94 
Lesotho .99 .47 
Mali 1 1.17 .96 
Mozambique .93 .56 
Niger 1.03 .94 
Senegal .98 .63 
Somalia .81 .42 
Sudan .81 1.00 
Zambia 1.03 .85 
Zimbabwe 1.20 1.29 
Source: Shapouri et al. (p.37) 
1 Defined as the ratio of available food production to food availability. 
TABLE VIII 
PER CAPITA CALORIES AVAILABLE FROM CEREALS 
Contribution of Daily calorie availability 
cereals to calorie 1966-68 1981-83 Percent of minimum calorie requirement 
consumptio n 
Country 1966-68 1981-83 1981 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Percent ........... Calories ......... ..................... Percent ................... 
Ethiopia 68 2,346 1,819 100 78 76 
Kenya 56 2,079 2,022 89 86 88 
Lesotho 76 1,848 2,281 79 98 111 
Mali 72 2,012 1,568 86 65 72 
Mozambique 36 2,403 1,592 103 68 70 
Niger 67 2,265 2,106 97 99 102 
Senegal 65 2,158 2,293 92 96 101 
Somalia 43 1,780 2,176 73 89 100 
Sudan 56 1,982 1,979 85 85 99 
Zambia 65 2,246 2,230 96 95 93 
Zimbabwe 63 2,498 2,215 107 95 90 
Source: (Shapouri et al. 1986, p. 7). 
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TABLE IX 
CEREAL FOOD AID TO TROPICAL AFRICA 197011-72/3 TO 1985/6 ('OOOtons) 
Country/ year 70/1- 74/5- 77/8-
72/3 73174 7617 79/80 80/81 82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 
Angola 0 0 5 13 25 60 69 72 91 
Burkina Faso 38 108 22 46 51 45 57 143 54 
Cape Verde 0 0 15 38 31 35 63 49 53 
Chad 3 67 19 29 14 36 69 203 45 
Ethiopia 10 96 72 117 228 344 172 1265 675 
Ghana 85 36 40 89 94 58 74 110 61 
Guinea 28 9 31 30 34 25 .43 34 27 
G. Bissau 0 0 12 19 26 35 19 23 6 
I Kenya 2 l 6 35 173 165 122 346 1931 
Lesotho 20 25 14 30 44 28 50 77 60 
Mali 41 180 49 26 50 88 111 239 113 
Mauritania 21 95 35 36 106 71 129 236 94 
Mauritius 23 33 17 13 21 13 22 17 15 
Mozambique 0 0 62 136 155 167 297 350 428 
Niger 21 195 68 17 11 12 13 284 80 
Senegal 30 101 25 96 153 91 151 97 69 
Somalia 5 16 82 99 330 189 177 262 128 
Sudan 32 79 42 138 195 330 450 1350 548 
Tanzania 8 11 131 82 236 171 136 118 93 
Zaire 21 3 12 58 77 110 53 100 103 
Zambia 0 0 13 78 85 83 76 117 119 
Other 34 66 41 87 196 316 573 400 294 
Total SSA 425 1121 812 1312 2335 2472 2926 5892 3349 
Source: Modernizing Hunger (Raikes, 1991, p.188). 
PORTION OF RECIPIENTS FOOD AID (TONNAGE) 
FROM THE UNITED STATES,1966-1983 
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Year Ethio- Kenya Leso- Mali Mozam- Niger Senegal Somalia Sudan Zambia 
eia tho bique 
Percent 
1966 96.73 100.00 .. .. .. .. 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1967 46.67 100.00 .. .. .. .. 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1968 0 100.00 .. .. .. .. .. 100.00 
1969 0 .. 0 0 .. 0 81.31 55.56 0 
1970 97.66 100.00 .. 0 .. 0 100.00 8,85 0 100.00 
1971 100.00 100.00 .. 0 .. .. 100.00 10.11 0 100.00 
1972 100.00 100.00 100.00 4.60 .. 4.11 20.29 0 0 100.00 
1973 23.08 85.71 89.80 37.01 .. 70.14 33.89 0 62.16 5.66 
1974 54.89 .. 100.00 55.51 TABLE )(60.84 31.72 0 85.55 
1975 20.38 0 100.00 6.07 0 7.42 6.80 17.52 30.80 13.79 
1976 16.67 12.64 94.64 1.19 0 25.30 29.92 11.99 2.78 .99 
1977 30.53 6.92 100.00 100.0 17.13 8.33 10.73 3.15 86.07 33.73 
0 
1978 32.97 14.75 86.29 52.94 33.57 46.78 47.88 52.17 84.77 0 
1979 42.80 4.14 100.00 25.67 51.54 1.06 32.58 68.34 79.04 69.18 
1980 33.19 82.00 61.52 19.59 59.72 80.00 54.45 67.78 89.14 75.09 
1981 11.79 67.19 97.75 6.86 6.77 27.54 42.02 65.76 81.29 70.79 
1982 1.19 47.46 56.86 6.86 6.77 28.55 28.37 38.10 55.18 44.43 
1983 2.31 60.13 55.81 20.15 14.62 100.0 58.78 85.49 44.91 45.82 
1981-
5.10 58.26 70.14 9.00 10.17 52.03 43.06 63.12 60.46 53.68 1983 
avera-
:e 
Source: (Shapouri et al. 1986, p. 50) . 
.. = no food aid received from any country 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
Avg. 
1966-
83 
1981-
83 
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TABLE XI 
PER CAPITA FOOD AID 
FROM THE UNITED STATES, 1966-1983 
Ethio- Kenya U8o - Mali 
eia tho 
1.19 20.16 0 
0 
0 
0 .13 
.06 
.36 
.50 
.13 
.37 
.24 
3.55 
.12 
.26 0 0 
0 2 0.61 
.20 0 6.00 
.25 0 3.82 
.14 13.18 8.23 
.II 17.82 16.77 
0 4.75 31.67 
Mozm Niger 
-bi.9,Ue 
Sene-
~al 
Soma- Sudan Zam-
lia bia 
Kilograms 
0 
0 
0 4.76 0.76 3.17 0.16 
0 
0 0 13.51 .27 1.31 
0 4.92 7.46 .22 1.85 
0 3.85 4.12 3.21 .73 
0 0 3.65 4.79 .64 
0 11.88 4.70 4.29 .83 
0 11.88 11.74 4.29 2.50 
0 43.35 19.17 3.33 2.28 
0 
0 
.24 
.05 
.11 
1.18 
0 
1.32 .37 6.25 8.69 .21 8.69 6.13 13.92 1.85 1.21 
1.04 .62 9.33 1.45- 6.13 18.30 4.88 15.37 .90 4.06 
l.78 .89 7.75 .03 11.41 .77 14.41 13.82 4.16 8.20 
2.07 .40 9.54 7.25 7.53 7.44 24.06 14.79 5.99 2.26 
2.47 1.07 12.08 2.97 10.25 3.76 8.19 19.07 9.16 15.22 
2.88 7.41 35.38 1.49 13.35 .98 15.93 46.29 10.17 29.11 
3.47 11.87 19.07 5.58 12.29 2.60 18.04 42.33 12.89 17.83 
5.60 8.39 10.93 6.85 15.08 10.19 11.00 29.08 14.23 10.02 
3.09 7.43 15.36 7.59 28.51 .29 14.15 12.43 20.17 15.06 
1.68 3.32 9.08 6.06 5.82 6.60 I 0.66 12.68 5.16 5.82 
4.05 9.23 15.12 6.67 18.63 4.36 14.40 27.95 15.77 14.30 
Zimba 
-bwe 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.30 
1.05 
.66 
1.23 
.24 
.98 
Source: (Shapouri et al. 1986, p. 52). Most of the food aid came from P.L. 480 title I and title II 
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TABLE XII 
FOOD IMPORTS AND FOOD AID DEPENDENCY 
Commercial food imports Food aid Food aid dependency 
Country 1966-6811971-7311981-83 1966-6811971-7311981-83 1966-6811971-7311981-83 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
........................................... 1.000 tons ............................ . ...•.••••••.••• Percent •..••••. 
Ethiopia 33.0 31.3 79.9 5.7 6.6 212.2 0.1 0.2 3.7 
Kenya 27.0 53.0 212.0 67.2 2.0 177.3 4.8 .1 7.4 
Lesotho 29.0 50.7 178.3 0 11.4 29.0 0 5.9 10.7 
Mali 14.0 47.7 95.0 0 50.4 54.5 0 5.9 6.1 
Mozam-
66.0 115.7 196.7 0 0 142.3 0 0 17.5 
bique 
Niger 8.3 13.3 79.3 0 19.1 30.3 0 3.0 3.0 
Senegal 234.7 270.7 427.3 31.6 30.1 93.2 5.1 4.6 9.1 
Somalia 35.0 74.3 176.3 1.0 15.4 168.8 .4 5.1 30.9 
Sudan 161.0 203.0 126.3 18.8 19.3 305.8 1.1 1.0 11.7 
Zambia 63.0 205.0 172.7 .2 2.0 90.6 0 .2 8.1 
Zimba-
85.0 49.7 36.7 0 0 7.8 0 0 .6 
bwe 
Total 736.0 1,114.4 1,780.5 124.5 156.3 1,311.8 1.0 1.2 7.4 
Source: (Shapouri et al. 1986, p. 54). 
TABLE XIII 
FOOD AID REPRESENTED AS A PERCENT AGE OF 
DOMESTIC FOOD PRODUCTION 
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Year Ethio- Kenya Leso- Mali Mozm Niger Seneg Soma- Sudan Zam- Zimba 
_eia tho bigue al lia bia -bwe 
Percent 
1966 0.60 11.09 0 0 0 0 2.51 1.10 3.17 0.06 0 
1967 0.06 0.06 0 0 0 0 8.93 0.32 1.38 0 0 
1968 0.03 0.12 0 0 0 0 2.81 0 0 0 0 
1969 0.17 0.00 0.98 0.31 0 2.83 5.74 0.27 1.94 0 0 
1970 0.25 0.11 0 2.71 0 1.60 2.06 3.93 0.49 0.13 0 
1971 0.07 0.14 0 1.93 0 0 2.96 7.06 0.41 0.02 0 
1972 0.22 0.09 10.16 4.50 0 0.94 2.84 6.70 0.58 0.05 0 
1973 0.15 0.06 11.81 11.31 0 6.73 14.21 4.70 2.01 0.57 0 
1974 2.34 0.00 2.16 20.00 0 37.13 14.79 3.77 1.50 0 0 
1975 0.69 0.23 4.93 4.15 0.33 5.26 3.08 17.70 1.17 0.53 0 
1976 0.70 0.35 9.41 0.77 11.60 17.08 3~10 23.74 0.52 1.66 0 
1977 1.30 0.47 3.73 0.02 18.31 0.40 10.17 23.74 2.48 3.72 0 
1978 1.58 0.22 4.44 4.21 12.17 3.38 23.12 23.61 3.55 1.13 0 
1979 1.23 0.69 6.23 1.43 18.50 1.87 4.41 33.52 5.03 10.49 0 
1980 1.60 6.12 23.12 0.83 28.51 0.45 13.23 85.13 8.14 17.99 0.47 
1981 2.17 6.73 11.61 4.12 24.38 1.20 15.74 85.00 8.56 7.76 0.23 
1982 3. 77 5.45 8.84 4.33 32.51 5.00 6.95 52.30 6.94 5.49 0.23 
1983 2.07 4.76 14.33 4.85 96.51 1.99 11.03 22.56 16.19 8.24 0.78 
Avg. 
1966-
83 
1981-
83 
1.07 
2.67 
2.15 6.21 3.64 13.49 4.77 8.21 21.95 3.56 
6.32 I 1.60 4.43 51.14 2.73 11.24 53.29 10.56 
Source: (Shapouri et al. I 986, p. 56). 
3.21 0.10 
7.16 0.42 
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TABLE XIV 
EXPENDITURES BY ACTIVITY GROUP, COHORT SAMPLE, 1985-1987 
Activity Group Total Nonfood Food Expenditures Food Budget 
Expenditures Expenditures Share 
(Ksh/capita/week) 
New entrants 62.61 11.48 51.13 82 
Sugar farmers 52.77 12.06 40.71 77 
Nonsugar farmers 49.14 9.59 39.55 80 
Merchants 77.21 37.50 39.71 51 
Landless 51.99 12.38 39.61 76 
Sample mean 52.71 11.74 40.97 78 
Source: (Kennedy 1989, p. 35). 
TABLE XV 
KENYA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 1967-1973 
Source Year 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Merchandise: Exp. f.o.b 221.9 235.3 253.0 285.5 293.6 310.8 384.1 
Merchandise: Imp. f.o.b -291.4 -302.0 -303.3 -381.6 -491.2 -429.4 -460.1 
Exports of services 151.3 174.2 202.4 224.5 238.6 229.6 200.9 
Imports of services -144.9 -172.7 -182.9 -203.0 -211.7 -201.3 -208.1 
Private unrequited transfers net -1.8 -0.1 2.6 1.1 -0.1 0.6 -2.3 
Gov. unrequited transf. net 4.7 25.1 20.1 24.5 58.4 24.6 22.6 
Direct investment 13.8 11.9 19.2 20.9 28.4 24.9 19.1 
Other long-term capital, n.i.e 32.9 31.5 34.3 58.1 19.6 69.3 55.6 
Shor-term capital, n.i.e 14.2 -8.0 2.4 7.7 3.7 -0.2 8.6 
Errors and omissions 11.2 25.2 15.6 7.6 -9.8 -1.8 4.8 
Allocation of SDR's - - - 5.4 5.1 5.1 -
Monetization of gold - - - - - - -
Reserves and Related items -11.9 -20.4 -63.4 -50.7 65.4 -32.2 -25.2 
~United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1974. 
TABLE XVI 
KENYA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 1983-1989 
Source Year 
1983 1984 1985 1986 
Merchandise: Exp. fob 926.6 1034.5 943.2 1170.2 
Merchandise: Imp. fob -1197.9 -1348.2 -1269.8 -1454.6 
Serv. & Income: Credit 98.3 628.6 663.4 732.0 
Serv. & Income: Debit -554.7 -617.8 -641.4 -693.0 
Private Unrequited Transfers 63.4 60.1 81.5 58.2 
Offic. Unrequited Trans., nie 116.5 116.6 110.2 149.0 
Direct Investments, nie 9.2 3.9 12.7 27.8 
Portfolio Investment, nie 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other Capital, nie 121.5 175.2 8.6 104.8 
Net Errors and Related Items 15.0 8.6 39.6 43.2 
Reserves and Related Items -97.9 -61.6 52.1 -137.7 
Tot. Change in Res. Assets -171.9 3.3 8.5 -18.0 
Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1989. 
TABLE XVII 
KENYA'S DEBT POSITION IN 1987 
Total debt ($bn): 
Public and public guaranteed long-term debt, by source of creditor ($bn): 
- multilateral creditors: 
- Bilateral creditors: 
- Private creditors: 
Debt/export ratio: 
~ African Debt: The seqarch for Solutions, Briefing Paper, 
UN Africa Recovery Programme, No.l June 1989. 
1987 
908.7 
-1622.6 
829.9 
-824.6 
72.0 
141.9 
45.0 
0.0 
316.8 
107.9 
25.1 
158.1 
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1988 
1017.5 
-1802.2 
862.3 
-877.8 
89.0 
256.4 
-19.4 
0.0 
380.9 
49.9 
43.4 
-8.6 
1989 
926.1 
-1963.4 
1008.5 
-941.2 
101.5 
280.9 
68.8 
0.0 
573.0 
67.6 
-122.0 
-20.9 
$5.95 
$2.05 
$1.65 
$0.78 
342.0 
TABLE XVIII 
A STATISTICAL GUIDE TO A CONTINENT IN CRISIS 
(KENYA: FINANCES) 
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Export fob Imports fob Total external debt Debt/exports 
($mn) ($mn) ($ bn) 
1985 1986 1987 1985 1986 1987 1985 1986 1987 
1,695.0 1,907.0 1,740.0 1,883.0 2, 158.0 2,451.0 4.39 4.93 5.95 
Source: (Africa Recovery, October 1989; extract from table in p.26-27). 
TABLE XIX 
DEBT SERVICE RATIOS 
Terms of Trade 
Country Gross national Exports of goods 
product and services 
1970 I 1983 1970 
Percent 
Ethiopia 1.2 1.4 11.4 
Kenya 1.8 5.5 5.4 
Lesotho .4 1.9 na 
Mali .2 1.3 1.3 
Mozambique na na na 
Niger .6 5.6 3.8 
Senegal .8 1.9 2.8 
Somalia .3 1.2 2.1 
Sudan 1.7 1.2 10.7 
Zambia 3.5 4.0 5.9 
Zimbabwe .6 8.1 na 
Source: (Shapouri et al. 1986, p. 43). 
na = not available 
I 1983 
11.5 
20.6 
2.5 
6.1 
na 
na 
na 
13.1 
11.2 
12.6 
31.6 
Cereal stock policies: The government 
between 1981 and 1983 had stock policies 
and practices the objective of which were to 
( 1) maintain supplies to domestic markets 
(2) to meet emergencies (3) to stabilize 
prices ( 4) to meet public distributiton 
programs (5) for strategic considerations. 
The stocks between 1981-1983 amounted 
for 494 ,000 tons representing 17 .5 per cent 
of the all availability. 
ratio(%) 
1985 1986 1987 
275.2 258.8 342.0 
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TABLE XX 
COMMERCIAL FOOD IMPORTS AND TOT AL 
MERCHANDISE IMPORTS, 1966-83 
Annual growth rate of value of ... 
Country Merchandise 
imports 
1 Com~ercial food 
) imports 
Ethiopia 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Mali I 
11.0 
13.78 
18.16 
14.76 
Mozambique na 
Niger 21.25 
Senegal 12.80 
Somalia 16.45 
Sudan 11.82 
Zambia 6.30 
Zimbabwe 11.64 
Source: (Shapouri et al. 1986, p.38). 
na: not available; NA: not applicable 
15.28 
9.67 
20.36 
15.33 
na 
22.80 
10.85 
19.46 
13.19 
6.77 
NA 
Value of commercial food iports as a 
percent of total imports 
1980-82 l Historical high 
point, 1966-82 
Percent 
10.23 13.5 
5.07 13.5 
37.13 37.8 
16.50 55.3 
na na 
11.57 19.9 
25.17 36.4 
43.30 57.1 
20.40 25.5 
10.00 12.4 
3.73 5.3 
TABLEXXI 
INPUT USES: LAND, TRACTORS, AND FERTILIZER, 1981 
Country I Arable land I Irrigated land 1 Tractors per I Fertilizer use 
1,000 hectares 
1.000 hectares Percent Number 100 grams of 
nutrient per 
heactare 
Ethiopia 13,220 0.5 0.314 33 
Kenya 1,830 2.7 3.607 344 
Lesotho 298 na 4.866 151 
Mali 2,055 5.6 .419 64 
Mozambique 2,850 2.4 2.043 12 
Niger 3,450 1.1 0.056 IO 
Senegal 5,220 3.5 0.091 47 
Somalia 1,100 15.0 1.591 12 
Sudan 12,390 15.0 0.937 60 
Zambia 5,150 0.2 0.903 166 
Zimbabwe 2,600 3.9 7.883 682 
Source: (Shapouri et al. 1986, p. 21). 
1 Irrigated land as a percent of arable land 
TABLEXXII 
A STATISTICAL GUIDE TO A CONTINENT IN CRISIS 
(KENYA: AGRICULTURE AND FOOD PRODUCTION) 
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GNP per capita Agricultural production Food production Food production per 
(S per year) (1979-81 = 100) (1979-81 = 100) capita 
(1979-81 = 100) 
1986 1985 1986 1987 1985 1986 1987 1985 1986 1987 
300 117.5 128.0 124.3 114.0 124.4 118.2 92.7 97.0 88.3 
Source: (Africa Recovery, October 1989; extract from table in p.26-27). 
TABLEXXIII 
DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL INPUTS 
Country Fertilizer supply Seed supply Chemical supply Farm equipment supply 
Ethiopia 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Mali 1 
Mozambique 
Niger 
Seneg3..l 
Somali::i 
Sudan 
ZambiJ. 
1 
x-
x 
: 2: 3 1: 
x 
x 
x 
x 
na 
x 
x 
x 
x 
Zimb;.ibwe : x x 
Sl""urce: Shapouri et al. (p. 26) 
1 = Private 
2 
"' _.., 
Government 
Mixed 
na = not available 
2: 3 1 : 2: 3 1: 2: 
x x x 
x x 
x x x 
x x 
na na na 
x x x 
x x x 
x x x 
x x 
x x 
x x 
l Supplies came from the operations de Developpement Rural (ODR). The most effective of 
these is the quasi-governmental Compagnie Malienne des Textiles (CMDT) 
3 
x 
x 
x 
TABLEXXX 
KENYA: MILITARY EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENT AGE 
OF GOVERNMENT TOTAL 
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Functional Classification of Central Government Exeenditure on Recurrent Accounta 
(K£ mn) %of 
1981182 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 l 985/86b 1986/87b total 
General public administration 130.3 111.4 132.3 159.4 164.7 199.4 12.5 
of which: 
general administration 66.l 64.8 62.3 84.2 74.6 91.0 5.7 
external affairs 10.3 12.2 13.8 15.6 20.l 26.7 1.7 
eublic order & safet~ 54.0 34.4 56.2 59.6 70.0 81.8 5.1 
Defence: (total) 122.4 130.6 129.5 100.7 105.2 145.4 9.1 
as% of total ~ov. exe.~ 14.7% 13.5% 13% 8.5% 8.4% 9.0% 9.1 
Education 180.6 192.1 210. 5 245.2 310.6 373.9 23.i 
Health 59.8 62.0 64.4 72.5 70.6 96.0 6.0 
Housing & community 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.3 4.4 2.2 0.1 
welfare 
Social welfare 15.1 17.3 20.6 23.4 27.2 33.l 2.1 
Economic services of which: 126.9 134.8 139.2 187.0 176.2 269.4 16.8 
general administration 11.7 10.7 11.7 9.6 16.7 18.5 1.2 
agriculture, forestry 45.3 58.6 54.1 97.8 65.9 135.6 8.5 
&fishing 
mining, manufacturing & 14.0 15.0 17.0 25.7 34.4 34.0 2.1 
construction 
electricity, gas, steam 13.7 13.l 16.4 16.0 18.7 19.l 1.2 
&water 
roads 19.9 16.1 19.6 9.6 7.5 11.5 0.7 
transport &communications 7.4 7.9 7.4 8.2 11.8 10.4 0.6 
other economic services 15.1 13.4 13.0 20.1 16. 4 40.3 2.5 
Other services. incl public 192.4 316.5 299.5 384.4 339.6 480.2 30.0 
debt 
Total 830.3 967.7 996.2C 1, 175.9 l. 255.2 c 1, 600.l 100.0 
a Fiscal year's ending June 30; includes a small element of investment expenditure. b Provisional. 
c Columns do not add to total in original source. 
Source: Economic Intelligence Unit 1986/87. 
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(*)Figure La and Figure l.b are borrowed from (EID 1991). Figure 2 and 23 are borrowed from (Nelson, 
1984). Figures 6-22 are borrowed from (Heyer et al., 1976). Figure 3, 4, and 5 are borrowed from (Hanley, 
Feb. 22,23, 1992). 
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Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost by Industrial Origin 1956-63 
Composition of Total 
Percentages 
-----------
Industry 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 
Recorded Monetary Economy 
Agriculture (incl. incidental services) 12.9 11.6 11.9 11.8 13.1 12.6 11. 7 12.8 
Livestock 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.7 
Forestry 0.4 0."3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 
Fishing and Hunting 0.8 o.s 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Total 18.2 16.3 16.6 16.6 17.7 17.2 16.3 17.J 
Outside Recorded Monetary Economy 
Agriculture 18.0 18.l 18.3 17.9 16.0 lS.2 19.0 18.S 
Livestock S.5 5.1 S.1 S.4 4.9 4.6 4.9 4.9 
Forestry 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.9 2.2 
Fishing and Hunting O;l O.l O.l 0.1 0.1 O.l O.J O.l 
Total 24.9 2S.l 25.3 24.7 22.J 21.J 25.9 25.7 
Mining and Quarrying 0.7 0.6 0.6 o.s o.s 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Manufacturing 9.4 9.6 9.9 9.4 9.6 10.l 9.4 9.4 
Construction 4.8 4.7 4.0 3.7 3.S 3.S 2.8. 1.9 
Electricity and Water 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 
TransPort, Storage and Communi-
cations 8.2 9.1 8.5 8.9 9.0 9.4 9.1 9.S 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 13.4 13.3 12.7 12.9 12.8 13.2 12.3 12.3 
Banking, Insurance and Real Estate 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1. 7 1.6 1.6 
Services 5.6 S.9 6.3 6.8 6.9 6.3 S.8 5.9 
Rents (including ownership of 
dwelling houses) 3.0 3.2 3.6 3.7 3.9 3.6 3.S 3.6 
Total 47.3 48.8 48.3 48.7 49.0 49.4 46.2 46.0 
Government 
Central Government 7.2 1.S 7.9 7.9 8.9 9.6 9.0 8.1 
Local Authorities 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.S ·1.6 1.7 2.3 
Defence 1.3 1.0 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 
Overseas Governments (local 
employees) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Total 9.7 9.8 9.8 10.0 11.1 12.0 JJ..5 11.1 
Total-Recorded Monetary 
Economy 75.1 74.9 74.7 75.3 77.7 78.7 74.1 74.3 
Total-Gross Domestic 
Product 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 - 100 
Total Product Agriculture, etc. (in.ride 
and out.ride recorded monetary 
economy) 
Axn'culture 30.9 29.7 30.2 29.7 29.l 27.8 30.7 31.3 
Livestock 9 .. 5 9.6 9.6 9.4 9.0 8.6 8.8 8.6 
Forestry 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.3 2.5 
Fishing and Hunting 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Total 43.0 41.4 41.9 41.2 40.0 38:.S 42.2 42.9 
Figure 6. Kenya's GDP from 1956 to 1963. 
Gross Domestic Product 
Sector Shares (at constant 1964 prices) 1964, 1969--73 (pcrocntascs) 
Industry 1964 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974• 
Outside Monetary Economy 
Agriculture 22.26 19.72 19.08 18.4S 17.89 
Forestry 0.(i() 0.56 O.S4 O.S3 O.Sl o.so 17.67 17.27} 
Fishin1 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 .. '. 
Buildin1 and Construction 1. 76 1.49 1.42 1.37 1. 34 1.30 
Water 0.63 0.58 o.ss O.SJ 0 . .51 0..48 
Ownorsh.ip of Dwcllinp 1. 68 1.56 1.54 1.53 1.51 1.49 
Total Product Outside 
Monelary Economy 26.96 23.94 23.16 22.43 21. 78 21.06 
Enterprises and non-
profit Institutions 
Agriculture 16.08 15.48 1.5.22 14.22 lS.13 JS.27 
Forestry 0.51 O.S1 0.60 0.61 0 . .58 0.61 
FishiDJ 0.26 o.2s 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.18 
Mining and Quarrying 0.44 0.44 0.53 O.S3 0.45 0.66 
Manufacturing and Repairs JO. 35 10.66 10.79 11.47 11 . .55 12.01 
Building and Construction 2.07 2.60 2.48 2 . .54 2.85 2.93 
Electricity and Water 1. '47 1.41 1.47 1.Sl 1.61 1.55 
Transport, Storaee 
and Communications 7.43 8.46 8.46 8.34 7.70 1.SS 
Wholesale and Retail trade 9.99 9.64 10.00 10.27 9.20 9.12 
Banking, Insurance, RcaJ 
Estate 2.98 3.70 4.03 4.09 3.95 3.89 
Ownership or Dwellings 4.0'4 3.08 2.97 2.88 2.73 2.74 
Other Services 3.60 4.0S 4.18 -4.38 4.U S.17 
Total Eotcrpriscs 59.28 60.34 60.95 61.01 li0.79 61.66 
Private Households 0.89 0.76 0.73 0.74 0.69 0.68 
General Government 
Public Administration 5.10 4.60 4.44 4.62 4.79 4.64 
Defence 0.66 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.91 
Education 3.39 4.68 4.98 4.98 5.39 5.SO 
Health 1.42 1. 76 1.84 1.97 2.11 2.05 
Agricultural Services 1.34 1.30 l.18 1.34 1.39 l.32 
Other Services 0.95 I. 75 1.92 2.03 2.20 2.17 
Total General Government 12.87 14.96 15.16 lS.81 16.7'4 16.59 
Total Product Monetary 
Economy 73.04 76.06 76.84 17.51 78.22 28.94 
Total Gross Product at 
Factor Cost (monetary 
and non-monetary) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
•ProvisionAI. 
Source: Republic of Kenya. Economic Surr~y. 1975, p. 7. 
Figure 7. Kenya's GDP: Sector Shares 1964, 1969-73. 
Chanpa In Populatioa and Population Orowth Rates 
Year 
1931 
1941 
1948 
J9Sl 
1961 
1962 
1969 
1971 
1974 
Population " Orowth Rate Between 
3,981,000 
4,ISl.000 
S,<405,966 
6,21 J,000 
8,346,000 
1,636,263 
l0.942.705 
11,524,000 
12,934,000 
Years Shown 
2.0 
2., 
3.0 
3.2 
3.3 
3.4 
3.S 
StMu: Republic of Kenya, Dnelo~"' Pla11 1974-11, p. '· 
1.31 
0.47 
1.Sl 
~.91 
J4.69 
0.66 
0.17 
O.S6 
12 • .53 
2.•2 
1.60 
7.91 
1.11, 
3.88 
3.S6 
5.63 
61.37 
o·.19 
LS4 
L.J8 
l.92 
16.17 
79.03 
100.00 
Figure 8. Kenya: Population and Growth Rates, 1931-1974. 
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Kenya's Balance of Payments, 1968-74 (£m) 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974& 
1. Balance of visible trade -36.9 -31.1 -50.S -91.3 -6S.9 -ss.s -162.4 
2. Balance on invisibles and transfers +22.R +2R.2 +33.0 +s1.4 +41.6 +s.o +46.3 
3. Current account balance (1+2) -14.1 -2.9 -11.S -39.9 -24.3 
-47.S -116.1 
4. Balance on Iona-term capital account +16.l +20.2 +Jo.9 +1s.2 +30.6 +49.0 
+63.0 
s. Basic balaDCIC (3+4> +2.0 +17.3 +u.4 -24.7 +6.3 +t..5 -53.1 
6. Compensatory financing balanccb - 7. 6 -22.7 -17.9 +17.9 -10.9 -9.3 +12.s 
7. Short-term capital, non-official extemal uacts, 
errors and omissions (balancins item) + 5. 6 +s.4 +4.S +6.8 +4.6 +7.8 +40.6 
Notes: • 1974 figures provisional. ' · 
b Linc 6 records changes in official foreign exchange reserves with opposite sign, i.e. a+ represents a decline in reserves; a - indicates 
an increase. 
Sources: Republic of Kenya, Economic Surveys, 1971-75, Central Bank Economic and Financial Review, October-December, 1974. 
Figure 9. Kenya's Balance of Payments. 1968-74. 
Balance of Trade 1969-74 (K£ million) 
Imports 
From outside E.A. of which 
Commercial 
Government 
From Uganda and Tanzania 
Total 
Exports 
To markets outside E.A. 
To Uganda and Tanzania 
Re-exports 
Total 
Balance of Trade 
---
1969 
---
117.0 
100.7 
16.3 
11.8 
---
128.8 
---
63.3 
28.8 
5.2 
---
97.3 
·---
1970 
---· 
142.0 
126.5 
15.5 
16.0 
---
158.0 
---
71.6 
31.4 
5.8 
---
108.8 
------
1971 1972 
------
184.1 177.6 
162.8 160.3 
21.3 17.3 
16.0 13.5 
------
200.1 191.1 
------
73.2 90.6 
33.9 32.8 
5.2 4.9 
------
112.3 128.2 
------
1973 1974 
------
205.8 353.0 
187.4 333.9 
18.4 19. l 
12.3 13.3 
------
218.1 366.4 
------
122.6 162.9 
38.8 48.3 I 
6.3 7.2 
------
167. 7 218.4 
With markets outside E.A. 
With Uganda and Tanzania 
-48.5 , -64.6 1-105. 7 1-82.2 
17.0 15.4 17.9 19.3 
-76.9 1-182.9 
26.5 35.0 
Total -31.5 I -49.2 I -87.8 I -62.9 I -50.4 1-147.9 
Source: Republic or Kenya, Economic Survey, 1974 and 1975. 
Figure 10. Kenya's Balance of Trade, 1969-74. 
Tenna of Trado 1970-7A (1964-100) 
External Trade 
Inter·tcrritorial Trade 
Total 
1970 
97 
102 
99 
1971 1972 
BS 82 
112 106 
93 91 
1973 
" 111
9l 
Source: Republic of Kenya. Economic Suney, 1915, p. 74. 
Figure 11. Kenya's Terms of Trade 1970-7 4. 
1974. 
68 
109 
7S 
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Kenya~s Domestic Exports .. Principal Commodities 1964-73 
· Percentage of Total Value 
Commodity 1964 196S 1966 '. 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 19"73 
Coffee, not roasted 32.7 . •29.9. 32.3 29.3 22.2 26.6 31.l 26.8 27.3 29:2 
Tea 12.9 . 12.9 15.0· 13.8 17.4 17.8 17.7 16.2 1s;1 13.8 
Sisal fibre and tow 12. 8 8.2 S.8 3;9 3.2 2.7 2.6 2.1 2.3 . 3.9 
Meat and meat preparations 4~ 6 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.2 4.1 4.0 s.o 5.4 3.1 
Pyretbrum extract and flowers S. 2 4.7. 4.9 5.4 S.3 4.4 3.0 4.6 S;O : J.O 
Hidca, skins.and furskins, undressed 2. 7 3.7 4.4 3.3 2.9 3.0 2.3 3.3 4;2 4.2 
Mair.c, uomilled . · - - - 2.6 8.3 4.4 - ·- - ·4.6 
Wattle bark and extract ··· · 2. 3 : : 1.8 2.7. L7. 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.0 
Pineapplfll. tinned 1. 9 · 1.6 0;9 1.0· 0.8 1.1 · 0.9 1.3 :t:O 1.2 
~tton,raw , 1.4 1.6 . 1.S 1.2 0.7 1.2'· 1.7 1.6 ;1.3 1.1 
Wool, raw ·. 1.1 1.2. LO 0.9 1.0 0.9 o.s 0.4 !0.4 0.7 
Cashew nuts . 0. 6 1.2 0:8 1.0 1.1 1.1 2.2 1.0 il.2; 0.5 
Beans, peas and lentils 1.1 1..() 1.0 0.6 1.4 0.8 0.7 0.6 1.2· 1.0 
Oil seeds, oilnuts and oil kernels 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.7 1.1 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.3 ·.o.4 
Butter and iheo 1.6 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.8 0~6 
Non-agricultural 9.7 16.4 14.9 18.3 15.3 16.3 16.7 19. 7 14.7 12.5 
Other 8.S 9.1 8.0 10.5 11.4 12.8 14.0 lS. l 14.9 19.2 
Total 100 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Annual Trade Reports, East African Customs and Excise De~ment and adapted from Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract, 
1974. . . . 
Figure 12. Kenya: Domestic Exports by Principal Commodities, 1964-73. 
Year 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
Coffee Production, 1963-74 
('000 metric tons) 
Estates Small-holdings 
Production Production 
24.8 16.6 
23.1 16.2 
28.4 28.5 
19.2 28.8 
18.8 20.8 
26.8 25.6 
27.9 30.4 
31.S 28.0 
34.2 27.8 
35.1 36.l 
30.8 39.3 
Total 
Production 
41.4 
39.3 
56.9 
48.0 
39.6 
52.4 
58.3 
59.5 
. 62 0 
71.2 
70.1 
Source: Republic of Kenya, Economic S11r¥~Y. 1969 and 1975. 
Figure 13. Kenya's Coffee Production, 
1963-74. 
Pyretbrum Production 1969-74 
Year Metric fons 
1969 81 
1970 95 
1971 1~3 
1972 185 
1973 151 
1974 196 
The Development of Smallboldet Tea 1964-74 
Total Hectara Number of Orowen 
at end of year at end of year 
Up to 1964/65 S,133 22,343 
1965/66 6,479 29,693 
1966/67 8,424 32,599 
1967/68 10,m 37,953 
1968/69 13,409 42,596 
1969/70 16.229 48,443 
1970nt 19)30 53,400 
1971/72 26,228 66,897 
1972/73 30,895 79,314 
1973/74 34,384 90,135 
Soma: Republic of Kenya, Economic S"1'Hy, 197S, p. 98. 
Figure 14. Kenya: The Development 
of Smallholder Tea, 1964-74. 
Exports of Fresh Horticultural Produce. 1968-74 
Volume Value 
(metric tons) (K.£) 
1968 1,476 156,481 
1969 2,519 267,026 
1970 3,224 342,088 
1971 5,123 543,600 
1972 7,856 833,600 
1973• 10,158 1,478,553 
1974• 11,335 1,692,475 
Source: Republic or Kenya, Economic Survey, 1914 and 1915. •Jn 1973 a separate valuation was introduced for cut flowers. The 1973 and 1974 value 
figures arc. therefore not comparable with previous years. 
Figure 15. Kenya's Pyrethrum 
Production, 1969-74. 
Source: Republic or Kenya, Econo,,.ic Survey, 1914 and 1915. 
Figure 16. Kenya: Exports of Fresh 
Horticultural Produce, 1968-74. 
r:w;nm 
.:.d± ... 1 
~ 
ttI12J 
Figure 17. Ecological Zones of Kenya. 
Import Price Index, 1970-74 (1964-100) 
---------
Overseas Imports 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 ------ ---. ---
Food 84 92 104 136 191 
Beverages and tobacco 137 143 160 176 l76 
Basic materials, inedible 117 127 131 138 186 
Mineral fuels lOS 106 120 133. 433 
Animal and vegetable oils and fats 133 131 124 168 fAl Chemicals 92 9S 102 134 2, 
Textiles 138 173 174 203 274 
Metals 113 117 126 159 243 
Semi-manufactures 119 117 129 150 233 
Machinery and transport equipment 101 114 138 151 171 
Consumer goods 115 129 140 155 229 ---
Total Overseas Imports 107 117 130 150 247 ------ ------
East African Imports 
Food and live animals 109 127 164 188 199 
Beverages and toba~o 127 121 99 124 164 
Crude materials, inedible 113 115 137 153 193 
Electric energy and residual fuel oils SS 87 82 77 84 
Animal and vegetable oils and fats 134 163 19S 174 272 
Chemicals 118 116 116 133 163 
Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles and 
related products 92 89 109 121 181 
Metals and metal manufactures 124 128 132 140 181 
Rubber, paper and paper products 107 110 109 126 161 
Consumer goods 91 67 74 90 119 
---------------
Total East African Imports 111 113 133 144 187 
---------------
All Imports 107 117 131 150 241 ---- -------
Source: Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey, 1975, p. 72. 
Figure 18. Kenya: Import Price Index, 1970-74. 
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Export Price ladox. 1'70-74 0964-100) 
OW.-S&porb 
A,rieJdt""" Exporu 
Food and live animals 
Ouldo materfala. exdudlns a1sa.1 
Sisa 
Total Asricu.lturaJ Exports 
Otlwr ExpotT11 
M!:"'1~u.&. l~bricantl and related 
C>cmlc:aJs 
Manufactured pods 
Total Ovcneu Expatta 
Eut African Exports 
Food and liw animala 
BeYeraaea and tobla:c) 
Crude materials. Inedible 
Mm..! ruc1a and lubricanta 
~abd vcptablc olla and fall 
Textile yarn. fabricll, made-up ardc:Jes 
and ralated procfucta 
Mctala and mCtaJ manulldurel 
Rubbw, paper and IMP"' produdll 
MadUoay and transport equipment 
Consumer sood' 
Total Eut African Exports 
All Exports Exdudina Gold 
1970 1971 
Ill 103 
100 103 
40 41 
104 96 
107 IOI 
123 136 
16 99 
103 99 
12' 121 
16 153 
128 147 
91' 106 
111 16:J 
102 ,. 
94 101 
JU 130 
Ill J]J 
182 211 
139 153 
Ill 126 
107 109 
Som'cl: Republic or Kenya, EcollOlflk SM,-,q, 191S, p. 73. 
um 
109 
114 
52 
10, 
106 
14, 
110 
107 
12' 
164 
122 
Ill 
uz 
122 
17.S 
1$2 
148 
220 
17& 
141 
119 
1973 1974 
124 us 
149 156 
101 l2J 
12' 1'1 
117 360 
156 197 
121 172 
127 168 
137 116 
173 146 
149 196 
12' 26$ 
19' J11 
13.S 151 
158 26' 
159 1SIO 
161 139 
211 111 
2.Sl l2J 
160 204 
131 110 
Figure 19. Kenya: Export Price Index, 1970-74. 
Net Food Imports 1964-73 (K£'000) 
Article 1964 196S 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Food and Live Animals 
Milk, evaporated or condensed 2S 1 
Milk. dry 208 206 418 3SS 158 171 330 
Fish and fish preparations 149 171 393 364 392 so 127 
Wheat, unmilled - 1S5 6SS 155 - - -
Maize, unmined 12 2,30S 3,692 6 3 s 387 
Rice 50 lSS ISO -ts 343 -31 101 
Malt 186 163 145 156 213 116 204 
Fruit and vegetables S27 681 652 672 S51 503 638 
Sugar rcfiacd, beet and cane 1,744 2,163 2.848 SH 62A 32A 93S 
Sugar confectionery ISO 174 173 151 205 141 174 
Chocolate and cocoa products 143 118 165 144 106 168 131 
Tea 1,667 1,786 1,192 806 853 569 881 
All other foods 1,006 1,S39 1,S21 1,248 1,420 1,184 1,644 
Total 5,867 9,617 12,004 4,SS3 4,868 3,23-0 S,SS2 
Source: Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract, 1974, p. 73. 
Figure 20. Kenya: Net Food imports 1964-73. 
Deliveries of Sheep, Lambs and Goats • 
to the KMC 1966-74 ('000 head) 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
Sheep Lambs Goats 
41.8 
39.2 
31.3 
49.0 
S0.4 
37.8 
33.2 
12.4 
6.6 
7.8 
7.6 
9 . .5 
11.6 
14.4 
15.3 
21.5 
5.4 
4.8 
13.3 
19.9 
12.3 
38.4 
47.3 
46.8 
46.S 
17.7 
6.S 
Source: Republic of Kenya. Economic Sunty, 1974 and 197S. 
1971 
425 
67 
297' 
898 
m 
20') 
609 
3,768 
235 
211 
1,446 
2,132 
11,010 
Figure 21. Kenya: Delivery of Sheep, Lambs and Goats, 1966-74. 
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1972 1973 
363 49 
-S2 91 
1,S84 3,597 
10 10 
36 -
3S6 81 
776 432 
7,053 6,732 
77 29 
134 102 
974 (IJ1 
1,S20 2,427 
12,836 14,1S7 
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C==:J priwale CONSUMER 
f 1 11 statutory and ogenu 
C cooperative 
EX~T MARKET! I I I \ !EXPORT MARKET 
MARKETINGI CHAINS IN KENYA 
Figure 22. Kenya's Marketing Network. 
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Figure 23. Organization of the Kenya Government, 1983. 
~ 
~~· '.Q 
""-"'ft.~ 
"""~ "'"~-1-
A and Bare points with higher elevation 
C is a point with lowest elevation in the 
area (The rain water retention reservoir 
must be dug at this point.) 
normal soil 
Figure 24. Rain water retention reservoir. 
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B 
rain water 
textl 
Level IV 
Neighboring villages and 
other oroducers 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
Big cities Big cities 
' ' 
' ' ' ' 
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-------------------~---------- ----------,---
( .--~~~~~~----'~~~~~~---. 
Provincial 
(medium or small urban 
centers) 
Provincial I : 
Level III 
Neighboring villages and 
other oroducers 
(2): (medium or small urban 
centers) 
I 
I 
) 
----/>-----
Level II 
Level I 
Legend: 
~ 
Subdivision/ 
Rural district town 
Village 
(rural areas) 
(A) 
Producing Areas 
Flow of produce (staples and meat products) 
in producing areas. 
~ 
Subdivision/ 
Rural district town 
Village 
(rural areas) 
(B) 
Non-producing Areas 
Notes: 
Flow of produce (staples and meat products) 
from producing areas to non-producing areas. 
(1) and (2): Sale of produce only to 
licensed distribution and retail companies 
~ate: Manufactured foodstuffs can originate 
from any level depending on the location 
of production sites or distribution centers. 
(3) Sale of produce to licensed 
distribution companies, local retailers, 
and popular market. 
Figure 25. A layered distribution model for foodstuffs. 
Production: 
Distribution: 
Marketing: 
Consumption: 
Small producers 
(peasants) 
Distribution 
companies 
Shops 
Retail companies 
Grocery 
stores 
Consumers 
(urban or rural) 
Big producers 
Food processing 
industries 
Super-
markets 
Figure 26. A layered model system for production, distribution, and 
marketing for foodstuffs. 
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